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 How did a country birthed in individual liberty and voluntary associations create just the 
opposite in its inflexible, layered, government-controlled public education system? Here, using 
public choice theory, I explain how near-sighted and unrelated reforms, often based in private 
motives, gave us what I call the public education centropoly – a hybrid government organization 
consisting of a set of monopolies layered beneath two additional government levels that 
especially fails disadvantaged students.  
After defending the use of public choice theory (Chapter 1) and summarizing the U.S. 
public education system formation (Chapter 2), in Chapter 3 I examine the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) and subsequent reauthorizations, showing how 
external reforms intended to correct the system’s educational failure of its disadvantaged 
students did little more than to expand and cement the centropoly. Chapter 3 contains a panel 
data, fixed effects empirical analysis of the associations between ESEA (and its various 
amendments) and staffing increases at the state and local (school district) levels between 1965 
and 2004. I find that, of 13 amendment sets analyzed, 8 are associated with large and highly 
statistically significant staffing increases relative to staffing levels in 1965 when ESEA was 
originally adopted. I conclude the chapter with a brief summary of ESEA Title I effectiveness 
literature and analysis, illustrating that any improvements gained might be outweighed by the 
problems the ESEA reforms generated – including the staffing increases, which have helped to 
increase the educational bureaucracy. 
 Although previous research examines reasons why charter school presence differs across 
states, very little research analyzes the relationship of this difference to the power of the 
traditional public schools (TPSs) directly rather than indirectly as through union or partisan 
  
strength. In Chapter 5, I hypothesize that the American TPS system itself is a predictor of 
opposition to charter schools. Relying largely on public choice theory, I first explain the 
incentives, power, and rigidity behind the TPS institutional network. I then apply this 
explanation to my hypothesis by employing a TPS power proxy –TPS staff size relative to adult 
(voting) population – as my variable of interest. Upon this foundation, I control for most 
characteristics shown in prior research to be associated with proportional charter school 
enrollment thereby deepening the understanding of how the TPS system works to prevent 
alternative learning opportunities for students who cannot afford to leave the TPS system. While 
noting certain caveats, I find a strong inverse association, providing evidence that the TPS 
institutional network defends itself against competition in Right-to-Work states. 
In some states, charters must meet inflexible, standardized performance standards to 
survive. Again through the lens of public choice theory, in Chapter 6 we hypothesize that 
charters that were established by African Americans and those which serve more African 
American students are more likely to close, and that state-imposed standardized closure rules 
exacerbate these inequities. Analysis confirms our hypotheses: The percentage of African 
American students and having an African American founder were associated with charter school 
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 America’s pragmatically idealistic inception contrasts sharply with the formation of the 
U.S. public school system. While the two began in tandem, public education deviated and 
devolved into a set of monopolies, centralized first by states and later by the federal government 
into a massive bureaucratic structure which reflects progressive ideology of how government and 
the private sector should work. I call this monopolistic, layered bureaucratic creation the 
educational centropoly. The American public school system is frequently referred to as the 
traditional public school (or TPS) system, but I coined the term centropoly because it more aptly 
represents the entirely new government type that has combined three governmental levels, 
including monopolies, into one multi-level structure.1 The base of the educational centropoly is a 
set of government monopolies, which hold captive their constituents by virtue of where they live, 
affecting especially those who have no means to change residences. Though not the sole 
transgressor, this foundation becomes important to my thesis, in which I focus on disadvantaged 
students. The next two levels of the centropoly are, in order of their addition to the multi-layered 
structure, the state and the federal government; both levels caused a greater degree of 
bureaucratization as well as resulting in a centralized structure. Importantly, parts of the 
centropoly then leverage all or part of the new structure to defend against any encroachment into 
the system. Each of these government levels relies on the others as needed to maintain its power. 
Here I argue that, once created, the educational centropoly has been simultaneously a growing 
 
1 Arguably, America’s health care system involves another multi-layer government structure that has resulted in 
bureaucracy and centralization as well as the ability of one layer to defend itself with the help of the others. 
However, users are not limited to use of specific facilities based on their residence (other than statewide), as is true 





government establishment, a stagnant education provider, and a stalwart defender of turf. I 
provide evidence for all three arguments. 
The following illustration represents the structure of my dissertation. In Chapter 1, I 
discuss the theory behind public organizations as reflected in the public school system. Here I 
present public choice theory as the foundation of my dissertation. I then juxtapose that theory 
against views of other thought leaders on bureaucracy, providing evidence that public choice 
theory appears to be not only correct, but also the most complete conceptualization of the 
American public education system.  
I divide the remainder of the dissertation into two parts and five chapters, three of which 
are empirical in content. I examine aspects of the centropoly in Part One and of charter schools, 







































Figure 1. Structure of Bradley-Dorsey Dissertation  
 
I present a two-part examination of the educational centropoly in Part One (Chapters 2 
and 3). In Chapter 2, I add to the literature by tracing, in a single document, the larger early 
education reform movements that shifted American public schooling from its individual 
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community beginnings to the layered structure it has become. In Chapter 3, I specifically 
examine twentieth-century reforms adopted under the most significant federal education act, the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), which was intended to correct one of 
the system’s most significant shortcomings by improving the educational outcomes of students 
disadvantaged due to low income. I provide evidence that these attempts to improve the 
education of low-income students have failed largely because of two phenomena: first, the 
system itself resists reform; and second, the ESEA reforms themselves have advanced and 
strengthened the public educational centropoly making it even better able to resist reforms. Here 
I empirically test the association between ESEA and its several amendments, including the seven 
reauthorizations, and the centropoly’s power as evidenced in the relative state- and local-level 
staff counts. I use a panel data, fixed effects longitudinal regression model to test my hypothesis 
that ESEA and its amendments are associated with a sustained growth in relative state and local 
full time-equivalent (FTE) public school staff. I find that there are positive, statistically 
significant associations between FTE increases and eight of thirteen ESEA law changes, relative 
to the original (1965) Act. None of the five remaining law changes analyzed was associated with 
a statistically significant FTE change, and only two of those five (nonsignificant) associations 
were negative. I also find a negative, statistically significant association between poverty and 
FTE in the first analysis even given my independent variables of interest: ESEA amendment sets, 
the majority of the funding of which was based upon census counts of children in poverty. This 
finding needs further examination, as it might be concerning.  
In Part Two I turn to charter schools, one significant attempt to exit the educational 
centropoly. Chapter 4 provides a brief but comprehensive overview of charter school history, 




choice movement. Here I also provide limited discussion of several theories of legislative 
decision-making. Chapter 5 addresses a direct, inverse relationship between the strength of the 
centropoly and strength of the charter school movement in states – providing additional, but 
differently focused, evidence of the traditional public school system’s power to resist reform. I 
again use a panel data, fixed effects longitudinal regression model to test my hypothesis that a 
state’s charter school enrollment is inversely associated with the state’s relative public school 
staff count. I find that this association is strong and statistically significant in states with Right to 
Work laws, where the states (not the unions) control whether an employee must be a union 
member to get or keep a job. The implication of this finding is that, in states without a strong 
formal union influence, the centropoly protects itself from reform involving students’ exit to 
charter schools. 
At this juncture it is important to discuss the concept of reform as it intersects with 
American public education. One must consider not only the focus, but also the source of any 
reform effort. This consideration intersects with public choice theory, which describes how, as 
government bureaucracies grow, policymakers respond by imposing reforms. Faced with these 
externally-sourced reforms the bureaucracy defends itself by “circling the wagons” – i.e., 
creating and using defensive measures to protect their organization, which frequently also result 
in greater bureaucratic strength and inflexibility (Downs, 1967). 
Both Chapters 3 and 5 address externally-sourced reforms. A higher government level 
conceived of and imposed ESEA onto a school system heretofore almost completely consisting 
of only the state and school districts. ESEA’s focus was to improve education for one student 
group in the extant district school system: students disadvantaged by poverty. The charter 




reformers desiring to reset public education in the form of independent schools devoid of the 
centropoly’s monopolistic and bureaucratic pitfalls; its focus, then, was to create a new type of 
public school outside the centropoly. As I detail in Chapters 3 and 5, the centropoly has resisted 
both of these externally-sourced efforts regardless of their focus.  
In Chapter 6, I consider a more direct intersection of the centropoly’s political influence 
on charter schools. Charter schools presented an opportunity for internally-sourced reforms, in 
that charter schools are created to be independent and therefore more accountable for their own 
success or failure. However, as shown in this chapter, externally-sourced reform measures 
frequently make their way into charter school laws; as such, they represent a reform the primary 
purpose of which is to protect the centropoly instead of improving the independent charter 
school. This, too, reflects public choice theory: the centropoly circles its wagons – this time 
widely, to prevent an external interloper’s success. Here I argue that charter school 
accountability has been adulterated by the same turf-protective politics that have weakened many 
states’ charter school laws, as I explain in Chapter 5. I argue further that these politics also have 
succeeded in restricting charter schools in ways that have, once again, negatively affected 





PART ONE:The Educational Centropoly 
Chapter 1 – Theoretical Examination: The Irony and Power of the Centropoly 
Introduction 
Examining theory behind the centropoly’s behavior involves looking at political, 
economic, sociological, and psychological factors, all as they play out in bureaucracies. Under 
mainline economics theory,2 the first three of these – politics, economics, and sociology – would 
fall under the category of political economy. I base my analysis in public choice theory, which 
operates within the overarching mainline economics theory and therefore is part of the realm of a 
particular branch of political economy. Public choice theory contemplates choices inside formal 
(e.g., public) institutions. The theory can be explained using three relatively simple concepts: 
individual incentives are similar inside and outside institutions, knowledge decreases as 
organizations grow, and organizational individuals seek increased resources as the natural 
outcome (Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, & Storr, 2016; Buchanan & Tullock, 1962, 1999; Tullock, 
1965, 2005; Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971, 2007). Mises (1949, 1998, 13) aptly summarized the 
force that underscores all economic theory, including public choice, when he wrote, “Action is a 
 
2 Mainline economics theory distinguishes itself from mainstream economics, the latter of which changes over time 
and frequently has emphasized the role of government over the marketplace. As Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, and Storr 
(2016, 4) state, mainline economics is based upon several positive premises about social order. These propositions 
include three on “the nature of human action and the role of institutions….” First, human benevolence has its limits, 
in part resulting in knowledge limits in navigating the social world. In other words, “human beings can be 
imperfectly benevolent…. [and we] are more likely to succeed … by relying on their self-love than by relying on 
their kindness” (Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, and Storr, 2016, 5). Second, because of these limits, both formal and 
informal institutions influence activity. Third, and key to mainline economics, “social cooperation is possible 
without central direction.” The editors conclude, “Stated another way, by relying on the emergent and human-
devised rules of conduct, agents possessing both the capacities and the failings of the typical human being can 
nonetheless work together to achieve their individual and collective goals (Boettke, Haeffele-Balch, and Storr, 2016,  





real thing. What counts is a man’s total behavior, and not his talk about planned but not realized 
acts.” 
Public choice theory is based upon the concept of rational self-interest. I begin my 
theoretical analysis by discussing several views of the concept of rationality. 
As the educational centropoly necessarily involves bureaucracy, I must examine it in the 
context of bureaucratic theory. It is intimidating to embark upon bureaucratic theory in any 
research work, as volumes have been written on the subject. Indeed, summarizing even one of 
bureaucracy’s primary scholars is a daunting task. Here I do not pretend to provide an extensive 
theoretical analysis of bureaucracy. I intend instead to provide theoretical evidence to support my 
theory of choice, public choice theory (no redundancy intended), and contrast it briefly against 
the work of two scholars whose views appear to differ. 
In summarizing and discussing public choice theory as it relates to bureaucracy, I cite the 
works of several authors including those I have discussed previously. Here I explain the primary 
concepts of public choice – regarding knowledge, public versus private intentions, and the 
behavior of bureaucrats in the final analysis: budget and power maximization. Later, in Chapters 
2 and 4, I show how public choice fits theoretically – first with the concept and behavior of the 
centropoly and then as an external force against charter schools. 
I contrast public choice theory against works of Max Weber and James Q. Wilson. Again, 
my analysis will not delve deeply into either scholar’s work, nor will it carefully dissect all 
relevant features of their scholarly works on the subject. Here I examine pertinent aspects of each 
scholar’s works, including secondary analyses of their works, to compare selected aspects with 





Prelude: On Being Rational 
People who argue that men are not rational are, in a sense, contradicting 
themselves. If men are not rational, there is no point, or possibility, of argument 
or discussion (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 30) 
 
Thus begins public choice theorist Gordon Tullock’s discussion of humans’ rational 
behavior in bureaucracies. Tullock proceeds with detail regarding how human rationality 
manifests itself, ultimately concluding that those who work in bureaucracies are “among the 
most rational of men” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 30). Even if humans are not consistently rational – 
i.e., if some humans are and some are not, or if some humans are more rational than others – then 
“[t]he people who rise in any merit-type hierarchy will be, at least, among the most rational of 
men” (Tullock, 1965, 1992). However, Tullock argues that people regardless of their culture are 
rational because “they aim at different objectives and base their operations on different 
‘information’ about the real world” (Tullock, 1965, 1992).  
Tullock asserts that many conclude humans are basically irrational in their behavior 
because they “[use] the term [i.e., rationality] in a wider sense than … intended here” (Tullock, 
1965, 1992). Tullock divides the motives behind all human actions into “two categories: 
instrumental and ultimate” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 30-31). Eating a particular food because one 
likes the taste is based on an ultimate focus, while a person who does a particular job does so, at 
least in part, for the instrumental, or ulterior, motive of earning money. He then concludes, 
“Actions motivated by instrumental considerations are, almost by definition, rational” (Tullock, 
1965, 1992, 31).  
Frequently, Tullock argues, human motivations are complicated because “[a]lmost all 
human beings have extremely complex aspirations, and any action is thought of as a method of 




often oversimplified, and this oversimplification leads to the conclusion that a person’s actions 
“may seem inappropriate to his stated ends” (Tullock, 1965, 1992). 
Tullock then addresses the concept of human error as it relates to rationality. Human 
error is ubiquitous, so a bureaucracy’s merit system generally will “select for intelligence” by 
allowing those who make the fewest mistakes to rise in the organizational structure. However, 
error still occurs, and public choice theory takes this into account. While, generally, economists 
have ignored error because in economic situations, errors cancel each other out, Tullock 
maintains that “in the typical organizational hierarchy, errors tend to compound each other” 
(Tullock, 1965, 1992, 32).  
In summary, Tullock views rationality as (1) a ubiquitous human characteristic, which is 
based on (2) actions divided into two categories of choices – ultimate (based on subjective 
assessment) and instrumental (based on means-end assessment); and is (3) subjected to a 
compounding of error in hierarchical organizations. Combined with the attribute self-interest, 
this combined characteristic – rational self-interest – is the basis on which public choice theory is 
founded.  
But theorists from different fields of study define rationality in different ways. Agreeing 
upon a definition is essential to understanding any theory behind actions in a bureaucracy, 
certainly including public choice theory. Here I examine meanings of rationality as used in 
economics, sociology and politics, and psychology. I then attempt to show that rationality as 
applied in public choice theory does not conflict with definitions from other fields of study – if 
certain ground rules are accepted. 
In all cases here, I ultimately compare among theories based on reasons for individuals’ 




from disagreement between these theorists’ definitions of rationality. Second, I focus on 
individuals’ actions within public organizations such as the public school system. I point out 
theoretical arguments that are not focused specifically within public organizations. 
Economics  
Since economics is a social science, it concerns itself with how individuals organize to 
meet needs and further enhance their existence (Goodwin, et al., 2019, 145). The classical 
economic view of rationality dates at least to Adam Smith’s conception of the invisible hand, 
which he explained in his famous book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, first published in 1776. In Smith’s conception, individuals would act self-interestedly 
through markets, and their self-interested actions would promote the welfare of the group. 
Importantly, as detailed in Goodwin et al. (2019, 145), many have ignored Smith’s prior book, 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments (first published 1759), in which he made it clear that self-
interest is not the only human inclination influencing both individual actions and the general 
welfare. Rather, he explains, actions are motivated by “moral sentiments”, or the “universal 
desire” for self- and other-respect, in addition to “the fortunate accident by which … selfish acts 
can [often, though not always] ‘promote the public interest’” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 145). This 
addition to Smith’s theory – and conversely, its oversight by others – becomes important later in 
my analysis. 
The neoclassical view of economics, which appeared in the twentieth century, simplified 
the classical by limiting the number of economic actors to two – the firm and the household – 
and further assuming that each of these actors maximizes utility in the form of profits (for firms) 




theory could be deduced from this assumption, termed the rationality axiom (Goodwin et al., 
2019, 146). 
In recent decades behavioral economists have challenged the neoclassical view by 
rejecting behavior-related assumptions in favor of actually testing behavior. Two important 
findings have resulted from behavioral economics; ironically, psychologist Daniel Kahneman 
discovered both. Kahneman uncovered a phenomenon he termed the “availability heuristic”, i.e., 
that individuals generally give more weight than is deserved to information that is “easily 
available or vivid” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 148). Kahneman also showed the effect “framing” has 
on individuals’ decisions, i.e., “the way a decision is presented to people can significantly 
influence their choices” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 148).  
Economists have also analyzed time’s role in individuals’ decision-making: individuals 
place different weights on gains amassed immediately versus costs amassed later for given 
decisions. Behavioral economists have changed the view of emotions’ role in decision-making. 
Instead of emotions having a straightforward and negative influence on decision-making in all 
cases, “studies suggest that reasoning is most effective when used for making relatively simple 
economic decisions, but for more complex decisions we can become overwhelmed by too much 
information” (Goodwin et al., 2019, 150). 
To summarize economics’ various general contributions to the definition of rationality, 
one might conclude it is not as simple as many others have opined. Even as far back as Smith 
(1759, 1776), economists have acknowledged behavioral nuances. This background combines 
with Tullock’s specificity regarding rationality in organizations to form a more detailed theory 
on which to base public choice than many acknowledge. Turning now to sociology and political 




of two processes is at work: either the theory is based primarily on human thought as opposed to 
action, or the theory assumes a literal translation of public choice arguments as with those who 
addressed only one aspect of Adam Smith’s nuanced theory regarding human action. 
Sociology and Politics 
Max Weber is likely the most well-known sociologist historically, although he also 
analyzed human thought and behavior based on politics. According to Kalberg (1980), Weber’s 
primary contribution was his development of rationality theory. Indeed, Kalberg (1980) analyzes 
Weber’s “major comparative-historical-sociological works….” (published after 1904) consisting, 
in part, of his analyses of the religions of China and India as well as ancient Judaism, and 
Weber’s well-known The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Kalberg, 1980, 1147). 
As Kalberg (1980, 1148) notes, Weber developed a typology of social action consisting of four 
action types – “affectual, traditional, value-rational, and means-end rational” which, Weber 
claimed, applied to all humans. Among these, Weber argued that “even everyday actions of 
‘primitive’ man could be subjectively means-end rational” because they constituted “pure 
exchange” relationships. Weber moved beyond analysis of human action when he developed 
four different types of rationality, as Kalberg illustrates in Table 1 (from Kalberg, 1980, 1161; 








Weber’s “Conscious Mastery of Fragmented Realities through Regularities of Action” as 











Theoretical “…[A] conscious mastery of 
reality through the 
construction of increasingly 
precise abstract concepts 





Indirect Values or purely 
theoretical 
problems 
Practical “…[E]very way of life that 
views and judges worldly 
activity in relation to the 
individual’s purely pragmatic 





Formal “… [R]elates to spheres of life 
and a structure of domination 
that acquired specific and 
delineated boundaries only 
with industrialization; most 
significantly, the economic, 
legal, and scientific spheres, 
and the bureaucratic form of 




Direct Rules, laws, 
regulations 
Substantive “[D]irectly orders action into 
patterns…. in relation to a 
past, present, or potential 
‘value postulate’ (Id., 1155) 
Subordination 




As shown in the above table, Weber conceived of rationality in multiple ways, but he 
conceived of bureaucracies as belonging in a single (the formal) rationality type. Weber 
theorized that formal rationality maintains a direct relationship to action and involves means-end 
calculations. Hence, it appears, Weber theorized that rational action differs based on who is 
doing the acting – and bureaucrats, it seems, act based on a definition of rationality that is like 




Zafirovski (2005) similarly concludes that, as classical sociological theory “clearly 
differentiates between economic and non-economic forms of rationality…., [the distinction is 
related to] Weber’s differentiation between instrumental rationality … and value rationality… 
[which in turn] corresponds to Weber’s alternative typology of rationality into formal and 
substantive” (Zafirovski, 2005, 105). Importantly, the author then concludes that, in classical 
sociological theory, “phenomena ‘treated as constants in economic analysis are very often 
compatible with significant structural variations-from a sociological point of view’ [Weber, 
1968, 341]” (Zafirovski, 2005, 106) (Emphasis added). 
Simon (1995, 48) plainly disagrees with public choice theory. He notes,  
The economist’s definition of rationality … imposes a crushing weight of 
knowledge acquisition, computation, and global consistency on the decision-
maker at the same time that it allows him or her nearly complete freedom in the 
selection of the goals of action. The former property of the theory might appear to 
provide it with strong predictive power: given the actor’s goals as defined by a 
utility function, and the (known) alternative actions, and the known (at least up to 
a probability distribution) connections between action and utility, only one action, 
in general, can be rational. The actor’s freedom to define the utility function 
destroys almost all of the predictive power so arduously obtained, because what 
action is rational will depend critically on what goals are assumed to have utility, 
and this is not specified by the theory. (Simon, 1995, 48-9) 
 
Is it possible that Simon (1995) assumes a literal translation of public choice theoretical 
explanations of action? I argue that Simon (1995) derives his conclusions from a high-level (i.e., 
non-detailed) vantage point. As such, it appears Simon ignores, first, the various contributions of 
economic theory in general (such as behavioral heuristics) and, second, the nuances 
contemplated in public choice theory (Tullock, 1965, 1992) regarding, e.g., the distinctions 
between the two action categories. As with the often-ignored first book by Adam Smith (1759), 
many who criticize public choice theory assume too little nuance and too much rigidity. I turn to 




additional valuable explanation of rational human behavior by examining the details surrounding 
it. 
Psychology 
As Sunstein (2020) and Clore (2011) summarize, the field of psychology has contributed 
in multiple ways to studies on rationality. Sunstein (2020) summarizes the contributions of much 
of behavioral science as “departures from standard accounts of rationality” (Sunstein, 2020, 38). 
Both Sunstein (2020) and Clore (2011) amplify this characterization through the use of research 
examples. For example, an individual differences study by Block & Funder (1986) found that 
judgment heuristics allow people to fare better in everyday life. “Engaging in heuristic thinking, 
although it occasionally leads to error, tends to be adaptive, rather than undesirable…. Indeed, if 
we routinely thought in a systematic, conscious, controlled fashion, humans would never have 
survived as long as we have. Thinking and acting appear to be guided, much more than is 
generally realized, by the requirements of resource management [Proffitt, 2006]” (Clore, 2011, 
3). In other words, individuals who do not take the time to consider every choice in detail are 
generally more successful in terms of life satisfaction. While this is not intended to be considered 
normatively, the research indicates that many employ heuristics in their decision-making 
processes, thereby “getting on with life,” and herein might lie the connection to public choice. 
Psychological studies also have found that emotion sometimes precedes, and sometimes 
follows, behavior. Clore (2011) details anticipation of various emotional states and the effect of 
this anticipation on action. Anticipation of negative emotion frequently leads one to modify 
one’s behavior. Most individuals would anticipate negative emotion in the cases of supervisors 
reprimanding, isolating, or otherwise casting them aside; many of these employees would 




individual in an organization could make the expedient decision to avoid unpleasantness by 
making choices to further his/her own advancement. “Good decision-makers are people who are 
both emotionally and intellectually intelligent in that they are attuned to the affective reactions 
that foreshadow productive and unproductive lines of thought and action” (Clore, 2011, 5). 
Psychological research also produced the finding that, while cognition regulates emotion, 
emotion also regulates cognition. In a study of how emotions are related to cognition at a global 
versus a detailed level, Gasper & Clore (2002) conclude that “… feelings in any given moment 
direct our mental processes, so that in happy states, people more readily adopt a global focus, 
whereas in negative states (e.g., sadness) they more readily focus on details….” (Clore, 2011, 8). 
For example, while management quality is not the subject of this paper, it is highly possible that 
management (leadership) in bureaucracies suffers in quality. Relatedly, Worthy (1950, 173) 
studies employee morale in organizations of various structures and finds: 
… [T]he smaller the unit the higher the morale, and vice versa. It is clear that the 
closer contact between executives and rank and file prevailing in smaller 
organizations tends to result in friendlier, easier relationships…. 
 In broader terms, the smaller organization represents a simpler social system than 
does the larger unit. There are fewer people, fewer levels in the organizational 
hierarchy, and a less minute division of labor…. 
 
Therefore, since “emotion often motivates thought….” (Clore, 2011, 8), and thought frequently 
leads to action, responses based on emotion can also be seen as a basis for rational action. 
 In summary, I question whether there might be more similarities than differences 
between the various theories of rationality. Whereas some view economic theory as truncating 
thought processes leading to actions, a more detailed examination shows such is not necessarily, 
or at least not always, the case. On the other hand, other social sciences generally delve more 




yet actions still result and likely are not so different from what public choice theorists describe in 
the public organizational setting. 
Public Choice: Identical Motivations Leading to Collation of Individual Preferences 
In contrast with the presumption that people participating in the political arena 
benevolently “rise above their own parochial concerns” to “promote the common good”, the 
public choice model “simply transfers the rational actor model of economic theory to … politics” 
(Shughart, n.d.). Public choice differs from most analyses of bureaucracies in two important 
ways. First, in public choice theory the individual, and not a group (such as the office or 
institution) is the analytical focus. Says Shughart, “Groups do not make choices; only individuals 
do. The problem then becomes how to model the ways in which the diverse and often conflicting 
preferences of self-interested individuals get expressed and collated when decisions are made 
collectively” (Shughart, n.d.) (Emphasis added). Second, differences between individuals and 
organizations occur, not because of motivational differences, “but because of stark differences in 
the incentives and constraints that channel the pursuit of self-interest in the two settings” 
(Shughart, n.d.) (Emphasis added).  
In other words, individuals enter the organizational “black box, and what emerges is the 
combined and perhaps layered effect of individual decisions which have been subjected to 
organizationally-created or -modified incentives and constraints. At each individual decision-
point step along the process in the institutional black box, the individual weighs his/her 
preferences considering what (s)he observes to be the preferences and limitations of the 
organization’s other participants, presumably considered in hierarchical order. While some 
individuals choose consciously to obey, and while some are doubtless more adept at navigating 




influences are doing so based upon a private calculation that deferring is their best option in the 
circumstances.3 
In summary, actors inside organizations have the same human motivations as any 
individual acting outside an organization. However, as an organization grows, any organizational 
individual becomes further insulated (removed) from the knowledge needed to accomplish the 
goal(s) sought. This and interactive issues, stemming from incentives operating inside the 
organization and often relating to power within the organization, result in actions directed toward 
benefitting organizational insiders and not the organizations’ constituents. 
Lavoie (1985) describes the “knowledge problem” by making the distinction between 
gathering data and gathering knowledge in the setting of a planning bureau. 
While a planning bureau can gather data, it cannot gather the knowledge 
needed for rational planning. Such knowledge is dispersed among market 
participants. It is embedded in their various skills and specialties, and it is 
generated by their competitive contention with one another. Yet without such 
knowledge the planning bureau would be unable to justify intervening in 
ignorance into the workings of the market process (Lavoie, 1985, 6). 
 
Importantly, then, data points are a poor substitute for the knowledge “on the ground” – 
i.e., all the various considerations that market participants know, learn, and convey in the market 
itself. Lavoie’s (1985) focus on economic planning could instead address any public 
organization, including the educational centropoly. In the briefest of statements, Lavoie (1985, 3) 
provides the key to understanding what I argue could be termed desire based on ignorance of 
those espousing planning as central to control of an economy or any part of it, including its 
educational component. The author comments, “All advocates of planning [as opposed to 
advocating reliance on the market economy] seem desperately to want comprehensiveness and 
 
3 Neal Peart, lyricist and percussionist of the Canadian progressive rock group Rush, in his Ayn Rand scholarly 




rely profoundly upon its rhetorical appeal.” The problem, he states, relies in the assumption 
behind the superiority of planning: “The critique of the market economy upon which planners 
base their argument presupposes that it is actually possible to scientifically control the causal 
development of a modern … economy” (Emphasis added). Public choice fits here by showing 
why such “science” cannot be actualized. Science relies on knowledge and knowledge is absent, 
to a large extent, from the very group espousing its employment. Additionally, the limited 
knowledge an organization possesses is manipulated, even if inadvertently, due to the playout 
(collation) of incentives functioning inside the organization. 
Public Choice and Bureaucracy  
Public choice theorist Anthony Downs (1967) identifies bureaus as a subset of 
organizations, which must exhibit all of four characteristics: (1) they are large – a term that 
could expand, at least in relation to the public school system, to include the effect of layering 
government levels;4 (2) most of a bureau’s members are full-time employees who depend on 
their employment in the organization for most of their income; (3) hiring, promotion and 
retention are at least partly based on achievement-related characteristics that can be judged by 
performance assessment, as opposed to ascribed characteristics (religion, race, class, 
connections) or election to office; and (4) their output is not subject to external market 
evaluation (Downs, 1967, 25) (Emphasis added). Downs (1967, 144-166) then describes how 
increasing bureaucracy defends and expands itself, and then rigidifies.  
 
4 Of course, not all U.S. school districts are large; indeed, many are small organizations. However, as will be 
explained later, the layered bureaucracy resulting from state and federal involvement changes the structure to some 
extent, effectively making even small districts operate as larger entities. State and federal involvement result in 





A central tenet of public choice theory is that knowledge suffers as distance increases 
between decision-makers and those who provide input. Tullock (1965, 1992, 148-152) describes 
this phenomenon in bureaucracies by employing an analogy to an American army experiment 
used as a teaching device, wherein trainees stood in a large circle outside hearing distance of 
each other. An officer would pass a message orally to one soldier, who then ran to the next 
soldier in the circle to deliver the same message orally, and so on until all soldiers had received 
the message. When the last soldier repeated the message, normally it no longer resembled the 
original. Tullock (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 148) ascribed this not to a defect inherent in using oral 
over written transmission, but instead to distortions arising “in the brains of each man”. He then 
elaborates regarding bureaucracies, explaining bureaucrats are not “mere postmen” but are 
interpreters as well (Tullock, 1965, 1992, 150). As bureaucracies have multiple hierarchical 
levels, so the possibility of multiple (mis)interpretations increases.  
William Niskanen (1971) furthered public choice theory by explaining that public 
bureaucracy employees maximize utility through rational decisions regarding survival and 
personal growth. Alternatively stated, officials, acting rationally, seek strategies to maximize 
their budgets. Regarding incentives, Downs (1967, 82) states, “Utility maximization … means 
the rational pursuit of one’s goals…. In order to predict what officials will do, we must know 
their goals.” Downs (1967, 82) juxtaposes social functions – the overt, publicly stated goals of an 
organization – against individual officials’ private motives. Private motives include increased 
power among organizational leaders, job retention and pay increases for employees, and others. 
Here we come full circle to the first concept, that of humans operating with the same motives 




According to Blais & Dion (1990, 657), “The Niskanen model predicts that the 
bureaucrat’s personal utility is a function of the budget and that bureaucrats attempt to maximize 
their budgets.” Specific considerations include salary, benefits and other perquisites, power and 
reputation, all which Niskanen theorizes constitute “a positive monotonic function of the total 
budget” (Blais & Dion, 1990, 656). Public bureaucracy officials, according to Niskanen, also 
maximize their budgets for survival purposes (Blais & Dion, 1990). 
Because humans populate institutions, organizational behavior is fundamentally human 
behavior. However, the layering of institutional control over humans produces layered responses 
with the deepest layers – and their motives – cloaked to some extent. Assuming, as with the 
public choice model, that “every official acts at least partly in his own self-interest” (Downs, 
1967, 83), one must take private motives into account when examining the actions of a bureau, 
and particularly a layered one. Downs (1967, 83) cites Calhoun (1953, 5): “‘Each [individual]… 
has greater regard for his own safety or happiness than for the safety or happiness of others, and, 
where these come in opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own.’” 
Hearkening again to the words of Mises (1949, 1998, 13), it is a person’s actions that ultimately 
count. 
How does public choice theory compare with the scholarly works of Max Weber and 
James Q. Wilson? Here, I use secondary sources to analyze Weber’s sociological and political 
works, and James Q. Wilson’s assessment of bureaucracy and related theory. 
Max Weber: Different Interpretations Leading to Confusion, and Perhaps Conclusion 
Max Weber proposes the concept of Bureaucracy in a context in which he 
considers the rationalization  of society as inevitable …, causing a growing 
impersonality in the social relationship…. Rationalisation boosted the project of 




conduct of human problems, fostering the ability to respond to unstable 
environments and to manage the inherent complexity….  
(Serpa & Ferreira, 2019, 12) (Internal references omitted) 
 
In the above statement, Serpa & Ferreira (2019) summarize several scholars’ analyses of 
the Weberian sociology of bureaucracies. Rowley, in his 2005 introduction to the work of 
Tullock (1965, 1992) regarding bureaucracies, agrees generally with this assessment. Public 
choice theory exists in sharp contrast, he says, to interpretations of Weber’s assessment that 
bureaucracies had become dominant because of their “efficiency in performing complex 
organizational tasks” and because a new middle class had emerged whose position depended on 
“... its possession of technical and organizational skills and … its authority position within the 
bureaucratic hierarchy” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xi). Further, according to Rowley, Weber 
characterized members of a bureaucracy as “selflessly [serving] the goals of their superiors,” 
even in the public sector (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xi.).  
However, this interpretation does not consider the distinction between Weber’s 
sociological work and his political writings. Whereas his sociological analyses focus on the 
structure of bureaucratic organizations and of the intended purpose(s) of bureaucracies, Weber’s 
political analyses ponder the political context and, hence, unintended consequences of the 
bureaucratic structure.  
Automatons vs. Autonomy  
Serpa and Ferreira (2019, 14) draw on several scholarly works to interpret Weber’s 
analysis of bureaucracies as consisting of “disinterested” individuals consenting to organizational 
objectives by agreeing, via employment, to be a cog in the bureaucratic wheel.  
For Weber, impersonality and formality, ensured by bureaucratic rationalisation, 
guarantee that organisational objectives are not confused with personal 
motivations or other interests (Godoi et al., 2017). Impersonality and formality 




formal way (Cruz, 1995). Furthermore, it would increase predictability in the 
functioning of any organisation (Ferreira, 2004; Filleau & Marques-Ripoull, 
2002) (Emphasis added).  
 
In other words, according to several analyses Weber points to the need for “rational action” to 
control uncertainty. Under this perspective Weber then characterizes individual bureaucrats as 
automaton-like beings disinterested to the point they would work in unquestioning obedience to 
this “rational” hierarchical authority, regardless of personal consequences.  
Others disagree, however. Cuff (1978) compares Weber’s sociological and political 
analyses of bureaucracy. Citing Beetham’s (1974) Max Weber and the Theory of Modern 
Politics, Cuff distinguishes between “Beetham’s Weber” (Cuff, 1978, 241) and the “Weberian 
model of bureaucratic administration” (Cuff, 1978, 240). Whereas, Cuff says, Weber’s 
sociological writings delineate a leadership and staffing structure allowing for improved 
efficiency in organizations, in his political writings he registers concern for the potential loss of 
political control by elected leaders, which, he maintains, is the proper sphere for such control. 
Says Cuff (1978, 241):  
Weber’s purpose … was to emphasize not what bureaucracy could do, but what it 
would not and should not do. As a political commentator Weber stressed the need 
to subordinate bureaucracy to strong political control. Strong leadership was 
required, he argued, to restrain the bureaucracy’s inexorable quest for 
autonomous power and to reduce its collusion with powerful economic interests 
(Emphasis added). 
 
Reprise: Public Choice Response to Weber 
To the extent Rowley (Tullock, 1965, 1992) refers to Weber’s sociological analyses, he 
maintains that Tullock’s public choice analysis constitutes a “direct rational choice attack” on 
Weber’s perspective (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xii). Rowley states that Tullock maintained a 
different view of rational action, and that Tullock based his “attack” partly on the analysis that 




completion’” (Tullock, 1965, 1992, xii). In 1957, C. Northcote Parkinson challenged Weber’s 
analysis by conducting two empirical studies – of the British Navy in 1914 and of the British 
Colonial Office in 1954 – each of which found that staffs grew even as the need for them shrank 
(Tullock, 1965, 1992, xii-xiii). Presumably, under the Weberian sociological interpretation, if 
bureaucrats were so “selfless,” they would voluntarily exit their posts when no longer needed. 
Yet, Parkinson found the opposite occurred in these two situations. I question, however, whether 
this analysis includes only that covered in Weber’s sociological works. As noted previously by 
Cuff (1978), Weber also recognized the dangers of bureaucracies, which he described as power-
amassing behaviors and which therefore, if only in a general sense, comport with public choice 
theory. 
James Q. Wilson: Theory by Exception? 
Wilson addressed bureaucracy more from a historical than a theoretical perspective. His 
1975 essay titled “The Rise of the Bureaucratic State,” in which he summarizes the history of 
U.S. government bureaucracy, provides context for the centropoly.5 Wilson (1975, 78) indicates 
the War Department had 80 civilian employees in 1801, while the Treasury Department was the 
only department to have substantial powers (e.g., collecting taxes, managing the public debt, and 
running the national bank). During the entire 19th century and the early 20th century, “[t]he 
number of administrative agencies and employees grew slowly but steadily … and then 
increased explosively on the occasion of World War I, the Depression, and World War II” 
(Wilson, 1975, 78). 
 
5 Interestingly, the executive branch of American government became the future locus of most federal bureaucracy 
when Vice President John Adams cast the tie-breaking vote to place federal executive department head removal in 
the hands of the President. State government executive branch bureaucracies generally followed suit; however, not 
all state public education bureaucracies extend from the executive branch. See, e.g., Kansas Constitution, Article 6, 
which establishes an independent State Board of Education “which shall have general supervision of public 




Given this history several questions come to mind. First, did bureaucracy appear through 
“explosive growth” only because of crises? Second, one might question whether an educational 
bureaucracy was necessary, whether what constituted a crisis changed in scope, or whether 
America simply grew accustomed to bigger governmental entities. Whichever way, perhaps it 
was only a matter of time before the U.S. government created an education department. 
Regarding U.S. bureaucracy Rozansky and Lerner (2012) note:  
Wilson argues that those who believed in the infallibility of institutions 
were almost entirely wrong and the public choice school was often right. But he is 
also critical of what he sees as the movement’s methodological dogmatism, and 
its resulting inability to account for the actual behavior of government agencies.  
 
To describe what Rozanski and Lerner (2012) call “methodological dogmatism,” the 
authors note that public choice theorists believe “that bureaucratic behavior is reducible to 
simple games of incentive; that a bureaucracy will always have an incentive to increase its 
funding, powers, and control; and that individual bureaucrats additionally are motivated by self-
interest, concerned chiefly with their careers, salary, and reputation.” To the contrary, the authors 
say, Wilson instead argues bureaucracies are different based on their structure and leadership, as 
opposed to their goals.  
In Bureaucracy (Wilson, 1989), a book the author describes as “primarily descriptive” 
(Wilson, 1989, 27), Wilson uses Carver High School in Atlanta, Georgia as an example of how 
structure and leadership can dramatically change an organization. Wilson describes Carver 
High’s status prior to Hogan’s appointment as principal in the terms used by Cooke (1985) 
regarding all-black middle or junior high schools: “[A] disorderly all-black … school in which 
the norm was to ‘leave the teachers alone and let the students fail’” (Referenced internally in 




things, operated in an “authoritative, even authoritarian style” and “stressed the importance of 
education, especially vocational education (Wilson, 1989, 21). 
 The problem with assuming Wilson’s example somehow undermines public choice 
theory is that it constitutes “theory by exception”. In other words, Wilson’s example of Carver 
High’s Principal Hogan is one in which a leader with courageous convictions defied the 
underlying system described by Cooke (1985) as arguably the exact result of the centropoly, 
which I summarize in detail in Chapters 2 and 3. In these chapters I show that the system as 
created instituted an “equal” (i.e., uniform) education in very unequal geopolitical circumstances, 
hence leaving disadvantaged students in a system that could not work for them. The Carver 
Highs of America might indeed change the circumstances for those students fortunate enough to 
attend such schools under such courageous leadership. But what happens when that leader 
leaves? Examples abound illustrating how the centropoly rushes to erase the reforms 
implemented by such leaders.6 
 Albeit limited in scope and wanting in additional research, at this juncture I conclude that 
my analysis of various other theories has not provided an alternative I would consider as superior 
to public choice theory. Once one has considered actions (not thoughts or beliefs) and excluded 
exceptions, it seems we return to the goals, knowledge, and budget bases of public organizations 
to derive the underlying life forces of the centropoly’s strength.  
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Chapter 2 – The Centropoly Rises: Formation of the American Public School System7 
 
Introduction 
America’s pragmatically idealistic beginning contrasts sharply with the formation of the 
U.S. public school system. While the two began in tandem, public education deviated and 
devolved into a set of monopolies, centralized first by states and later by the federal government 
into a massive bureaucratic structure. I call this monopolistic, layered bureaucratic creation the 
centropoly. 
The American founders provided fertile ground for Adam Smith’s invisible hand to 
flourish through a constitution designed to limit government and allow individual liberty. The 
founders’ design gave the free market – of both goods and ideas – an optimal setting. Alexis de 
Tocqueville praised the resulting American civic society stating Americans maintained a correct 
understanding of self-interest, which tempers individualism by recognizing the need for social 
involvement via small, “free” organizations. Americans, he opined, operate under the assumption 
that sacrificing oneself for one’s fellows is useful in maintaining one’s own interests through 
maintenance of the government form. Herein, said Tocqueville, lies the nexus of individual 
liberty and social responsibility (Tocqueville, 1840; 891, 920-923). While no human governance 
system is perfect, Tocqueville concluded that the combination of the invisible-but efficient 
informal information systems and the conscious development of communities populated by 
 
7 This chapter and Chapter 3 together, in large part, comprise the following forthcoming book chapter: Bradley-
Dorsey, M. (Under Contract). “Rise of a Centropoly: Good Intentions, Distorted Incentives, and the Cloaked Costs 
of Top-Down Reform in Public Education” (working title), in Candela, R.; Fike, R.; and Herzberg, R., Institutions 
and Incentives in Public Policy: An Analytical Assessment of Non-Market Decision-Making (working title). Under 





responsibly acting individuals served both individuals and communities well in their quest for 
betterment.8  
Schooling in America began in precisely this way: a nonsystem consisting of individual, 
community-organized schools. Historical twists, however, led public schooling to an alternate 
universe. Instead of remaining community-based, public schooling evolved into the educational 
centropoly – my term for the multi-level, monopolized, and centralized government bureaucracy 
that controls American public schools. Extending from early reformers’ actions, this change 
unfolded in pieces over time to eventually form the complex structure we have now. Through 
external reforms that have attempted to “repair” schools, social policy interventions have caused 
increasing centralization through larger and deeper formal institutions. This result has decreased 
knowledge (a process explained by Tullock, 1965, 1992, 148; and Lavoie, 1985) and 
strengthened bureaucratic inflexibility (Downs 1967, 144-166), and it has left numerous students 
vastly underserved.  
Importantly, neither bureaucratization, centralization, nor monopolization alone created 
the U.S. public school system. The three combined to generate the layered and hyper-inflexible 
centropoly we have today. Here I add to the historical literature by explaining the myriad 
changes reformers wove together to unify what once represented diverse community interests, 
monopolize schools that once operated independent of such protection, and centralize what was 
once decentralized. 
 
8 Indeed, later the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom, regarding successful efforts by communities to overcome 
community (“commons”) challenges absent centralized control, would reinforce Tocqueville’s impression. (See, 
e.g., Cole & McGinnis (Eds.), 2015; Boettke, Lemke, & Palagashvili, 2015.). Although public education could have 





“Exigencies of an Earlier Era”: Formation of the U.S. School System and the Dawn of the 
Centropoly  
Considerable support exists for state educational oversight. Early philosophers such as 
Plato and Locke defended education as fundamental to the well-being of a society. The issue in 
the U.S., however, is not that American states took control of their schools, but rather, how they 
did so. Importantly, American reforms led to centralized, bureaucratic, and monopolistic control. 
Contrary to what public education has become, informal organizations drove early 
American school efforts. Public schools began with both public and private roots as individual, 
voluntary efforts in small communities before the nation’s establishment.9 In some areas private 
schools were permitted to operate in community schoolhouses. In other areas, parents and others 
volunteered to form and operate schools. Legislators permitted and funded still other schools via 
a “rate bill”, for which only the users of the school would pay (Cubberley 1916, 4). In fact, 
education in America did not begin as a system at all, let alone a centralized one. Cubberley 
(1916, 3) notes that, since the U.S. Constitution does not mention “any form of education for the 
people” nor was education mentioned during the debates of the Constitutional Convention, 
“education became one of the many unmentioned powers ‘reserved to the States’” under the 
Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
A country as large and diverse as America, however, is bound to be affected by many 
forces. Among them for schools, concerns developed around diversity itself. Reformers uneasy 
about the country’s growth and diversification in many aspects, including religion, culture and 
 
9 The nation’s response to the 2020 pandemic has included a return to small-group schooling (often referred to as 






race, industry, and population density, began to exert more control over the relatively 
unconnected schools in individual communities.  
These reforms were not carefully planned; instead, they occurred in piecemeal fashion 
over time and through various social and cultural changes. As Hess (2010, 40) explains, 
frequently defenders of the current public school system “impute … [a] high-mindedness to what 
are in fact makeshift responses to the exigencies of an earlier era.” In this paper, I employ instead 
a perspective of historical mindfulness to what these exigency-based reforms have actually 
produced in the aggregate.  
The Early Influences: Religions, Wars, and the Beginning of a Centralized Structure  
Before the Revolutionary War, schools were community-centered and largely religion-
focused, a logical arrangement when religious congregations were the dominant forms of social 
organization. Early school organizational efforts were interwoven with religion.  
For example, in 1647 Massachusetts adopted what became known as the Old Deluder 
Satan Act. Known as the first compulsory education law in America,10 the Act clearly identified 
its purpose as maintaining true “knowledge of the Scriptures” instead of being “clowded by false 
glosses of Saint-seeming deceivers” (Old Deluder…, https://www.mass.gov). Despite its stated 
religious purpose, the Act only required towns of 100 or more to provide a Latin grammar 
 
10 Although the law was indeed compulsory, Hazlett (2011, Abstract) notes it and other similar compulsory 
education laws were not “strictly enforced until Horace Mann advocated schooling for all, with his Common School 






school.11 12 “Old Deluder” is arguably a precursor of laws that, while requiring towns to provide 
education for all children, could have allowed towns to direct education as each saw fit. 13 14  
Ultimately, however, the anti-Deluder model did not prevail. Cubberley (1922, 356) 15 
observes that the half century after the Revolutionary War could be seen as a transitional period 
from church to state control of education. Common School leaders concerned about post-War 
educational decline began to focus not only on providing similar content, but on providing that 
content via a similar structure, to all children including those who otherwise could not afford an 
education. 16  
Beginning around 1825, new cities arose and older cities began to grow, hence 
transforming the nation’s previously rural, agricultural, and pioneer character. Educational and 
 
11 Latin grammar schools, having originated in Europe, were essentially college preparatory schools. The first one in 
America was the Boston Latin School, established in 1635, also known as the first public school in what would 
become the U.S. (National Geographic at https://www.nationalgeographic.org/thisday/apr23/first-public-school-
america/) Hess (2010, 41) notes that “Historian Gerald Gutek has observed, ‘The colonists believed in a two-track 
system of schools – one for the poor and another for the wealthy.’” Latin schools, he says, were for upper class 
(male) children. 
12 Hazlett (2011, Abstract) notes that “[the] law's title was derived from its purpose, as teaching youth to read 
allowed access to the [Protestant] Christian Bible, with their presumably subsequent faith and doctrinal adherence 
producing virtuous citizens….” 
13 In fact, Vermont and Maine established the first school voucher programs in the U.S. Implemented in 1869 and 
1873, respectively, the states’ town tuitioning programs provide for towns without a public school to provide tuition 
to send their students to a public or private, non-religious school in another location. (EdChoice, last modified 
August 29, 2019, America’s School Choice Programs…) 
14 Additionally, early American schools were more likely to be religiously diverse (at least in terms of Christian 
denominations), given the fact immigrants to America frequently had escaped religious persecution (van 
Raemdonck & Maranto n.d., 4). 
15 Ellwood P. Cubberley was both an academic scholar and a (progressive) thought leader in the field of education. 
Here, I use his historical writings. Some have questioned Cubberley’s historiography because of his point of view 
regarding the formation of the U.S. school system. See, e.g., Cartwright, 1996. 
16 The Common School movement had roots in philanthropic group efforts. Philanthropic groups began founding 
schools through the Sunday School movement, providing both religious and minimal secular learning; the City 
School Societies, fashioned after the English charity schools to provide a rudimentary education to the poor; the 
Lancastrian (or monitorial school) movement, a system under which the more advanced students taught less 
advanced students; and the Infant-School Societies, establishing schools for children between the ages of four and 
eight (Cubberley, 1922, 357-363). According to Cubberley (1922, 363), “These four important educational 
movements … all arising in philanthropy, came as successive educational ideas to America during the first half of 
the nineteenth century, supplemented one another, and together accustomed a new generation to the idea of a 





social conditions changed first for people in the Central and Northern states (Cubberley, 1922). 
Southern states held their agrarian, slavery-based economic system until long after the Civil War 
ended (Cubberley, 1922, 363-364). With city growth also came large-scale manufacturing 
leading to the demise of small industries and of the apprenticeship system. Also, the 1810s had 
initiated the suffrage movement by extending voting rights to non-property-owning males. With 
the extension of voting rights, general knowledge and civic virtue grew in importance, lending 
support for educational purposes beyond religion (Cubberley, 1922, 366) 
The new focus on education’s importance brought changes in school structure and lesson 
content. National growth fueled in large part by immigrants, different from each other and from 
those who had settled earlier, helped spark Common Schoolers to work toward civic unification 
through education. Religious diversity accompanied immigration, resulting in religious tension 
that surfaced in the schools and school reform movements. With increased Catholic immigration 
anti-Catholic Protestants, including politicians and Common Schoolers, mobilized to suppress 
the spread of Catholicism in the schools (van Raemdonck & Maranto, n.d., 3; Hess, 2010, 87-
88). 
Common Schoolers focused on much more than just religious instruction. The 
movement’s efforts to unify the delivery of American education led by extension to a perceived 
need for a formal structure by which to do so. Importantly, a visit to Prussia in the 1840s 
influenced Common School movement leader Horace Mann to advocate that schools be 
organized by age-based grade levels. Prussia, notes Hess (2010, 81-82), had adopted such a 
system to help rebuild national pride when the country faced defeat at the hands of Napoleon in 




had implemented it in the first place, and recommended it be adopted in the U.S. This rigid, 
Prussian war-inspired organizational structure, remains dominant today. 
Centripetal Forces Appear: Uniformity and the Power of Progressive Ideas 
American public schools became a unified system through various means. Among the 
more important are formation of the district system, establishment of state constitutional clauses, 
and creation of a mass-production teacher preparation model.  
School districts  
Near the time states began forming state public school systems, the growing number of 
individual community schools began forming into districts. Some experts saw school districts as 
the “natural” organizational unit, since schools whose areas adjoined did not follow extant city or 
township boundaries and instead became smaller and irregularly shaped school districts. 
Cubberley (1916, 5) states, “As a unit of organization, the district was well suited to the needs of 
the time…. Districts could be formed anywhere, of any size and shape, and only those families 
or communities desiring schools need be included in the district organization.” Cubberley (and 
others) therefore embraced the district system, describing it as a creation of the state (Cubberley, 
1916, 14). 
District formation created American public school monopolies, which continue today. 
School district geographic boundaries provided demarcation lines, inside which resident students 
attended school. As districts grew, district officials further subdivided districts into school 
attendance or “catchment” areas (Cubberley, 1916, 6-8; NCES, 2015-16, The Boundary 
Collection), wherein a student attended the school located in the catchment area that includes the 
student’s residence. State constitutional provisions and resulting state laws then codified the 




State constitutional clauses  
Due perhaps in part to a renewed religious conflict, more states began to include 
education in their constitutions. Six of the fourteen state constitutions framed by 1800 did not 
mention education and several others did so only briefly (Cubberley, 1916, 3). As of 1834, 
almost half of the states had adopted education clauses. (Tractenberg, chapter draft, “An 
historical overview”). Between 1835 and 1912, the number of states with constitutional 
education provisions doubled, and most of these were explicit regarding the establishment and 
funding of free common school systems (Tractenberg, chapter draft, “An historical overview”).17 
Given the country’s constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, one could argue the 
goal of religious preference is a private function as opposed to the more general social functions 
of literacy and citizenship. Yet, religious tension helped to solidify state constitutional education 
provisions. A new wave of immigrants brought religion back into focus, thereby contributing to 
permanent structural changes to public education. With additional millions of Catholics 
immigrating to the U.S. in the mid-1840s (Byrne, 2000), Catholic political power increased, and 
Catholics began using their power to combat Protestant efforts to de-Catholicize their children 
via the common schools. (DeForrest, 2003, II.C.). Education became more diversified in various 
locales, but this result was short-lived (Maranto & van Raemdonck, 2015). Ultimately this 
religious battle spawned several unsuccessful attempts at U.S. constitutional amendments to 
 
17 The anti-Catholic state Blaine amendments – arguably indicative of private motives as opposed to social functions 
– would become highly instrumental in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in preventing attempts to move away 
from this centralized public education system to one involving parental choice. Equally important, however, the 
amendments represent evidence that centralized state educational systems became the consequence of reformers’ 
attempts to balance the desires for limited government, individual liberties, and natural markets against a social 
concern for national unity in the face of diversity. But national unity can easily evade a nation’s grasp if what 
constitutes a “unified” view is contentious. As Hayek explains, “The common welfare or the public good has … 
remained a concept most recalcitrant to any precise definition and therefore capable of being given almost any 





prohibit federal resources from being given to religious groups or schools. Maine Congressional 
Representative and presidential hopeful James Blaine proposed one such amendment in 1875 as 
a springboard to the office of President. Upon failure at the federal level, Blaine amendments 
began surfacing in states’ constitutions. At this writing, 37 states have Blaine amendments in 
their constitutional education clauses.18 (Parker 2016; Institute for Justice n.d.; DeForrest, 2003, 
II.C.). 
Overall, state constitutions served to solidify the 50 partially centralized and largely 
monopolized educational systems into their layered, state-centralized form, thus setting the stage 
for a future layer – the federal government – to complete the centropoly. State constitutions 
generally call for the state to not only fund, but govern the public schools in a manner that, 
structurally speaking, originates at the state level. This more-or-less universal constitutional 
system generally sets forth a state elected individual (chief state school officer, governor) or 
body (state board of education) to oversee the state system. (Railey, 2017) As pointed out by 
Friedman (1955; 1962, 1982), a state government instead could fund but not manage or control 
individual schools. This important observation is predicated upon the public choice notion that, 
as an organization thickens, two results materialize. First, knowledge dissipates as information 
distance lengthens between an organization’s leaders and those it serves (Tullock, 1965, 1992). 
Second, this increased distance further exacerbates the natural tendency for leaders’ private 
incentives to override concern for those being served (Downs, 1967). 
 
18 The state Blaine amendments only recently lost their power to separate religion and public education: in June 
2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states cannot exclude religious families and schools from school choice 





Teacher Preparation  
Reformers unified teacher preparation as well, lowering its quality as a result. The 
Common School movement spurred efforts to establish a formal teacher preparation system, and 
the state normal school became the Common Schoolers’ major teacher preparation effort. As 
Labaree (n.d., 293) notes, given limited resources to establish normal schools, “normal school 
leaders ended up choosing relevance [reaching more prospective teachers by ‘skimping on 
professional preparation’] over rigor [providing ‘a few model teachers’ with rigorous 
professional training]”. The development of teachers’ colleges in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to prepare new teachers hence brought considerable uniformity, while 
deemphasizing content knowledge of teachers and leaders (Maranto and Wai 2020, 6).  
The Progressives and Scientific Management  
Progressive reformers not only further solidified a central public education vision, but 
also created a centralized delivery system. Continued rapid socioeconomic change including 
increased immigration and urbanization in the mid- to late-1800s brought wholesale 
transformation not only in specific areas of U.S. social policy, but also in the way policy was 
implemented. Having viewed the American “freedom experiment” a failure, Progressives set to 
work to design a system that would rein in and thus significantly reduce the influence of the 
invisible hand approaches to society and its government, exchanging them for a top-down system 
of control through bureaucratic governmental agencies. Centralizers thus pushed for their 
arguably private view of government – private, because it is in direct contradiction to the social 
functions of American government explicated in the country’s founding documents. 
Woodrow Wilson, 26th U.S. President and academic who advocated Progressivism, wrote 




class of experts” constitutes a better, more efficient way to implement policy (Pestritto, 2007, 
Administration and the ‘Living Constitution’). He dismissed the founders’ limited-government 
social function by stating that “administrative principles and constitutional principles [are] 
distinct” so constitutional principles (e.g., that of checks and balances) “interfered with 
efficiency and should not be applied to the exercise of administrative power (Pestritto, 2007, 
Administration and the ‘Living Constitution’).” In response to Progressive influences, 
policymakers began developing programs to serve particular groups of Americans or accomplish 
particular policy missions, with agencies employing professional bureaucrats. For the 
Progressives, the professionals, guided within a rule-bound bureaucracies, knew what was best 
for the public.  
The Progressive reformers transformed public education. Thought leaders like 
Ellwood Cubberley worked to bureaucratize schools specifically to control them. While 
the first state systems originated in the early 1800s (e.g., New York State in 1812 
[Cubberley 1916, 9]), states’ educational administrators gradually began adopting the 
Progressives’ ideas.  
As mentioned previously, the school district/catchment area system resulted in a state-
sanctioned arrangement of monopolies motivated to maintain their status – one that, when 
coupled with the Progressive-led move toward centralization and bureaucratization, tended to 
insulate the public school system from those it was intended to serve. Rather than considering a 
return to local schools, reformers doubled down on centralization, pushing harder for uniformity 





In the early 1900s, Frederick Taylor’s Scientific Management Theory spread into public 
education, first in magazines and education journals which attacked schools as inefficient and 
unprofessional (Callahan, 1962, 51). In 1918, the Commission on the Reorganization of 
Secondary Education presented the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education, which 
recommended curricular content that was less academic and more uniform across schools, while 
at the same time tracking students within schools (Commission on the Reorganization …, 1918). 
Often termed the “factory model” of education, school leaders began assigning students based on 
age (elementary and secondary grades) or subject matter (secondary grades), largely for the 
convenience of school personnel. This single, “one size fits all” reform has resulted in additional 
problems for students, such as impersonalization and social promotion – policies gravely 
affecting disadvantaged students who are tracked, and passed through bureaucratic systems 
whether they learn or not (Doherty, 2004).  
The question of how much control states should exert over their public school systems 
evolved erratically across states. As a thought leader, Cubberley (1916, 24-25) discussed the 
consideration of elements that could balance a state system between too little and too much state 
control. Ultimately, however, he did not equivocate on whether and, to a great extent, how the 
state should control the public education system by controlling the schools. 
 [T]he authority and power to develop [public schools] have come from the State 
and not, except secondarily, from the community…. The school district … [was] erected 
for the purpose of better local administration. The State creates these subdivisions of 
itself and then endows them with their powers … as the best interests of the State may 
seem to require. It has been the people as a whole, represented in the legislature of the 
State, and not portions of the people here and there, who have been supreme in the matter 
of educational legislation (Cubberley, 1916, 14) (Emphasis added). 
 
The Progressive reformers thus pushed for centralizing separate community schools 




professionals who were removed from the schools. Under public choice theory, every such move 
increases the distance between the decision makers and their constituencies. Mises (1949, 1998, 
7) states, “There is no such thing as perfection in human knowledge, nor for that matter in any 
other human achievement. Omniscience is denied to man.” Building upon this fact, Tullock 
(1965, 1992, 76-77) expounds upon bureaucratic actors’ incentives: “While it is probable that the 
subordinate will know more about any given situation than his superior, it is also true that the 
ambitious and intelligent bureaucrat will tend to cut himself off from external reality, unless he is 
a conscious hypocrite. The official who is not hypocritical about his task soon learns than an 
active curiosity leads … to quarrels with superiors…; hence he suppresses his curiosity.” 
Thus, as organizations become more centralized, organizational actors become even more 
separated from complete or accurate information. This fact helps to explain how and why 
centralization is the antithesis to optimal community action. In the case of public education, 
every step toward greater centralization has further distanced the decision-makers from the 
consumers of education (Downs, 1967; Payne, 2008). 
Centropoly, Segregation, and Systematic Inequity 
Apart from other educational considerations, the district monopoly system gave schools 
captive consumers whom bureaucrats could now frequently ignore (Bradley-Dorsey & Maranto, 
2021). More egregious, however, the school monopoly apparatus has trapped large numbers of 
U.S. schoolchildren whose families cannot afford to move to a different district or school. This 
includes, systematically, disadvantaged students and many students of color.19  
 
19 Indeed, despite widespread acceptance of the Tiebout Effect theory (i.e., that the public can “vote with their feet” 
to pursue public goods such as schooling by moving to different neighborhoods), the Tiebout Effect is also widely 





A pointed example of the school monopoly effect can be traced through the systematic 
segregation of African Americans. Early anti-black public policy actions are perhaps more 
widely known than those occurring in the 20th century; however, the black-white gaps observed 
by civil rights leaders in the early 1900s (National Advisory Commission, 1968, 223) widened 
further with the advent of the Great Depression and the subsequent New Deal policies. Central 
among these policies that further disadvantaged black citizens was public housing. For example, 
New Deal housing, initially administered by the Public Works Administration in 1933, was 
rigidly segregated, and indeed created new segregated neighborhoods, as did later government 
housing related programs (Rothstein 2017, 20-24). 
Because districts maintained geographic boundaries atop a system of racially and 
economically segregated communities, the “common” school system envisioned by Mann, 
Cubberley, and others served educational communities whose needs were anything but uniform. 
Given racial and economic segregation, the children enrolled in these “uniform” schools differed 
markedly across districts – and within districts’ schools – hence rendering education and its 
delivery unequal. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, awareness of this inequality grew and 
fueled a massive reform movement at the federal level. I turn now to the largest federal reform 
initiative and argue that these external efforts ultimately were attempts to reform the extant, 
flawed system of vastly unequal schools serving markedly different student populations. Instead, 
though, the resulting educational system grew in the U.S. and its bureaucracy strengthened, 
increased in complexity, and hardened into a hybridized centropoly, ill-equipped to deal with the 
problems it attempted to address regarding the needs of the vastly diverse American student 




One of the most grievous overarching repercussions of American educational reforms can 
be explained by examining this formalized school segregation in terms of public choice, 
specifically, with what Downs (1967, 144-166) referred to as control processes and the rigidity 
cycle. As bureaucracies grow, control increases through processes such as monitoring and the 
creation of monitoring agencies (Downs, 1967). Operating bureaus respond by assigning 
personnel to provide information to the monitors – information that sheds the best light possible 
on the operating bureau. “In potentially controversial matters,” notes Downs (1967, 152), “they 
often devote extra resources to ‘beefing up the record’ to provide ample justification for their 
behavior.” Downs describes the rigidity cycle as what happens to some bureaus as they grow 
larger – effects I ascribe to the centropoly. Layering additional government levels automatically 
increases an organization’s size. Leaders’ resulting “leakage of authority…. leads to … a 
growing rigidity of behavior and structure within the bureau…” (or, in this case, within the 
hybridized super-bureau). Control by monitors results in “ever more complex and ever more 
restrictive regulations upon the operating [super-] bureau…. [T]he bureau also tends to devote 
ever more resources to figuring out ways of evading or counteracting the monitors’ additional 
regulations (Downs, 1967, 159). The author also notes that specialization increases and operating 
authority escalates (Downs, 1967, 159), resulting in the “incapability for fast or novel action” 
(Downs, 1967, 160). 
I demonstrate these effects to some extent in Chapter 3, which first carries on the history 
of American public education by summarizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(ESEA) and its reauthorizations and other amendments. I then explore several consequences of 




local staff growth. I conclude by summarizing evidence of the consequences in both theoretical 
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Chapter 3 – Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Centropoly Thickens20 
Introduction: When Help Turns to Harm 
In Doing Bad by Doing Good, Christopher Coyne (2013) addresses the problems of 
humanitarian action by summarizing its crucial elements through a public choice lens. Although 
humanitarianism is driven by normative principles – i.e., the morality of helping those in need – 
Coyne analyzes humanitarian action instead through a focus “on the ability of outsiders to 
effectively engage in humanitarian action whether or not there is a moral imperative to do so” 
(Coyne, 2013, 12-13). Coyne analyzes “ability” in terms of the system in which state-led 
humanitarian action operates, and he argues that the system is woefully inadequate – not only to 
produce positive humanitarian outcomes but also because it can cause harm in the form of, for 
example, further inhumane actions.  
I offer here a partial corollary analysis of public education and the public education actors 
who, failing to acknowledge the history of the centropoly, perceive of its schools as the moral 
solution to K-12 education and view repairs to the system, through the injection of federal policy 
and accompanying funding, as the appropriate solution. After having provided the formative 
history of the centropoly in Chapter 1, here I summarize the reform history that began in the mid-
twentieth century to repair a glaring problem of the “reformed” American public educational 
system: what to do with the disadvantaged students who languished in the centropoly’s schools. 
After detailing the advent of the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965 ESEA) and its multiple 
later amendments, including the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), I examine empirically the 
 
20 This chapter and Chapter 2 together, in large part, comprise the following forthcoming book chapter: Bradley-
Dorsey, M. (Under Contract). “Rise of a Centropoly: Good Intentions, Distorted Incentives, and the Cloaked Costs 
of Top-Down Reform in Public Education” (working title), in Candela, R.; Fike, R.; and Herzberg, R., Institutions 
and Incentives in Public Policy: An Analytical Assessment of Non-Market Decision-Making (working title). Under 




association between ESEA’s amendments and relative state and local public education staff 
growth. I then briefly discuss the extent to which the educational condition of disadvantaged 
students has changed, if at all. 
Dysfunctional Reform for the Disadvantaged: The Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965 
(ESEA) 
School segregation, propagated by educational, housing, and economic public policies, 
set the course for the famous 1954 Brown v. Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court decision 
that “[t]he ‘separate but equal doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson … has no place in … 
public education.”21 President Eisenhower’s 1957 decision to send troops to Little Rock 
evidenced the slow response to the 1954 Brown decision (Clark 2020). Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr.’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech preceded the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by approximately 
one year and ESEA by less than two years. The mid-1960s brought President Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty. The Civil Rights Act expressly prohibited school 
segregation, deeming invalid state and local laws permitting such segregation, yet public school 
leaders had already established and continued to maintain government monopolies via district 
and school catchment area boundaries. ESEA, intended to improve the educational outcome of 
students disadvantaged by low income, was considered a major part of the War on Poverty. Its 
spotlight intervention: funding targeted to district public schools with large low-income student 
enrollments. 
Many expressed concerns regarding federal intervention into education prior to ESEA. 
As an early example, even before calls came to focus federal attention on America’s 
 





disadvantaged, the most significant education legislation had been the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (NDEA). A direct response to Russia’s launching of Sputnik, NDEA 
authorized funding for teaching specific secondary school subjects such as math and science. 
Although dwarfed in size by ESEA, Senator Barry Goldwater warned, “‘If adopted, [NDEA] will 
mark the inception of aid, supervision, and ultimately control of education in this country by 
federal authorities’” (Collins, 2014, 9) (Internal references omitted). 
Reformers pursued funding focused on education for America’s poor soon after NDEA’s 
passage. But these federal reforms faced obstacles, such as the role of the federal government in 
education, inclusion of religious schools, and mistrust of local school district officials. President 
John F. Kennedy’s Aid to Education bill failed in 1961, in large part because it excluded aid to 
private schools. (Sorensen 1965, 360).  
During the debate preceding ESEA, civil rights activists argued that public school 
administrators had placed low priority on education for disadvantaged students and that the 
schools had been unresponsive to these students’ needs (McLaughlin, 1974).22 An anonymous 
civil rights activist stated forthrightly, “Title I will be money down a rathole unless it includes 
some measure to protect the interests of poor children” (McLaughlin, 1974, 1). Democratic 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy expressed similar concerns during the 1965 Congressional hearings 
on ESEA. Kennedy noted that “… the school itself has created an educationally deprived 
system” (McLaughlin, 1974, 4). Kennedy made a last-minute demand for an amendment to the 
legislation mandating reports of educational achievement. “‘What I want to make sure of is not 
just that the money is not wasted, because you can find more money, … but the fact that the lives 
 
22 For example, ten years after the momentous Brown v Board of Education U.S. Supreme Court decision ordering 
school desegregation – and one year before passage of ESEA – the vast majority of African American students in 





of these children are not wasted,’” he stated (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003, 215). The 
Senator’s demand for achievement evidence, however, resulted only in a requirement that 
districts or state education departments receiving federal funds file an annual report (Thernstrom 
& Thernstrom, 2003, 215). Innocuous though well-intentioned, this language would lay the 
groundwork for the use of statewide achievement testing to evaluate schools instead of focusing 
on individual student success (Koretz, 2008). 
Summary: The Original Act and its Amendments 
Enacted in 1965, ESEA marked the onset of rapidly growing federal involvement in 
education – which, in turn, further centralized public education, thickened educational 
bureaucracy, and solidified into the centropoly. The chain of amendments and reauthorizations 
itself illustrates the rapid increase of this hybridized government organizational structure.23 
Together with its eight reauthorizations and several other weighty amendments, ESEA has been 
the single most significant federal education legislation in the U.S. According to Klein (2015), 
“… [F]or the most part, each new iteration has sought to expand the federal role in education.” 
The only federal education legislation to surpass the original 1965 Act in scope has been some of 
its reauthorizations, most notably the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), which will be 
discussed in detail later. 
The original 1965 Act consisted of five titles,24 of which Title I was the Act’s focus 
(Collins, 2014, 14). Title I, “Financial Assistance to Local Education Agencies for the Education 
 
23 School district consolidation is arguably another policy designed to correct underlying systemic problems while 
creating or exacerbating extant problems. Driven largely by policy makers’ desire to improve efficiency, the number 
of school districts nationally has dropped from more than 127,500 in 1932 to fewer than 20,000 in the early 1970s 
and fewer than 15,000 in the 2001-02 school year (Coulson, 2007). As researchers find diminishing returns to the 
efficiency of larger districts, it is also noteworthy that larger organizations frequently result in further centralization, 
hence greater separation from information.  





of Children of Low-Income Families,” originally funded at $1.06 billion, authorized the 
provision of assistance to schools with large proportions of low-income, “educationally 
deprived” students via formula-driven grants to compensate for this educational deprivation by 
providing additional funding specifically for these students. Titles II through V created several 
additional programs, hence adding to federal educational intervention (Collins, 2014, 14-20; 
McGuinn & Hess, 2005, 295-6). Ironically, the original Act expressly prohibited federal control 
of education (Collins, 2014, 16). However, with successive reauthorizations came additional 
programs and requirements. Congress has amended ESEA many times to contain provisions and 
government bodies relating to education for disabled students, bilingual education, and other 
programs and entities. It is certain, however, that these programs contributed to government 
growth at all three government levels: federal, state, and local. Each successive law added 
funding, government bodies, or staffing, or a combination thereof. Not all the amendments 
addressed the needs of the originally targeted student groups, but they contributed to federal 
centralization of education through funding, requirements tied to receipt of the funds, and other, 
perhaps unanticipated, incentives resulting from law changes.  
Congress reauthorized ESEA every three years during the first fifteen years, increasingly 
focusing on “resource accountability,” e.g., ensuring the funds were spent on schools enrolling 
low-income students and students with lowest achievement levels (Puma & Drury, 2000, 3). 
Schools frequently used “pull-out” programs for eligible students wherein remedial teaching 
staff removed students from the regular classroom to instruct them. Criticism of pull-out 
programs led to a 1978 amendment which allowed for schools whose enrollment was at least 
75% low-income to focus on school, instead of individual student, improvement (Puma & Drury, 




implementing schoolwide programs (Puma & Drury, 2000), but this changed in 1988 when 
Congress discarded the local match requirement. 
The 1981 reauthorization under Reagan constituted an attempt to reduce federal intrusion 
into public education. Under Reagan, federal regulations were reduced from 75 to 14 pages, and 
Title I – the largest ESEA-funded program – was renamed Chapter 1 (though this changed back 
in later legislation). The 1988 reauthorization began to focus on “‘program improvement’ 
efforts” where Chapter 1 students showed inadequate gains in achievement (Puma & Drury, 
2000, 3). 
The law changed again with the 1994 reauthorization. Two important revisions were a 
mandate that all states adopt standards-aligned assessment systems by 2000-01, and a reduction 
in the poverty-rate threshold, for operating a schoolwide Title 1 program, from 75 to 50% 
poverty (Puma & Drury, 2000, 4-5). 
In summary, ESEA’s evolution so far had led to promotion of external, school-based 
accountability while reducing focus on student-targeted improvement provisions. But 
reauthorizations to this point were minor steps when compared to the changes coming through 
the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) under George W. Bush. 25 
No Child Left Behind Act: Sea Change in Federal Intervention  
Other than the original Act, the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) exerted the greatest 
impact compared to the other ESEA reauthorizations. Enacted in 2002, NCLB “… effectively 
scaled up the federal role in holding schools accountable for student outcomes.” (Klein, 2015). 
Arguably NCLB’s most important element is made obvious from the Act’s title: No Child 
was to be ignored, translated in the Act as focusing on disadvantaged students. As Kymes (2004) 
 




notes, research conducted by Bush’s administration “concluded that many present-day 
educational systems were still attempting to serve a population that has not existed since the 
1950s….” The country’s disadvantaged had long since become not simply those who weren’t 
interested in academics, but students who, more pointedly, were tied to factors anchored in the 
histories of minorities and the poor. 
Ironically, then, NCLB represented a recognition that the same problems existed which 
the original Act was purposed to address nearly four decades earlier. Even though the goal of the 
original ESEA was to improve educational outcomes of this student group, NCLB made specific 
demands that attempted to ensure districts and schools would not ignore disadvantaged students. 
These demands included mandatory reporting at student subgroup levels (e.g., income and race 
or ethnicity), so that districts and schools could not hide achievement gaps by averaging overall 
student performance. 
Second, and relatedly, NCLB was the first-ever federal attempt at an outcome-based 
educational accountability system. Previous ESEA iterations contained provisions that focused 
on aspects of accountability, such as testing and reporting, but NCLB contained a federal 
mandate that states meet specific outcome measures. Prior to this, several states had adopted 
standards- or outcome-based accountability programs beginning in the 1980s and continuing into 
the ‘90s. The state-level programs grew out of concerns arising from A Nation at Risk, a 1983 
report describing America’s educational system in dire terms.26 27 28 
 
26 Considered hyperbole by some, the report claimed: “If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on 
America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.” 
See A Nation at Risk, April 1993, paragraph 2, at https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html . 
27 By 2000, 48 states were involved in standards-based accountability systems. The state plans varied in content, 
implementation, and success levels. 




Many found themselves still aware that America ranked in the middle among other 
nations regarding educational performance (Hanushek & Luque 2003, 485). Some concluded 
action was needed at the national level – again, doubling down on externally-sourced, top-down 
reform (Downs, 1967).  
The cornerstone of the NCLB accountability provisions was the requirement that all 
students, with rare exceptions, reach the “proficient” level on state math and reading tests by 
school year 2013-14. Under the law, each state was required to (a) define the test score levels 
that met the state’s “proficiency” designation, and (b) set and meet its annual targeted “Adequate 
Yearly Progress” (AYP), or percentage of students achieving at the state’s self-prescribed 
“proficiency” level for each year.  
Consequently, state testing became an integral part of the newly mandated high-stakes 
accountability system created through NCLB.29 States had to create tests to measure students’ 
proficiency status in math and literacy in specified grades, while reporting also on student 
subgroups such as those from low-income families, those with limited English proficiency, and 
students with disabilities.  
This testing itself changed administrator and teacher behavior toward their students, as 
well as student learning behaviors and outcomes. According to Koretz (2008, 47) in the U.S. the 
“primary [function] of large-scale achievement” testing changed from helping individual 
students (via diagnosis) to group-based accountability (holding schools, districts, and teachers 
accountable) – the latter being precisely the purpose of NCLB-based testing.  
 
29 As mentioned previously, however, not all aspects of the NCLB accountability system were mandatory. The Act 





ESEA (and particularly, the NCLB reauthorization) therefore helped create the 
organizational accountability movement.30 The concern about disadvantaged students, which 
resulted in the Act’s passage, evolved into measurement of disadvantaged student progress, 
which then drove the group-based testing accountability movement (Koretz, 2008, 54). This 
progression represented a step in the incremental march toward a more centralized and 
bureaucratic institution, as the focus became even more centered on the success of the school 
instead of the success of the student. 
This well-intended testing mandate is a prime example of centralization gone awry. The 
mandate took attention away from the constituents – students – as public school system 
employees focused on ways to make their institutions look better, or at least deflect punishment. 
All such behaviors reflect the “circling of wagons” around the institution itself – precisely the 
behavior that public choice theorists had described (e.g., Downs, 1967). 
During the latter years of NCLB, raising AYP (the percent-proficient measure) became 
increasingly difficult for states. Supporters and critics alike began to question whether it was 
possible to reach the 100%-proficient goal for all students. Because of this and other factors, the 
federal Education Secretary implemented a directive allowing for a waiver from the continued 
mandated increases. Called the ESEA Flexibility Waiver, the U.S. Department of Education 
(USDOE) waived states meeting certain requirements from the mandate to continue increasing 
their proficiency levels. Forty-two states received flexibility waivers under NCLB (Balingit, 
2015). 
 
30 One could analyze the transformation from student to organizational focus, resulting from just the NCLB, in great 
detail. Another such example is that the federal government revised its AYP target requirements to allow for states 
to meet AYP in a particular year, by improving subgroup performance while not meeting its stated targeted goals. 





However, many of NCLB’s institutional effects survived. By holding districts and 
schools accountable – perhaps a natural policymaker inclination, given schools’ prior 
performance regarding disadvantaged students – the Act served to focus on the organization and 
not on the students themselves. In other words, students became the instruments to reflect school 
and district success, rather than the constituency to be served.  
ESEA: Connections to Government Growth and Centralization 
Though difficult to measure in a causal sense, ESEA has had a dramatic impact on 
government growth and centralization both directly and indirectly. Several indicators of this 
growth and centralization apply at all government levels and can be attributed, at least in part, to 
the adoption of ESEA and its subsequent reauthorizations. 
Federal Funding  
While not the sole cause of federal education funding increases, ESEA has figured 
prominently and remains an important funding source. The following provides a summary of 
federal elementary and secondary education funding in general and ESEA specifically. 
As illustrated in the first panel of Figure 2, federal funding for elementary and secondary 
education (constant dollars) rose from $5 billion in FY 1960 to $20 billion in FY 1970, the year 
of the second ESEA reauthorization. By FY 1980 spending had increased to a $29.7 billion high. 
That year was followed by a sizeable and sustained spending decrease (as measured in constant 
dollars) that lasted until after the fifth ESEA reauthorization (FY 1988). Revenues climbed for 
the next approximately two decades with additional fluctuations, including a dramatic spike due 
to the Great Recession, and then declined abruptly after the Great Recession to approximately 




following the 2010 Great Recession-related spike, total federal elementary and secondary 









Figure 2. Federal Revenues for Elementary and Secondary Schools: FY 1920 – FY 2015 




Figure 3 represents the funding history of Title I grants to local education agencies 
(LEAs),31 evidencing the dramatic funding increases from just the largest ESEA program. As 
shown in Figure 4, ESEA Title I grant funding historically has fluctuated from between 20 and 
39 percent of total federal elementary and secondary education funding. In 2018, ESEA 
comprised 29 percent of federal K-12 education funding. 
 
Figure 3. ESEA Title I Grants to Local Education Agencies: Appropriation Amounts for FY 
1980–FY 2019 







31 According to ESEA, a local educational agency (LEA) is “a public board of education or other public authority 





Figure 4. ESEA Title I Grants as a Percent of All Federal Education Revenues: Current Dollars 
Source: Education Department Budget History Table: FY 1980-2021, at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/history/index.html.  
 
In recent fiscal years, the amount of federal ESEA funding has stabilized at around $14 - 
$16 billion. In FY 2017, ESEA Title I funding was just over $14 billion, and total federal 
funding for public school education was over $57 billion. Total federal revenues per pupil, based 
on the $57 billion amount, was more than $2,000 (NCES, 2020, 7).  
Staffing: Federal, State, and Local Levels  
As with federal funding, the number of federal full-time equivalent (FTE) education staff 
for public school education functions has increased markedly since the passage of ESEA. As of 
1965, the Office of Education, within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 
employed more than 2,100 people. Forty-five years later, in 2010, the U.S. Department of 
Education (USDOE) employed almost 4,300 people. The federal public school-related workforce 
increased dramatically with the upgrade of the federal education function to a cabinet level 





The staffing increases were not confined to the federal government, however, since 
ESEA and its reauthorizations contain specific powers and duties for both state education 
agencies (SEAs) and LEAs. Figure 5 provides a historical overview of staffing changes at the 
state and local public education institutional levels between 1957 and 1997. As shown, school 
district FTE staff grew from fewer than 1.5 million FTE in 1957 (0.9% of the total U.S. 
population) to about 3.9 million in 1997 (1.4% of the total U.S. population). Total state and local 
staff grew from about 2.0 million FTE in 1957 to more than 7.0 million in 1997. Subtracting, this 
means the number of FTE positions for state agencies grew over the same period from 0.5 
million to about 3.1 million. State agency personnel include employees hired to support or 







Figure 5. Full-Time Equivalent Employment of U.S. State and Local Public Education Agencies:  
FY 1957 – FY 1997 
 
 The student-to-staff ratio provides another illustration of public education employment 
increases over time. In FY 1950, the number of students per staff member was 19.3 (Maranto & 




ratio has hovered between 8.0 and 8.9 except for FY 2015, when the ratio jumped to 9.4. The 
ratio for FY 2018 was 8.5. 
 Figure 6 (divided into panels 6.a. and 6.b) provides a state-by-state comparative 
illustration of the change in the proportionate number of local public school FTE staff, i.e., per 
100 students enrolled in local public schools, between 1993 and 2013. As shown, states have 
differed in the staffing levels they have provided in the public schools. Also as shown, most, but 







Figure 6. Local Public School FTE per 100 Students Enrolled, School Years 1995 & 2014 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core 
of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey", 1994-95 v.1a,  
















































































































































Figure 6.a. Alabama - Missouri 










































































































































































Figure 6.b. Montana - Wyoming 




Empirical Evidence: ESEA is Associated with State and Local Staff Growth  
Although the descriptive evidence appears to show general growth in staff numbers, not 
all states grew in staff during the more recent years, and staffing levels differed markedly among 
states. Here I attempt to answer a single research question: Is ESEA and its subsequent 
amendments related to state and local public education staffing growth? I hypothesize that the 
various amendments are indeed associated with staffing growth at the state (SEA) and local 
(LEA) levels. 
In seeking literature on this subject, I examined the question both specifically to U.S. 
public education and more generally to U.S. governmental bureaucracies regardless of specialty. 
I found a rich and diverse theoretical literature, which I summarized in small part in Chapter 1. 
Regarding the precise question of staffing growth, either in education specifically or in U.S. 
governmental bureaucracy generally, I located only Scafidi (2012, 2017). Scafidi (2012, 1) notes 
that, between Fiscal Year (FY) 1950 32 and FY 2009, K-12 public school enrollment increased 
by 96 percent, yet in the same period the public school FTE count grew 386 percent. Scafidi 
(2017, 3) conducts extensive descriptive work on U.S. public education staffing, noting that 
staffing declined from FY 2009 to FY 2012 because of the Great Recession; however, “[a]fter 
FT 2012, American … public school employment began growing again at a rate faster than 
increases in student enrollment.”  
The staffing surge Scafidi (2012, 2017) identifies accompanies the fact that public school 
organizations also have become more complex. Scafidi states the staffing increase was not driven 
only or even primarily by an increase in the number of teachers. Instead, during this period, 
 
32 Scafidi (2012) began measuring prior to enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the 





“[T]eachers’ numbers increased 252 percent while administrators and other staff experienced 
growth of 702 percent, more than seven times the increase in students (Scafidi, 2012, 1).” Both 
the teaching and administrative staff influxes have revealed themselves through new staff titles, 
such as several mentioned in a recent Fayetteville, Arkansas school board agenda. These include 
federal Title I teachers and administrators, in-school suspension staff, child nutrition staff, 
speech pathology staff, film and TV staff, coaching staff, personalized learning staff, gifted and 
talented teachers, and special education teachers (Fayetteville Public Schools, 2019). 
The following longitudinal, fixed-effects regression analyses provide a clearer picture of 
the relationship between ESEA over the years and public education staffing levels. To conduct 
this regression model, I obtained panel data covering multiple years for each of the 50 states 
from two sources: (a) 1965 – 1992 data from the U.S. Census of Governments (COG) conducted 
every five years, wherein I calculated the average change for the years in between the five-year 
intervals; and (b) the NCES Common Core of Data (CCD) for 1993 - 2009. The lack of a single, 
continuous data set presents a limitation. The CCD data might be preferable since annual data are 
available, but they do not cover the earlier ESEA years. Although the COG data were gathered 




attention to data reporting. Either way, because there is a clear change between the two data sets, 
as shown in Figure 7,33 I could not combine them.  
Figure 7. Mean State-Local School FTE per 100 Population Based on Different Data Sources: 
1970-2009 




33 Sources of Figure 7 include the following: Population: U.S. Census: 1970-1980 – Population Distribution Branch, 
Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population of States, 1970 to 1980; 1981-1990 – Population Distribution 
Branch, 1981 to 1989 Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population of States, and Year-to-Year Components of 
Change (all data consistent with the intercensal estimates shown in Table 2 of CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS Series, P25-1106); 1990-2000 – ST-99-7 State Population Estimates and Demographic Components of 
Population Change: Annual Time Series, April 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999, Population Estimates Program, Population 
Division; 2000-2010 – Table 1. Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, 
States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2010; 2010-2019 – Population Division, Table 1. Annual Estimates 
of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019 
(NST-EST2019-01). Staff:1972 Census of Governments, Vol. 3 Public Employment, No. 2 Compendium of Public 
Employment, Table 13 Full-Time Equivalent Employment of State and Local Governments. 1982 COG, Vol. 3, No. 
2; 1992 COG, Vol. 3, No. 2; U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core 
of Data (CCD), "Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey", 1992-93 v.1a, 1993-94 v.1a, 1994-95 
v.1a, 1995-96 v.1a, 1996-97 v.1a, 1997-98 v.1a, 1998-99 v.1c, 1999-00 v.1b, 2000-01 v.1a, 2001-02 v.1a, 2002-03 
v.1a, 2003-04 v.1b, 2004-05 v.1c, 2005-06 v.1a, 2006-07 v.1c, 2007-08 v.1b, 2008-09 v.1a; "State Nonfiscal Public 















Therefore, I conducted two separate longitudinal panel data, fixed-effects regression 
analyses, both of which follow the same model: 
!"#$%&!" = (# + ($*+,$,!" + (&*+,&,!" +⋯+ ('*+,',!" + .$!"#/"0!" +	.&!"#/"2!" + 3!" 
My dependent variable, !"#$%&!", is the natural log of state and local public education 
FTE staff for each year beginning two years after the relevant amendment group. This 
measurement is to account for the time lag between a law’s adoption and the changes 
implemented as a result.  
My independent variables of interest are categorical variables representing all sets of law 
changes beginning just after adoption of the original ESEA. The variable value is “1” if the 
amendments were in effect for a particular year. For example, the variable for the 1981 
reauthorization would contain a value of “1” in the years 1981 and all years thereafter. I compare 
the resulting associations relative to the 1965 original enactment. Hence, law change coefficients 
are additive. 
In this relatively simple model, I employ fixed-effects panel regression to account for 
nonrandom, unmeasured differences within individual states, such as economic conditions. I add 
controls for the natural log of the state’s population in poverty and of the state’s total population 
in each year as reported by the U.S. Census.  
As discussed previously, Figure 7 shows a clear pattern of increase in the mean 
proportional state and local education FTE in most ESEA amendment years. Only 4 of the first 
23 years and 3 of the second group of 17 years experienced a mean proportional FTE decrease 
over the previous year. Considering all fiscal years shown in both data sets, there is an overall 
growth pattern over the years, and proportional FTE growth occurs in most, but not all, years. It 




FTE occurred in the first set, i.e., FYs 1965 – 1992 (using the first data set). During this period 
the number of FTE grew from less than 1.5 in 1965 to almost 2.1 in FY 1992 for every 100 
people. During the second period (using the second data set) the mean FTE dipped to 1.8 per 100 
people in FY 1993 and rose again to 2.1 in FY 2009. Note, however, the sizeable interruption in 
values between the two data sets, as shown in the figure. 
 
Table 2 reveals the results of the regression analyses. The first column, reflecting the first 
and largest set of ESEA laws, shows that of the eleven law changes in the regression, six (those 
enacted in 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1984, and 1988) reveal highly statistically significant 
(p=0.01) FTE staff growth. Of the remaining five laws (those enacted in 1974, 1977, 1978, 1981, 
and 1983), only two are associated with FTE staff decreases and none are statistically significant. 
Of the two laws associated with FTE staff decreases, the 1981 law might be expected to show a 
negative association since the 1981 reauthorization was President Reagan’s attempt to reduce 





Table 2  
Associations between State and Local Education Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Staff (log) and 
ESEA Amendments by Year Adopted; Amendment Years 1966 – 1992; 1994 – 2002 34 
 
Earlier ESEA Amendments  Later ESEA Amendments 
1966  0.061***  1994 0.074*** 
 (0.008)   (0.018) 
1968  0.071***  2002  0.055*** 
 (0.009)   (0.012) 
1970  0.074***  
No. in Poverty 
(log) 0.096 
 (0.008)   (0.078) 
1972  0.045***  Population (log) 0.900*** 
 (0.008)   (0.122) 
1974  0.012  Constant -3.758*** 
 (0.008)   (1.311) 
1977  0.007  Observations 840 
 (0.010)  Number of States 50 
1978  -0.013  R-squared 0.438  
 (0.010)  Standard errors in parentheses 
1981  -0.012  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 (0.008)    
1983  0.011    
 (0.010)    
1984  0.034***    
 (0.009)    
1988  0.080***    
 (0.005)    
Number in 
poverty (log) -0.194***    
 (0.013)    
Population (log) 1.035***    
 (0.018)    
Constant -2.284***    
 (0.184)    
Observations 2,395    
Number of States 50    
R-squared 0.944    
Standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
 




To interpret the model, it is important to remember that all laws are in operation from 
their enactment year forward. Additionally, because the law variables are binary, all are relative 
to the original 1965 Act’s passage. Finally, the model assumes staffing changes two years 
following adoption of the law. Therefore, to interpret the regression results, one must consider 
that the 1965 Act’s staffing influence continues in all years since and including 1967 (two years 
after passage, the assumed staff change delay), the 1966 reauthorization’s staffing influence 
continues in all years since and including 1968, and so on. This means, for example, that the 
1966 law change, for which the assumed staffing change is in effect from 1968 forward, is 
associated with a 6.1 percent FTE increase. The 1968 law, in effect from 1970 forward, is 
associated with a 7.1 percent FTE increase, and so on. The population coefficient is expected to 
be large and highly statistically significant, since states’ populations have grown sizably over the 
past decades. Controlling for population eliminates this variable’s impact from the law change 
associations. 
Importantly, however, the log of the number in poverty is highly statistically significantly 
(p=0.01) associated with a 0.194 percentage point FTE decrease. In other words, poverty is 
associated with a decrease in FTE separate and apart from the law changes and the population 
control. This could have additional, and concerning, implications for the nation’s poorest 
students. More research is necessary to further examine this coefficient. 
The second column in Table 2 shows a similar analysis for the 1994 and 2002 laws. As 
shown, these laws are associated with highly significant (p=0.01) total FTE staff increases of 7.4 
and 5.5 percent, respectively. The poverty coefficient in this model is not statistically significant. 
 In summary, over the two analyses (using two data sets), there are positive associations 




changes analyzed was associated with a statistically significant FTE change, and only two of 
those five (nonsignificant) associations were negative. The negative association between poverty 
and FTE in the first analysis needs further examination, as it might be concerning. 
The Educational Condition of Disadvantaged Students 
The obvious question becomes whether the sizeable resource increases, due at least in 
part to passage of ESEA and its subsequent iterations, have resulted in educational improvements 
for the disadvantaged students they were intended to help. Clearly, ESEA was adopted to reduce 
or even close achievement gaps between low-income and other students. Also, clearly, research 
evidence reveals it has not done so – especially when considering the multiple billions of dollars 
spent over time. 
Descriptive NAEP Test Evidence  
NAEP, mandated by Congress, is “the only assessment that measures what U.S. students 
know and can do in various subjects across the nation [and] states….” (NCES, n.d., at 
https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/) Although limited, i.e., it samples each state’s 
fourth- and eighth-grade student bodies, NAEP measures include public school reading and math 
scores. Also, while NAEP has been testing students since 1969, longitudinal, standardized data 
became available for all states only upon the passage of NCLB.35 
Figures 8 and 9 show the NAEP average scale score performance data for 4th and 8th 
grade math. As shown by these figures and by Figure 11, the NAEP math scale score gaps have 










Figure 8. NAEP Average Test Scores for 4th Grade Math: 1996-2019 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1996, 2000, 2003, 




Figure 9. NAEP Average Test Scores for 8th Grade Math: 1996-2019 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1996, 2000, 2003, 

























Figure 10. NAEP Math Test Score Gap between  Low-Income and Not Low-Income 4th- and 
8th-Grade Students: 1996-2019  
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1996, 2000, 2003, 
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Mathematics Assessments. 
 
 
 Figures 11 through 13 show the same information for NAEP reading scores. Reading scores once 






Figure 11. NAEP Average Test Scores for 4th Grade Reading: 1996-2019 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998, 2000, 2002, 




Figure 12. NAEP Average Test Scores for 8th Grade Reading: 1996-2019 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998, 2002, 2003, 







Figure 13. NAEP Reading Test Score Gap between Low-Income and Not Low-Income 4th- and 
8th-Grade Students: 1996-2019 
Sources: 4th Grade – U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National 
Center for Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Reading Assessments. 
8th Grade – U.S. Department of Education, Institute of Education Sciences, National Center for 
Education Statistics, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 1998, 2002, 2003, 
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, and 2019 Reading Assessments (2001 data not 
available). 
 
Sousa and Armour (2016) Research Synthesis Summary 
Addressing only ESEA’s Title 1, Sousa & Armor (2016) review prior research evaluating 
the program’s effectiveness in closing achievement gaps between disadvantaged and non-
disadvantaged students using a research synthesis approach to summarize studies conducted 
between 1966 and 2011. After reviewing five peer-reviewed evaluation studies and conducting 
their own standardized national assessment score trend analysis, the authors conclude there is 
“very little evidence that the Title I compensatory education program has significantly improved 
the academic achievement of disadvantaged students nationwide” (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 309). 
In summary, none of the studies used randomized control trials (RCT), considered the 




program across the nation. This is likely due to the “near universal implementation of Title I,” 
which negates possibility of a control group.  
Nevertheless, Sousa and Armor (2016) examined five peer-reviewed studies – two meta-
analyses, two National Assessments (conducted by the USDOE), and one panel data analysis of 
state-level results of the standardized national assessment (National Assessment of Educational 
Progress, or NAEP).36 They also conducted their own summary analysis of NAEP data covering 
1990 to 2013. 
Three peer-reviewed studies evaluated Title I effectiveness at closing gaps during school 
years prior to before 2000, i.e., before NCLB was implemented. These studies showed “[no] 
meaningful gap reductions” and, in fact, widening achievement gaps in one of the studies (Sousa 
& Armor, 2016, 309).  
The two later peer-reviewed studies provide evidence suggesting NCLB “had modest 
effects on 4th grade test scores, especially in math, and these gains were somewhat stronger for 
disadvantages [sic] students” (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 309). One of these studies is particularly 
noteworthy. Dee & Jacob (2011) conducted a quasi-experimental examination in which the study 
authors compared states that had not implemented NCLB-like accountability reforms prior to 
NCLB with their performance under NCLB. The authors found that, by 2003, states with pre-
NCSL accountability reforms reduced the gap between black and white students by 7 points 
compared to 5 points for states without the pre-NCSL reforms (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 310). A 
similar finding resulted for students disadvantaged by poverty.  
 
36 NAEP, mandated by Congress, is “the only assessment that measures what U.S. students know and can do in 
various subjects across the nation [and] states….” (NCES n.d., at https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/) 
Although limited, i.e., it samples each state’s fourth- and eighth-grade student bodies, NAEP measures include 




Finally, Sousa and Armor (2016) conduct an overall analysis of 1990-2013 NAEP data. 
The authors conclude, “The overall progress is disappointing, particularly for the poverty gap. 
The achievement gaps between [low-income] students … and those not [low-income] have 
remained virtually constant for reading and math at both grade levels [i.e., 4th and 8th grade]” 
(Sousa & Armor, 2016, 310). Black-white and Hispanic-white gaps showed better results. The 
authors then commented on the distinction between results before and after NCLB, noting that 
“after 2000 [the national approach] was to adopt accountability practices which had proven 
effective in some states during the late 1990s” (Sousa & Armor, 2016, 310). 
The distinction between pre- and post-NCLB Title I effectiveness studies should be 
emphasized. Whereas prior to NCLB, Title I consisted of several policy changes and nearly four 
decades, the studies regarding NCLB-related effectiveness – and particularly Dee & Jacob 
(2011) – are more specific. This places at least the Dee & Jacob study on stronger footing when 
considering Title I effectiveness. However, several areas of concern remain. First, Dee & Jacob 
found gap improvements for only certain NAEP test scores among different disadvantaged 
groups. Second, as noted previously, others have expressed concerns with the institutional 
accountability approach adopted through NCLB. Additionally, concerns have been raised that, at 
least in the states that implemented the NCLB flexibility waiver, achievement scores might have 
dropped.37 Since the Sousa and Armor study ends in 2013, and NCLB waivers were generally 
granted in 2014 and 2015, additional study is necessary to determine what happened later 
because of NCLB, as well as what happened after NCLB was no longer in effect. 
 
37 AYP did, in fact, drop dramatically for the lowest-performing Title I schools in Kansas once that state 
implemented the waiver. As a result, after receiving this information the Kansas legislature implemented the state’s 
only tax credit scholarship for these schools. See Appendix B for the presentation to the joint meeting of the Kansas 
Senate and House Standing Education committees; see Kansas State Department of Education (n.d.), “Tax Credit for 




Major Reason behind ESEA Reforms’ Failure: A Public Choice Explanation 
Given the layered structure of the school system, it is not difficult to explain why 
hundreds of billions of federal reform dollars amounted to little, if any progress for any, 
including disadvantaged students. The district monopolies provide personnel with negligible 
incentive to improve student outcomes. The layering begun via early state control has only 
increased in the ensuing years, as federal and state controls have expanded thereby thickening 
educational bureaucracy. Thus has the centropoly formed and strengthened. Relatedly, a key 
disincentive to change, quite simply, is that most educational administrators and school boards 
prefer schools to remain as they are, not as some, e.g., some policymakers and much of the 
public, would like them to be (Maranto & Wai, 2020; Downs, 1967).  
The entire infrastructure of laws, agencies, and staffing resulting from ESEA and its 
iterations was superimposed, in waves, upon an already centralized and monopolized public 
education system, hence bringing to life the hybridized U.S. educational centropoly, with its 
layers of government operating above each student. The effects of this large-scale evolution 
should be emphasized. Layering has contributed to what Tullock (1965, 1992) discusses 
regarding communication distortions, and to what Downs (1967) refers to as the rigidity cycle. 
Government layering has produced additional bureaucracy which, in turn, has led to reduced 
information as well as increased monitoring, regulation, and defensive moves, of and by the 
centropoly.  
Additionally, as Mises (1944, 57-63) explains, a public bureaucratic manager has only 
his/her set of rules to govern behavior. This happens because public enterprises, such as public 
schools, lack the simple information device of the profit motive. Absent the profit motive, public 




among different groups of people, but they do understand that (a) “… the appearance of a deficit 
is not considered a proof of failure…”; and (b) “every service can be improved by increasing 
expenditures” (Mises, 1944, 61, 62). Since the primary interest of each such manager is 
“improving the satisfaction of needs only in their special branches of activity” (Mises, 1944, 62), 
the focus becomes budget maximization.  
Finally, the centropoly has decreased focus on schools’ constituencies. Stated 
alternatively, increased defensiveness and information distance further emphasize private 
motives (Tullock, 1965, 1992). Disadvantaged students and their parents were captive in school 
districts in 1965, and they remain captive today, because they cannot afford to move to a 
different district or school or to enroll their children in a private school. Educational captivity 
places these students and their parents under the control of officials – at three government levels 
– working in settings offering job security in numerous ways, via the school system’s now-
centropolized status. Professional educators frequently tell complaining or questioning parents to 
leave their children’s education to the professionals. Yet, these professionals not only have 
limited information relative to that of the parents, but they also prioritize their own private 
interests ahead of those of the students. 
As shown previously, in U.S. public educational centropoly, the purpose of the institution 
is to maintain the institution. The public school system fits Downs’s description of bureaus – 
actually, of an organization (more precisely, a bureau) made up of several bureaus. A state 
educational system is composed of the state education bureau and its many school district 
organizations or bureaus. The imposition of federal control – tied to the “golden handcuffs” 




education system: now, the states as well as their monopolistic school districts are required to 
follow federal bureau mandates in addition to their respective state bureau requirements. 
The public school system frequently defends itself against perceived threats, such as 
funding cuts or school choice legislation, by publicly stating that its goal is to serve the children. 
Public choice theory, however, helps to explain how the public education system primarily 
serves itself. The schools and states exhibit collective willingness (of multiple organizational 
participants) to take the strings attached to higher-level (e.g., federal) money, thereby becoming 
more bureaucratic. This, in combination with the fact that the bureaucracy is separated, often by 
several levels, from its constituency, means that self-interested bureaucrats decide with woefully 
inadequate information on what is best for the students under their control.  
 Given these circumstances, what is the educational centropoly’s incentive to focus on 
improving, for example, achievement gaps evidenced in the NAEP scores? The students will 
remain regardless of personal or institutional achievement (Chubb & Moe, 1990). Given 
widespread public sector job protection and teacher tenure, neither low-performing teachers nor 
poorly performing school leaders are incentivized to prioritize student achievement. Finally, their 
monopoly status coupled with their political clout means that public schools will remain 
unchanged regardless of their performance or lack thereof. Widespread measurable success – 
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PART TWO: Charter Schools in the Shadow of the Centropoly 
Chapter 4 – Charter Schools: History, Context, and Political Considerations 
Introduction 
 Ironically, American charter schools emerged both from, and as an alternative to, the 
educational centropoly. Although now squarely a part of the school choice movement, charter 
schools began as an attempt to reform school districts by flattening their structure. When this 
attempt received no traction, reformers shifted it into a school choice option. Why and how did 
this unique reform occur? 
 To understand the charter school reform movement in America, one must know the 
underlying system from whence it emerged and provided an alternative. In Chapter 2, I provided 
a somewhat detailed history of the system’s formation; here, I first summarize that history 
focusing on the centripetal forces that shifted American public education from small, 
community-based schools to a monopolized, centralized bureaucratic structure which I call the 
educational centropoly. I then summarize the history of the charter school movement. Finally, I 
discuss the theory behind charter schools in three ways: decision-making theories as they apply 
to a school choice reform like charter schools, and public choice theory from both the decision 
makers’ and educational centropoly bureaucrats’ viewpoints. 
The American Public School System in the Context of Formal Organizational Theory 
It is important to examine the literature related to public organizations, of which 
American public schools are a subset, to fully understand the politics of charter school formation 
and growth. As noted previously, little if any research has been conducted on public school 





Public Choice Theory in Context 
In Chapter 1, I provide a detailed analysis of public choice theory in the context of the 
bureaucracy. Here, I discuss public choice theory both in terms of the formal policy decision 
makers (i.e., state legislatures) and in terms of the formal policy decision influencers (i.e., 
educational centropoly bureaucrats). 
Central tenets of public choice theory include that (a) officials, acting rationally, make 
choices based upon private (as opposed to their more public and benevolent) motives; (b) 
complete knowledge allowing for optimal implementation decision-making is largely missing 
from the bureaucratic organization; and (c) in place of knowledge to drive organizational 
decisions, bureaucratic officials seek strategies to maximize their budgets (Downs, 1967; 
Niskanen, 1971). This latter behavior likely is the natural conclusion to officials’ actions based 
on rational incentives. Regarding incentives, Downs (1967, 82) states, “Utility maximization … 
means the rational pursuit of one’s goals…. In order to predict what officials will do, we must 
know their goals.” Downs (1967, 82) juxtaposes social functions– the overt, publicly stated goals 
of an organization –against individual officials’ private motives. Private motives include 
increased power among organizational leaders, job retention and pay increases for employees, 
and others. 
Because humans populate institutions, institutional behavior is fundamentally human 
behavior. However, the layering of the TPS system’s institutional control over humans produces 
layered responses which might strengthen incentives to protect the institution itself. Assuming, 
as with the public choice model, that “every official acts at least partly in his own self-interest” 
(1967, 83), one must take private motives into account when examining the actions of a bureau. 




safety or happiness than for the safety or happiness of others, and, where these come in 
opposition, is ready to sacrifice the interests of others to his own’” (Emphasis added). 
Downs (1967) describes how bureaucracies are formed and how they implement 
decisions based on public choice theory. But how did America’s schools become so 
bureaucratic? 
The Structuring of the American Public Education System 
 American public schools began with both public and private roots as individual, 
voluntary efforts in small communities before the nation’s establishment. It would take many 
decades for schools to be absorbed, by what one might describe as organizational centripetal 
force, into centralized state school systems. 
During early days some private schools were permitted to operate in community 
schoolhouses. In other areas, parents and others volunteered to form and operate schools. 
Legislators permitted and funded still other schools via a “rate bill”, for which only the users of 
the school would pay (Cubberley, 1916, 4). 
Prior to and even after the Revolutionary War, school organizational efforts were 
interwoven with religion but soon began to take on secular characteristics. Cubberley (1922, 
356) points out that the half century after the Revolutionary War could be seen as a transitional 
period from church to state control of education. Alongside this change, community schools 
began organizing into districts. Cubberley (1916, 5-7) describes the evolution of the district 
system from establishment in only small areas to statewide; as more districts formed the web of 
districts spread first across counties and then across states.  
Importantly, the district and state system transformed American public schools into a 




which resident students attended school. As districts grew, district officials further subdivided 
districts into school attendance or “catchment” areas (Cubberley, 1916, 6-8; NCES, The 
Boundary Collection), wherein a student attended the school located in the catchment area that 
includes the student’s residence. State constitutional provisions and/or resulting state statutes 
then codified the monopolistic state-plus-district systems, which continue today (Railey, 2017; 
states’ constitutional education clauses and education statutes). As pointed out by Friedman 
(1955; 1962, 1982), a state government instead could fund but not manage or control individual 
schools. 
The Common School movement occurred at roughly the same time, as the nation grew 
rapidly into one consisting of diverse immigrant groups. Common Schoolers worked to unify the 
nation civically through education. Led by Horace Mann and mixing secular and Protestant 
motives the Common School movement brought about a Protestant-influenced education (hence 
making Catholic immigrant children more suitable citizens in the view of Protestant reformers) 
(van Raemdonck & Maranto n.d., 3; Hess 2010, 87-88) and importing the age-based grade level 
system from Prussia (Hess, 2010, 87-88). 
The Progressive movement brought leaders like Ellwood Cubberley to bureaucratize 
schools specifically to control them (Cubberley, 1916, 14). This influence spread to teacher and 
principal preparation, which were influenced by a uniform teacher preparation model (Maranto 
& Wai, 2020) and implementation of the principles of Scientific Management (Callahan, 1962). 
The Progressives thus pushed for centralizing separate community schools under state, instead of 
community, control. The movement also succeeded in not only training school leadership with a 
focus on efficiency, rather than education, but also in creating the satellite institution of teacher- 




Finally, state constitutions provided a sound structural base for centralization in addition 
to the district monopolistic system. Whereas early state constitutions seldom mentioned 
education, later state constitutions systematized the 50 partially centralized and largely 
monopolized educational systems into their conglomerate, centralized form. 
The layering of districts under centralized state control produced concrete negative 
effects. Drawing on the history of U.S. educational reforms over time, one of the most serious 
overarching effects resulted from combining formalized school segregation, via district and 
school monopolization, with what Downs (1967) and others discuss of formal institutions’ 
centripetal pull. District and school catchment area systems, now constitutionally and/or 
statutorily protected and layered under centralized state control, have trapped large numbers of 
U.S. schoolchildren whose families cannot afford to move to a different district or school. This 
includes, systematically, disadvantaged students and many students of color.38  
Importantly, because districts’ geographic boundaries were now formalized into state 
systems and lay atop a system of racially and economically segregated communities, the 
“common” schools envisioned by Mann, Cubberley, and others governed the educational needs 
of communities whose needs were anything but uniform. Given racial and economic segregation, 
the children enrolled in these uniform schools differed markedly across districts – and among 
districts’ schools – hence rendering education and its delivery unequal. In the mid-twentieth 
century, awareness of this inequality grew and fueled a massive reform movement at the federal 
level. Bradley-Dorsey (forthcoming) argues that federal reform efforts beginning in the mid-
twentieth century, while attempting to reform the extant system of unequal schools serving 
 
38 Indeed, despite widespread acceptance of the Tiebout Effect theory (i.e., that the public can “vote with their feet” 
to pursue public goods such as schooling by moving to different neighborhoods), the Tiebout Effect is also widely 




markedly different student populations, instead increased centralization and top-down control. 
The advent of federal interventions into an already layered, centralized TPS system resulted in 
further layering and more centralization. As pointed out by Downs (1967), increasing a 
bureaucracy’s size and external control mechanisms produces defensive moves on the part of 
bureaucrats, which actions themselves result in rigidity and possibly also in additional size 
increases.  
School Districts: Evolution of Bureaucracy and Size 
Since the early days of district formation and state control, centralized system 
organization also has continued to evolve. Due in large part to federal intervention (Bradley-
Dorsey, forthcoming), district staffing has grown demonstrably. Scafidi (2012, 1) notes that, 
between Fiscal Year (FY) 195039 and FY 2009, K-12 public school enrollment increased by 96 
percent, yet in the same period the public school FTE count grew 386 percent. Scafidi (2017, 3) 
notes that staffing declined from FY 2009 to FY 2012 as a result of the Great Recession; 
however, “[a]fter FY 2012, American … public school employment began growing again at a 
rate faster than increases in student enrollment.”  
The staffing surge accompanies the fact that public school organizations also have 
become more complex. Scafidi states the staffing increase was not driven only or even primarily 
by an increase in the number of teachers. Instead, during this period, “[T]eachers’ numbers 
increased 252 percent while administrators and other staff experienced growth of 702 percent, 
more than seven times the increase in students (Scafidi, 2012, 1).” Both the teaching and 
administrative staff influxes have revealed themselves through new staff titles, such as several 
 
39 Scafidi (2012) began measuring prior to enactment of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 and the 





mentioned in a recent Fayetteville, Arkansas school board agenda. These include federal Title I 
teachers and administrators, in-school suspension staff, child nutrition staff, speech pathology 
staff, film and TV staff, coaching staff, personalized learning staff, gifted and talented teachers, 
and special education teachers (Fayetteville Public Schools, 2019). 
However, states vary widely in the relative size of their TPS organizations. Table 3 shows 
the public school employee load for each of the 50 states, in order of their relative number of 
FTEs. As shown in Table 2, public school FTEs per 100 adults range in the 50 states by a factor 
of more than 2.0, from 1.5 to 3.7. In the example states used previously, Kansas school districts 
have approximately 3.1 FTE employees for every 100 adults, or 1.7 times as many as Arizona’s 
approximately 1.8 local school district FTE employees per 100 adults. As explained later in 
greater detail, I hypothesize that across all states the number of TPS FTEs per 100 adults, an 
important expression of TPS power since adults are allowed to vote, is inversely related to 





Table 3  
State Rankings: 2017 K-12 Public School FTEs per 100 Adults 
Rank State 
TPS FTE Staff 
per 100 Adults  Rank State 
TPS FTE Staff 
per 100 Adults 
1 Nevada 1.50  26 Missouri 2.64 
2 Washington 1.67  27 Utah 2.64 
3 Arizona 1.84  28 Virginia 2.75 
4 California 1.97  29 Indiana 2.75 
5 Oregon 2.04  30 New York 2.76 
6 Florida 2.05  31 Minnesota 2.79 
7 Hawaii 2.07  32 Oklahoma 2.83 
8 Idaho 2.16  33 Kentucky 2.84 
9 South Carolina 2.19  34 Georgia 2.86 
10 New Mexico 2.25  35 New Hampshire 2.86 
11 Louisiana 2.29  36 South Dakota 2.96 
12 Michigan 2.36  37 Mississippi 2.96 
13 North Carolina 2.37  38 Alaska 3.11 
14 Rhode Island 2.38  39 Iowa 3.12 
15 Delaware 2.39  40 Kansas 3.14 
16 Massachusetts 2.40  41 Arkansas 3.18 
17 Pennsylvania 2.40  42 North Dakota 3.20 
18 Alabama 2.41  43 Maine 3.29 
19 Wisconsin 2.46  44 Nebraska 3.29 
20 Tennessee 2.47  45 Texas 3.31 
21 Maryland 2.51  46 New Jersey 3.44 
22 Colorado 2.52  47 Connecticut 3.45 
23 Illinois 2.52  48 Ohio 3.55 
24 Montana 2.53  49 Vermont 3.58 






Charter Schools: Historical and Political Context  
The modern concept of school choice was born in 1955, before most federal intervention 
into the TPS system began, via Milton Friedman’s treatise on school vouchers (Friedman, 
1955).40 41 Friedman’s (1955) call for vouchers reasoned against formal institutional control of 
public schooling, recommending free market control instead. That same year, the Minnesota 
legislature enacted the first tax deduction for education expenses (EdChoice, “America’s School 
Choice Programs…”), but twentieth-century school choice did not arise for several decades. The 
Wisconsin Legislature adopted the first voucher program in 1990, and shortly thereafter the 
Minnesota Legislature adopted the first charter school program (1991). 
Charter School History 
Public charter schools grew out of the modern TPS educational reform movement 
generally, as well as the school choice movement. In 1974, principal-turned-academic Ray 
Budde presented his idea for reorganizing school districts in a paper titled “Education by 
Charter.” Kolderie (2005, 1) describes Budde’s idea as one of reorganizing school districts by 
focusing on their existing schools:  
[Budde had] always had a strong interest in ‘the way things are organized’ 
and in ‘how things work or don’t work in organizations’…. Ray Budde’s proposal 
was actually for a restructuring of the district: for moving from ‘a four-level line 
and staff organization’ to ‘a two-level form in which groups of teachers would 
receive educational charters directly from the school board’ and would carry the 
responsibility for instruction…. 
 
Importantly, Budde’s idea was to flatten an already centralized and layered bureaucracy. 
Though Budde’s idea went almost unheeded, in 1988 American Federation of Teachers president 
 
40 Voucher programs consist of providing public money for parents to place their children in private schools. 






Albert Shanker revived and revised the idea in a speech wherein he endorsed the notion of 
teachers beginning new schools. However, Shanker’s idea, which would have required school 
district authorization and contemplated collective bargaining between unions and districts 
(Peterson, 2010), was short-lived. 42 Instead, Kolderie, Joe Nathan, and others in Minnesota 
transformed the idea into one requiring authorization outside the school district and union 
organizations, at which time Shanker removed his support (Peterson, 2010). The first charter 
school law was born out of this movement in Minnesota in 1991, not long after enactment of the 
first private school voucher law (Wisconsin, 1990). 
Once the Minnesota Legislature had adopted the first charter law, the charter school 
movement caught fire. Generally, charter schools were accepted more rapidly than were 
vouchers. From 1991 through 1998, a total of 34 states plus Washington, D.C. enacted charter 
laws (Hassel, 1999, 1). Currently 45 states plus the nation’s capital have charter laws, while 5 
states have no such measures. (Sixteen states plus Washington, D.C. and Puerto Rico have 
voucher programs.) 
Charter Law Quality Rankings 
Having been influenced by both the centropoly and the private school choice movement, 
all charter laws require charters to be public schools of choice, meaning they are publicly funded, 
nonreligious, and tuition-free, and the school cannot discriminate or be selective in enrolling 
students. Frequently they focus on innovative teaching methods or specialized curricula (Hassel, 
 
42 Other reform efforts also influenced the charter movement. Economic deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s 
generated interest in deregulating other areas of government and some states followed suit, attempting to deregulate 
their public education systems. During the 1980s, Minnesota business and nonprofit organizations examined ways to 
deregulate the state’s public schools (Cohen, 2017). In 1994, the Arizona State Senate considered a bill that would 
have reduced state mandates over the school system. Although that bill died in the House, the Legislature passed its 






1999, 5). Charter school laws differ drastically in strength and quality, however. Hassel (1999, 
18) describes strong statutes as those possessing five characteristics: allowing a body or bodies 
other than a local school district to authorize a charter; allowing multiple parties to begin a 
charter school, granting charters both legal and fiscal independence from school districts, 
exempting charters from most school district laws and regulations, and authorizing the creation 
of many new charter schools (Hassel, 1999, 18).  
Others, such as the Center for Education Reform (CER) and the National Alliance for 
Public Charter Schools (NAPCS), both charter school advocacy organizations, and the American 
Federation for Teachers (AFT), a teachers’ union, differ in the items they define as foundations 
of good charter school state laws. While some scholars doubt the efficacy of state charter school 
rankings,43 here I use the CER model because it places value on charter school laws containing 
fewer government restrictions (Chi & Welner, 2008, 275-276) and is as such better aligned with 
public choice theory.44  
The 2018 CER model ranks states by assigning points based on four elements, assigning 
a letter grade to the various rankings (Candall, 2018, 9-11): 
• Authorizing (15 points possible) – CER assigns points not only on the presence of 
multiple authorizers, but also on the degree of independence authorizers possess. 
• Growth (15 points) – Charter laws lose points if policies (e.g., caps on the number of 
charters) prevent the opening of additional charters or the spread of successful charter 
models. 
 
43 See, e.g., Chi & Welner, 2008.  
44 In promoting the use of a transparent goal set behind any ranking system, Chi & Welner (2008) propose the 
addition of equity as a charter school law component. An admirable quality at its base, adding this to charter school 
laws while ignoring the history of the segregated educational centropoly could be problematic. This, however, is a 




• Operational Autonomy (20 points)– According to CER, states that grant blanket 
waivers from school district rules result in more innovation and more diverse 
educational offerings; points assigned by CER vary based on the degree of autonomy 
a state’s laws allow. 
• Funding Equity (15 points) – States that do not offer at least baseline funding to 
charters inhibit their growth and development; CER therefore varies points based on 
funding equity. 
Table 4 lists the 50 states and the District of Columbia45 in order of their 2018 “grade” 
ranking by CER. Figure 14 maps the CER’s 2018 grade ranking of U.S. state charter laws. CER 
assigns the grades based on the total number of points granted (Candall, 2018, 66). The states are 




45 In the next chapter, I exclude analysis of the Washington, D.C. charter schools. Instead, I examine state political 
influences, wherein generally a governor and legislature determine the existence of charter schools. The U.S. 
Congress and President vote on the Washington, D.C. charter schools, hence considerably changing the political 
landscape. 
46 Both the table and the map show the status of charter school laws as of 2018, at which point only 44 states had 
enacted charter school laws. As noted previously in this paper, currently the charter state count is 45, with the recent 
addition of Vermont’s charter school law. Such a recent addition would not have influenced the findings of this 




Table 4  
List of States and District of Columbia According to 2018 CER National Charter School Law 
Rankings & Scorecard (in order of ranking) 
 
Ranking States 
A District of Columbia47, Arizona, Indiana 
B Michigan, Minnesota, Colorado, California, Florida, New York, 
Massachusetts, South Carolina 
C Texas, North Carolina, Utah, Oklahoma, Missouri, Wisconsin, 
Louisiana, Tennessee, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey 
D Hawaii, Kentucky, Oregon, Arkansas, Delaware, Maine, 
Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, Alabama, Wyoming, 
Mississippi, Rhode Island, Washington 
F Alaska, Virginia, Kansas, Maryland, Iowa 
0 
(No charter school 
law) 


















Figure 14. Map of CER’s 2018 Grade Ranking of U.S. State Charter School Laws 
 
Thus, states with charter laws differ in the strength and quality of those laws. Seen 
alternatively, states differ in their ability or willingness to resist charter school legislation or 
expansion. Among the first wave of charter school laws adopted, the Arizona and Kansas laws 
serve as examples of differing charter law quality. Both states passed their charter school laws in 
1994. However, Arizona’s law allowed for multiple authorizers, did not cap the number of 
charter schools, and allowed charters flexibility (Ziebarth, 2019, [NAPCS], 14). Kansas’s law 
restricted authorization to only school districts.48 Twenty-six years later, Arizona maintains more 
than 500 charter schools, which serve approximately 213,000 students, or almost 20% of 
 
48 CER granted Kansas points for not placing a cap on the number of charter schools; however, allowing only school 




students attending publicly funded schools.49 Kansas has 10 (school district-authorized) charter 
schools, which serve about 3,300 students, or less than 1% of Kansas’ 491,000 public school 
students.50 In 2018, CER ranked Arizona’s charter law first among the 50 states, and Kansas’ law 
forty-second of the forty-four states with charter laws at the time.  
The bases of these ranking differences have led to vastly different charter school 
enrollment proportions among the states. Table 5 lists the 50 states in order of their charter 




49 Arizona Charter Schools Association. (n.d.; © 2020). 




Table 5  








1 Arizona 17.08  26 Indiana 4.47 
2 Colorado 13.26  27 Oklahoma 4.18 
3 Utah 11.29  28 Georgia 4.11 
4 Louisiana 11.29  29 Tennessee 3.76 
5 Delaware 11.25  30 New Jersey 3.51 
6 Florida 10.44  31 Illinois 3.24 
7 California 9.95  32 Maryland 2.67 
8 Michigan 9.62  33 Missouri 2.58 
9 Nevada 9.32  34 New Hampshire 1.97 
10 Pennsylvania 7.97  35 Connecticut 1.92 
11 New Mexico 7.81  36 Maine 1.24 
12 Idaho 7.00  37 Kansas 0.64 
13 Ohio 6.64  38 Wyoming 0.60 
14 North Carolina 6.50  39 Washington 0.22 
15 Minnesota 6.41  40 Mississippi 0.20 
16 Arkansas 6.36  41 Virginia 0.09 
17 Rhode Island 6.20  42 Iowa 0.08 
18 Hawaii 6.18  43 Alabama 0.03 
19 Texas 6.02  44 Kentucky 0.00 
20 Oregon 5.54  45 Montana 0.00 
21 Alaska 5.27  46 Nebraska 0.00 
22 New York 5.12  47 North Dakota 0.00 
23 Wisconsin 4.94  48 South Dakota 0.00 
24 Massachusetts 4.69  49 Vermont 0.00 
25 South Carolina 4.48  50 West Virginia 0.00 
 
Relationship between TPS FTE Rankings and CER Charter Law Rankings 
As shown in Figures 15 and 16, comparing the quality of states’ charter school laws, as 
measured by CER, to the proportions of charter school enrollment and TPS FTEs reveal strong 
patterns. Figure 18 displays perhaps a predictable pattern between the mean charter school 
enrollment per 100 TPS students and the 2018 CER charter school law ranking. Since CER is a 




charter enrollment at the higher ranks. Figure 19, on the other hand, shows an inverse pattern 
between the mean TPS FTE per 100 adults and the 2018 CER charter law ranking. This 
comparison has not been made before, to this author’s knowledge. This descriptive comparison 
illustrates what I suspect to be occurring nationwide – that a relationship exists between TPS 
power measured in proportional staff numbers, and proportional charter enrollment. Overall, the 
correlation between the 2018 CER state rankings and charter enrollment per 100 TPS students is 
0.534.  
 
Figure 15. Mean Charter Enrollment per 100 
TPS Students Enrolled over All Years  
by CER Rank 
(0=No Charter Law; 1="F"; 5="A" 
Figure 16. Mean TPS FTE per 100 Adults  
over All Years by CER Rank 
(0=No Charter Law; 1="F"; 5="A" 
 
 In Chapters 2 and 3, I show how the American public school system became monopolized, 
centralized, and bureaucratized. In both Weber’s political analysis of bureaucracy and public choice 
theory one needs only the third characteristic – bureaucracy – to cement an organization’s power. 
The question that arises from the descriptive analyses in this chapter is simple: Does the centropoly 
itself hold political power over states’ charter schools?  
In Chapter 5, I use the relationships illustrated in Figures 18 and 19 to conduct an empirical 
analysis of the potential power of the educational centropoly to influence the size and strength of 



























states’ charter schools through the mechanism of staff counts. First, though, I present an exploration 
of relevant decision-making theory focused at the policymaker (i.e., elected official) level instead of 
the bureaucratic level. Although Part Two of my dissertation addresses the political power of the 
centropoly, its power is in influencing those who make the policy decisions. One should therefore 
consider decision-making theory in light of the power of the centropoly. Here I briefly examine 
Lindblom’s incrementalism theory, Tsebelis’s veto player theory, and Kahneman and Tversky’s 
prospect theory, and then place them in context with public choice theory.  
As pointed out in Atkinson (2011), Charles Lindblom introduced the theory of 
incrementalism in decision-making in 1959 and continued to expand and revise this theory 
throughout his career. As summarized by Atkinson (2011, 10), incrementalism consists of decision 
makers engaging in “a local search for options” when “certainty regarding outcomes or agreement 
over core values” is absent. This process produces “small adjustments from the status quo premised 
on what is practical and what is possible” (Emphasis added). Lindblom adjusted his theory during 
his scholastic career, expanding it to include what he termed partisan mutual adjustment, a term 
referring to large-scale policy decisions, hence broadening the concept of incrementalism to issues 
larger than everyday, small-scale political decisions. 
Importantly, notes Atkinson (2011, 11), Lustick (1980) agrees with Lindblom’s basic theory 
but limited it by arguing incrementalism “works well in situations where … there are no thresholds 
or sharp discontinuities” (e.g., no drastic departures from past policy, funding, or bureaucratic 
control, which could result in a partisan split among policymakers). Atkinson (2011, 11) notes that 
Howlett and Ramesh (2003) argue incrementalism is but one of several decision-making styles, one 
that is “best suited … to situations in which the policy context is relatively simple, and the 
constraints on decision makers are relatively high.”  
I argue that school choice in America, exemplified by charter schools, represents a “sharp 




past arrangement between policymakers and the centropoly. School districts – as well as the state and 
federal education departments that support and oversee them, see in any school choice option the 
threat of losing student enrollment to these other schools. Importantly, centropoly funding is driven 
by enrollment. Just as importantly, the larger the centropoly’s representation among a policymaker’s 
constituency, the greater is its influence on the policymaker’s vote. Because of the high stakes the 
policy context is not simple nor the constraints on decision makers low. Hence, policymakers 
expecting school choice reform to occur under an incrementalist approach would see disappointment 
instead.  
I argue further that the following two theories of decision-making provide a better basis for a 
policymaker’s choice to pursue school choice. As explained previously, school choice is a direct 
threat to the power of the centropoly in at least three ways. School choice threatens to (a) reduce the 
monopolistic power of the school districts; (b) reduce the centropoly’s material resources (i.e., 
money and staff); and therefore (c) reduce the centropoly’s power in general. 
Tsebelis (2000) contrasts incrementalism with the veto player theory of decision-making 
Tsebelis bases his theory on a constitutional distinction regarding the basis of “support and authority 
for executives, legislatures and judiciaries….” When a constitution provides for independent support 
bases, there are relatively many “veto [control] points” (Atkinson, 2011, 13). In brief, the veto player 
theory maintains a quantitative basis. Atkinson (2011, 13) points to a quotation by Tsebelis (1999, 
605) for clarification: “Significant policy change is more difficult to achieve as the number of veto 
players increases.” 
Atkinson (2011, 13) critiques the veto player theory for being “deterministic and 
mechanical,” stating further: 
In the veto player model policy assumes a stop-and-go quality with a 
heavy emphasis on stop. There is no allowance for mutual adjustment beyond the 




coalition partners, constitutional veto players, and the tyranny of the electoral 
cycle, can be both pragmatic and imaginative. 
 
Atkinson’s critique is apt when considering the policymaker’s decision to support or 
oppose school choice. When considering school choice, the veto player theory applies to 
constitutional, quantifiable characteristics of a state’s political landscape. A state’s constitution 
can and has played an important role in the success or failure of various states’ choice proposals. 
Limiting this discussion to only charter schools, the Kansas constitution serves as an example. 
The Kansas Constitution, Article 6, establishes an independent State Board of Education “which 
shall have general supervision of public schools….” and which is answerable to neither the 
Governor nor the Legislature. Some have noted this constitutional construction might place the 
State Board of Education as a coequal to the three branches of Kansas government in some ways, 
including the control over charter schools. 
As Atkinson (2011, 14) notes, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory 
which addresses the risks associated with decision-making. While risk reduction assessment is 
essential to both incrementalism and prospect theory, the latter argues that decision makers use 
heuristics, such as looking for “similarities in decision situations” to assist them in dealing with 
uncertainty. In short, says Atkinson (2011, 14), “Prospect theory’s most important contribution … is 
the observation that people behave differently in confronting decision situations in which outcomes 
are framed as losses compared to gains.”  
Both the veto player and prospect theories of decision-making fit – to some extent, at least – 
the decision process of enacting charter school laws. The veto player theory, though strict and 
mechanical, can at least serve as an additional incentive (or disincentive) to pursue such legislation, 
depending on a state’s constitutional structure and language. The prospect theory is even more 




Both theories comport with the public choice notion of rational self-interest. Nobel laureate 
James M. Buchanan is noted for describing public choice theory as “politics without romance” 
(Buchanan, 2003, 13). Public choice theory posits that those who have sought election wish to 
maximize their chances of winning the next election (Brennan, n.d.). Given the unromantic, private 
goal maintained by elected policymakers of winning the next election, Brennan comments: 
The logic of public choice theory is that we need to take seriously the fact that 
government is a complex social machine inhabited by people who are, more or less, 
the same as everyone else and in which periodic elections play a central role. The 
critical question for assessing policy is not ‘what policy is the best we can imagine?’ 
but rather, ‘what, from what we know of real-world politics, is the policy that’s most 
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Chapter 5 – Public School FTEs as a Predictor of Low Charter School Enrollment 
Introduction 
Charter schools have served several purposes, not the least of which is to provide an 
alternative to the traditional public school (TPS) system, especially for students who otherwise 
have little chance of leaving their local public school. Charters have grown rapidly but not 
uniformly across states. With vastly different or nonexistent laws among the 50 United States, 
charter school enrollment in 2018 ranged from 0.0 to nearly 17.1 students for every 100 public 
school students enrolled.51  
On another public education metric, in 2016 the 50 states employed from 1.5 to 3.8 full-
time equivalent (FTE) public school staff per 100 adults. Many have known that charter school 
laws differ in strength, which results in charter school enrollment differences. Fewer likely knew 
that the proportion of TPS FTE staff differs among the states by a factor of more than two. Here I 
show that these variables are strongly related, with evidence to suggest why and how these 
relationships exist.52  
U.S. public school politics are complicated and intertwined. More than 200 years of TPS 
history have effectively produced a monopolized, centralized, and layered system. The question I 
pose here is: To what extent has this system itself slowed or stopped school alternatives for 
students otherwise unable to leave their assigned TPS schools? 
Charter schools emerged in the recent past as one such alternative. Most early charter 
school political research, however, stopped short of examining the TPS institution itself. Past 
 
51 The District of Columbia’s 2018 charter school enrollment amounted to 44.3 students per 100 TPS students 
enrolled. I exclude Washington, D.C. from this analysis, primarily because the entire U.S. Congress decides its 
charter school law. Additionally, its enrollment proportion is clearly an outlier when compared to the 50 states. 
52 Some have suggested another research direction, i.e., measures of TPS FTE staff proportional to TPS enrollment 
and to cost per pupil. The purpose for such research would be to assess whether a cost difference exists between 




research primarily addresses party politics, rural-versus-urban politics, teacher unions, and race 
or ethnicity in examining the strength of the charter school movement. 
Only recently have scholars explored the extent to which the TPS system itself might 
prevent the creation of alternative schooling opportunities for those who cannot afford to leave 
the school system. This literature is important, since the conglomerate history of TPS reform has 
produced a layered bureaucracy which, I suspect, frequently works to close off alternatives. I 
seek here to quantify the extent to which this turf-protective tendency is associated with the 
presence or lack of strong charter school laws and resultant charter enrollment. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I review the literature 
regarding charter school politics. I explain my hypotheses in Section 3 and summarize my 
methodology and results in Section 4. Controlling for variables shown in previous research to be 
associated with charter market share and for which multiple-year data exist, I test for an 
association between proportional charter enrollment and the proportional size of TPS FTE staffs, 
to determine whether this measure of the political strength of traditional public schools is 
associated with charter enrollment.  
This comparison carries the potential limitation of how to interpret any relationship 
derived from regressing charter market share on TPS FTE proportion. The likelihood is high that 
the relationship between these two variables is endogenous – that is, the question becomes to 
what extent each of these variables influences the other. On the one hand, according to public 
choice theory the TPS institutional pull would yield a negative association (i.e., charter 
enrollment would be expected to decline as TPS FTE increases, because staff increases result in 
increased TPS system power); on the other hand, a strict zero-sum analysis of staffing 




association (i.e., increased charter enrollment would be expected to decrease TPS FTE 
requirements). Although using panel data and fixed effects regression helps to remove 
endogeneity, I also employ additional analyses to mitigate the problem (Section 5). As I deepen 
the findings, a clearer picture emerges of how the TPS institution might prevent alternative 
learning opportunities offered by charter schools. My ultimate goal is to understand institutional 
inflexibility in the context of learning alternatives and for what it might be doing to students in 
trade for adults’ job security and institutional control. I discuss these and other implications in 
Section 6. 
Literature Review 
 Charter school politics are complicated and attempts to understand them have been 
ongoing since the charter movement’s inception in 1991. Having grown partially out of the 
broader school choice movement, charter schools have inherited some of the political issues 
surrounding school choice in the U.S., though the tension and complexity might play out 
differently among the different varieties of educational choice. Race and partisan politics are two 
of the primary issues, although researchers have studied other issues as well. On the other hand, 
influence by other forces, such as an early connection to teachers’ union officials, might cause 
differences between charter school and private school choice politics.  
 When examining charter school politics, it is important to look beyond the surface. One 
should examine charter school politics as part of the broader category of school choice politics – 
and, since the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, perhaps certain TPS district political issues as 
well. Charter-related political issues also may be divided into several additional subject 
categories, among them partisan and urban versus rural considerations. Third, charter politics 




charter-related politics influence the strength of charter laws as well as whether a charter law 
exists at all. Hence, the mix of a state’s charter politics might influence a continuum of results. 
Potentially Relevant School District Political Issues 
In a paper unrelated to charter schools or school choice specifically, Hartney and Finger 
(2020) conduct a TPS district-level analysis of influences on COVID-19 related reopening plans 
by comparing political measures to other influences such as market forces. The authors find that 
two measures of the political environment – “far more than ‘markets’ or ‘science’” – appear to 
influence school district reopening plans. These measures are the percentage of voters in the 
district’s county who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 general election, and the size of a 
school district as a proxy of teacher union strength. They out-perform both private market share 
and health-related measures in their predictive power regarding reopening plans. This finding 
was in large part related to its pandemic setting. There are, however, parallels one can draw 
between measures Hartney and Finger (2020) examined, and measures related to charter school 
politics – but importantly, Hartney and Finger’s analysis omitted a relevant consideration if one 
is to transfer the analysis to non-pandemic settings. Partisan politics, union politics, and TPS 
(versus other school options’) market share issues could also affect charter school presence and 
strength in states.  
In this study I examine partisan political characteristics based on state-level measures for 
which yearly data were available. Facing a similar challenge with union analysis, I use Right-to-
Work law status as a proxy for union involvement. Noting the authors’ consideration of market 
influences, I include measures for private school enrollment (private competition with charter 




School Choice Politics  
Shuls & Wolf (2015) clearly describe the complications of private school voucher 
politics, noting the simplistic political linkages normally attributed belie their true complexity. 
The politics of school vouchers in the United States are often simplistically and 
inaccurately portrayed as pitting Republicans against Democrats and whites against 
minorities. In reality, the political coalitions that have succeeded in passing private school 
choice laws … consistently involve a blend of African American or Latino Democrats, … 
due to a concern for social justice and an expectation that minority students will benefit, 
along with (mainly) white Republicans, … due to confidence in the effectiveness of 
market-based reforms and the fact that vouchers are a wedge issue for Democrats. 
Opposition … typically comes from both white and minority representatives of the 
educational and Democratic political establishment, along with moderate white 
Republicans representing rural and suburban districts. Thus, the political divide 
surrounding school vouchers is more new versus old, grassroots versus established, and 
both ideological extremes versus the ideological middle than it is a simple case of right 
versus left or white versus black (Shuls, 2018, Abstract).  
 
 Shuls (2018) analyzes the intricate relationships and distinctions between personal and 
political motivations in support for or opposition to school choice programs. In his focus group 
analysis of St. Louis and Kansas City parents, he points out what appears to be a contradictory 
stance. 
….[S]chool choice programs [elicit] mixed emotions from parents. Most 
participants personally support school choice and … [send] their children to 
magnet, charter, or private schools. At the same time, they have reservations 
about broader school choice programs. As Schelling (1978) suggests, these 
individuals act in their own self-interest despite the impact it might have on the 
aggregate. More to the point, they are willing to express choice themselves, but 
deny it to others (Shuls, 2018, 80). 
Explaining this contradiction, Shuls (2018, 88) describes the tension between looking out 
for one’s own children and supporting neighborhood schools. “[I]t is not surprising that many 
parents face a school choice dilemma,” Shuls states. “They want to help the local public schools 




Charter Schools and Partisan Politics  
Wong and Shen (2004) dissect states’ charter laws by examining specific charter law 
characteristics’ relationships with each other and with other factors. The authors find that 
Democratic legislative control results generally in more restrictive laws but is not “universally 
‘anti-charter.’” (Wong and Shen, 2004, 193). Instead, the relationships depend on which charter 
school law characteristics are considered.  
Hassel (1999) earlier found that party politics, particularly Republican control, are 
associated with early passage of charter laws and even more strongly associated with strong 
charter school laws. The author categorizes state legislative party control for the years 1991-1995 
into “high-GOP” and “low-GOP” (Republican control of both chambers in more or less than half 
of these years, respectively). Two-thirds of states (66.7%) with high-GOP legislatures adopted 
charter laws versus 35.0% of low-GOP states. The ratio of high-GOP to low-GOP states passing 
strong laws was nearly 3:1 (44.4% versus 15.0%).  
Hassel (1999) also tracked party control of the governorship in those years. States with 
Republican governors were only slightly more likely to pass charter laws: 42.1% versus 38.7% 
for Democrat governors. The partisan gap widens significantly when examining these 
independent variables for passage of strong charter laws. Republican governor-controlled states 
adopted 36.8% of strong laws to Democrat governor states’ 9.7%.  
Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) conduct a highly detailed state- and district-level analysis. 
They decline to measure associations between partisan politics and passage or strength of charter 
school laws, stating they consider such measures, in the context of the states’ presumably 
representative government, to generally reflect “the preferences and demographics of the 




which the authors measured the association between Republican governors and charter laws and 
found no statistically significant effect after controlling for other variables in the model.  
Urban versus Rural State Politics  
Shakeel and Henderson (2020) review eight years of national survey data and find 
reduced support for charter schools among rural residents. Using a survey instrument the 
researchers find that increased information does not lead to greater charter support among rural 
residents. Hence, the charter school support gap between urban and rural residents appears to 
remain stubborn. Shakeel and Maranto (2019) note that rural communities have fewer charter 
schools, probably since rural communities have greater support for traditional schools and less 
diversity among students, which leads to less demand for schooling options. The authors point to 
the existence of “successful charter school networks” located in large cities and supported by 
“highly educated social entrepreneurs … and educational philanthropies….” On the other end of 
the spectrum, states without charter laws tend to be rural. Similarly, but in mirror image, Hassel 
(1999) and Wong and Shen (2004) find that urbanized areas are associated with strong charter 
laws.  
Charter Schools and Organizational/Bureaucratic Politics  
Several organizations are involved in the operation of traditional public schools (TPSs), 
and their constituencies might have strong opinions regarding charters. These organizations 
include teachers, administrators, and parent groups. The politics of these organizations overlap at 
least minimally if not significantly. The most often-cited example is teachers’ unions. Stoddard 
and Corcoran (2007, 44) find a somewhat complicated relationship between teacher union 
membership proportion and charter school legal status. The higher a state’s percent of teacher 




was to pass a law later and to pass a weaker law. However, once a law was passed, the 
association between teacher union membership and percent of students enrolled in charters was 
positive though weak (when controlling for law strength). Moe (2011) and Maranto (2005) 
suggest the possibility that strong unions might result in weaker public schools, particularly in 
urban areas, leading different state-level coalitions to coalesce against alternative schooling 
options in the weaker-school states. Maranto (2020) further suggests a distinction in school 
politics between strong-union states such as New York and weak-union states in “flyover 
country”, detailing the perhaps-counterintuitive motives of administrators in emphasizing loyalty 
rather than academic quality in their schools.  
Other TPS-related organizations include school board members, school administrators, 
state education departments, school employees (not necessarily union-involved), and parent 
groups. The first two of these organization types are more likely to be organized formally; the 
third (state education departments) is likely to have a neutral or covertly supportive relationship 
with TPSs, differentiated by charter school status in the state; the fourth (employees whether 
union members or not) is likely to be unofficially organized around self-interests related to 
employment and pay; and the fifth group (parents) is likely to be unorganized or at least less 
formally organized, and might be either self- or community-interested, or both53.  
Researchers have studied support or opposition in its relationship to charter schools by 
groups that naturally include parents. Stoddard and Corcoran (2007, 44-45) study charter support 
by racial and ethnic population proportions. They find that states with proportionately larger 
Hispanic populations tended to pass earlier and stronger charter laws. The proportion of Black 
 




population has no significant relationship with “passage, timing, or strength” of charter laws but 
is strongly related with charter enrollment rate.  
Finally, and importantly, two recent studies examine the relationships between TPS 
organizational strength (measured via staffing counts) and charter school law support or strength. 
Tran (2020) examines the characteristics associated with passage of the 2016 Massachusetts 
charter schools referendum and finds no significant association with teacher count. On the other 
hand, Conaway, Scafidi, and Stephenson (2016) examine the associations between voter support 
for the successful Georgia 2012 Charter Schools Amendment and a number of county-level 
characteristics including the percentage of public school employees. The authors find a negative 
relationship between voter support and public school employees as a percent of the county 
population. Although these two studies resulted in different findings, both support the analyses 
contained herein, as will be discussed later. 
 The goal of this chapter is to further elucidate some aspects of organizational 
relationships. Importantly, associations need to be examined between drivers of TPS institutional 
strength and charter school law presence and strength. Although it is frequently agreed that such 
relationships somehow drive school choice support or opposition, this abstract philosophical 
agreement has perhaps resulted in only minimal research in the area. Yet, its examination might 
provide additional information on an organizational predictor of charter law strength and the 
resulting possibility of charter school enrollment changes. This is ultimately what I seek. 
Hypotheses and Data 
Here I compare associations with some, but not all, variables shown in previous research 
to be associated with charter schools. Because I am relying on panel data, I am limited to using 




data across several years, I control for population growth to separate its influence from my 
associations of interest. Finally, recognizing that the potential for bias due to unobserved 
variables exists, I use a state fixed effects model to control for unobserved differences within 
states. I further parse this issue by includng year fixed effects in the panel regression model to 
control for between-state differences across the various years. 
Hypotheses  
I hypothesize that there is an inverse association between TPS system size/strength and 
charter law quality. I proportion the state TPS FTE count against the state’s adult population, 
since adults may vote. I proportion charter school enrollment against TPS enrollment. 
Data  
I employ multiple-year panel data for the 50 states to gain a clearer picture of 
relationships across time between my dependent variable and my variable of interest plus several 
controls. By doing so under a panel data fixed effects regression model, I control for unobserved, 
time-invariant differences within states. Such differences might include intra-state general 
economic conditions. 
Using two rich datasets I determine the covariation between TPS FTEs per 100 adults 
living in the state and charter school enrollment per 100 TPS students enrolled in the state, while 
controlling for several variables. I use the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
Common Core of Data (CCD) for all TPS, charter school, and private school information. The 
CCD, maintained by the U.S. Department of Education and the Institute for Education Sciences, 
consists of an immense set of enrollment, funding, and staffing data for public schools. NCES 
provides the data at several levels, including the state level. The Digest of Education Statistics, 




data and TPS staff and enrollment data used for my analysis.54 I use the U.S. Census Intercensal 
Estimates for data on the population of residents aged 18 and over and the population by race 
and ethnicity. I use data on expenditures per pupil, adjusted for regional cost differences, 
maintained by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. Additionally, I use state-level historical data 




I employ one dependent variable: 4ℎ&67!"(&, which represents a state’s charter 
enrollment in a particular year for every 100 TPS students enrolled that year in the state. I derive 
these variables using data from the NCES Digest of Education Statistics and the U.S. Census 
Intercensal Estimates. Because charter enrollment data were available at the state level only for 
certain school years, my analysis is limited to school years 2000-2006 and 2010-2016. Note I use 
a measurement of charter enrollment that follows the FTE measure by two years, in keeping with 
my hypothesis that TPS power (relative proportional FTE) predicts the charter school enrollment 
probability and would therefore take time to materialize. 
My variables of interest are represented by the vector $%&!" and include the proportion 
and annual percentage change of TPS FTE per 100 adults (for state i and year t). The latter 
variable, reflecting annual percentage change, helps to control for endogeneity between the 
dependent variable and my primary variable of interest. These data also are derived from NCES 
Digest and U.S. Census data. 
Demographic and other controls include the following: 896!" – a racial/ethnic breakdown 
of the percentage of Hispanic students and the percentage of Black or African American students 
 




who do not identify as Hispanic; %",:!/"2!" – the state’s total population, to control for the 
effect of population growth on the analysis; /;7/<29!&=26>!" – the average expenditures per 
pupil, adjusted for regional cost differences; /790&67100%/A!" – the average number of private 
school students enrolled per 100 TPS students enrolled in the state (as noted, data were available 
only for every other year so sample size is compromised when using this variable); /:7,B89=!" 
– categorical variable indicating a state’s legislative and executive office party mix, wherein a 
“1” indicates complete Republican control (governor’s office, both legislative chambers), “2” 
indicates complete Democrat control, “3” indicates a partisan split between the governor’s office 
and the legislative chambers; and “4” indicates a partisan split between the legislative chambers; 
Year variables; and Right-to-Work variables – a vector of variables including a binary variable, 
wherein the value of “1” is given if the state has maintained Right-to-Work status for the 
duration of its charter school law, and an interaction between Right-to-Work status and 
proportional TPS FTE. Note I employ these variables in my second analytical model. I obtained 
this dataset from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL). 
Research Design and Results 
Descriptive Analysis 
 Tables 6 and 7 provide the parameters of the variables I employ in my model. As shown, 
although there are more total observations for the variable of interest (proportional TPS FTE) 
and the controls, the lack of observations in several years for the dependent variable 
(proportional Charter enrollment) limits the observations used in much of the analysis. Also, as 
noted the limited data available for private school enrollment further reduces the sample size in 





Table 6  
Dependent Variable and Controls 
Variable  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Charter Enrollment per 100 TPS Students 650 2.303 2.864 0.000 18.635 
Total Population (log)  15.132 1.012 13.111 17.483 
Pct Black Non-Hispanic 850 10.097 9.417 0.283 37.357 
Pct. Hispanic 850 9.984 9.730 0.683 48.535 
Expenditures per Pupil  
 (Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; avg.) 850 10668 2980 4895 22506 
Expenditures per Pupil  
 (Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; log) 850 9.238 0.268 8.496 10.022 
Private Enrollment per 100 TPS Students 399 11.440 4.853 2.381 28.062 
Party mix 850 n/a n/a 1.000 4.000 
Year 850 n/a n/a 2000 2016 
 
 Table 7 describes attributes of my variable of interest, for all 50 states as well as for 
Right-to-Work (RTW) and non-RTW states. Note there is little difference between the maximum 
values for RTW and non-RTW states, but the minimum value for RTW states is approximately 
0.4 FTE per 100 adults less than the minimum value for non-RTW states. 
 
Table 7  
Variable of Interest, Right-to-Work States 
FTE Per 100 
Adults Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
RTW States 391 2.760 0.506 1.127 3.898 
Non-RTW States 459 2.660 0.463 1.591 3.890 
All States 850 2.706 0.485 1.127 3.898 
 
Initial Research Design 
I employ OLS regression methods on panel data to determine the association between 
charter market share and TPS strength once I have controlled for a number of state-level 
characteristics examined in previous studies. My equation is as follows: 
4ℎ&67!"(& = (# + C$($$%&!" + C&(&896!" + =)()%",:!/"2!"




where 4ℎ&67!"(& is the charter school enrollment per 100 TPS students enrolled for state i in 
year t+2 (two years after measurement of $%&!"); $%&!" is a vector of variables representing 
proportional TPS FTE per 100 Adults, including the proportion and annual percentage change of 
public school FTEs per 100,000 adults;	896!" is a vector of variables representing the percentage 
of non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics in a state;	%",:!/"2!"	is a variable representing the log of 
total population; /;7/<29!&=26>!" is the average expenditures per pupil, adjusted for regional 
cost differences;	/790&67100%/A!" is the average number of private school students enrolled 
per 100 TPS students enrolled;	/:7,B89=!" is a categorical variable indicating a state’s 
legislative and executive office party mix, wherein a “1” indicates complete Republican control 
(governor’s office plus both legislative chambers), “2” indicates complete Democrat control, “3” 
indicates a partisan split between the governor’s office and the legislative chambers; and “4” 
indicates a partisan split between the legislative chambers; Year is the school year; and	3 
represents the error term. 
Initial Results 
 Table 8 displays the results. Here I include the analysis without, and then with, the 
private enrollment proportional variable. As mentioned, private enrollment data were available 
for only every other year, thus decreasing the sample size considerably. Exhibiting the results in 
this manner illustrates the effect of the smaller sample size as well as the variables themselves. 
 As shown, all other things being equal, a state’s TPS FTE per 100 adults has nearly a 1:1 
inverse association to charter enrollment per 100 TPS students, significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level (p=0.01), when employing Model A (without private enrollment). In other 
words, a one-unit increase in the FTE per 100 adults is associated with a 0.951-unit decrease in 




enrollment but without per-pupil expenditures), the coefficient expands to a loss of nearly 1.6 
charter students per 100 TPS students enrolled (p=0.05). Model C, the complete model (albeit 
with a smaller sample size), results in a slightly smaller (1.534-unit) decrease (p=0.05). Hence, 
the null hypothesis (i.e., no inverse association between proportional charter enrollment and 
proportional TPS FTEs) is rejected, regardless of the model employed. 
 The table also shows a highly statistically significant (p=0.01) association between 
charter enrollment per 100 TPS and the following variables: 
• Total population (log) – All other things equal, controlling for total population 
separates the effect of population growth from the associations of interest. As shown 
in Table 5, a 1 percent increase in total population is associated with an 
approximately 0.08- to 0.10-unit increase in charter enrollment per 100 TPS students, 
depending on the model examined. 
• Percent of the population who are of Hispanic descent – Growth in the Hispanic 
population is associated with an increase in proportional charter enrollment. Every 
percentage point increase in Hispanics in a state is associated with an increase of 
approximately 0.4 to 0.5 students in charter enrollment per 100 TPS students 
depending on the model chosen, all things equal. Note again that the proportion of 
Hispanics within states has been increasing over time. 
All other things equal, with every percentage point increase in Black Non-Hispanics in 
the state, charter enrollment per 100 TPS students is predicted to decrease by nearly 0.4 units in 
any of the models, although only the Model A coefficient is statistically significant. Note that 
Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) earlier found a strong relationship between Black proportion and 




that over time, the within-state percentage of Blacks has decreased in recent years, while the 
within-state charter enrollment has generally increased. Hence, this negative coefficient, highly 
statistically significant but not large, could be an artifact of these shifting demographic patterns 
over time.55  
Private enrollment per 100 TPS students is associated with a 0.13- (Model B) or 0.14- 
(Model C) unit charter school enrollment reduction (p=0.05). Expenditures per pupil appear to be 
associated with a statistically insignificant charter school enrollment reduction.  
The variables regarding political party mix appear to weakly reinforce previous research, 
if at all. All other things equal, and relative to years in which Republicans held the governor’s 
office and the majorities of both state legislative chambers, a partisan split among these three 
state-level elective office groups is associated with approximately a 0.3- to 4-unit decrease in 
charter enrollment per 100 TPS students (p=0.05 or p=0.1 in Model A; p>0.1 otherwise). 
  
 
55 It is also possible that other factors influence this coefficient. A newly developing literature is surfacing which 
provides evidence that African American adults might oppose TPS alternatives for the rational reason that they are 
successful in seeking and keeping employment in the TPS system. See, e.g., Carroll, Cheng, Maranto, & Teodoro 
(In Press), who advance a “theory of race and ambition, in which individuals respond rationally to their career 
opportunities in light of their own racial identities (Carroll, et al., 4).” The authors posit that “Black individuals 
perceive public education administration as offering promising career opportunities relative to other alternatives 
(Carroll, et al., 3-4),” largely because of the job discrimination experienced historically by African Americans. 





Table 8  
Original Model: Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment in the 50 States 
Charter Enrollment  
per 100 TPS Students 
(A) 50 States; PP Exp 
Incl; Priv Enr Excl 
(B) 50 States; PP Exp 
Excl; Priv Enr Incl 
(C) 50 States; Both PP 
Exp and Priv Enr Incl 
TPS FTE/100 Adults -0.951*** -1.572** -1.534**  
(0.344) (0.617) (0.617) 
Ann. Pct. Change: TPS FTE/100 0.017* 0.014 0.016  
(0.010) (0.021) (0.021) 
Total Population (log) 7.944*** 9.906*** 9.419***  
(1.762) (2.838) (2.858) 
Pct Black Non-Hispanic -0.384*** -0.341 -0.358  
(0.146) (0.234) (0.234) 
Pct. Hispanic 0.524*** 0.461*** 0.408***  
(0.086) (0.131) (0.136) 
2.Party-All 3 Dem. (Gov, Sen, Hs) -0.050 -0.115 -0.037  
(0.182) (0.279) (0.284) 
3.Party: Split, Gov Different -0.311** -0.346 -0.309  
(0.156) (0.249) (0.250) 
4.Party: Split, Sen/Hs Different -0.323* -0.35 -0.289  






2003.year 0.086 -0.075 0.079  











2009.year 0.484 -0.2 0.529  






2011.year 0.681 -0.128 0.641  






2013.year 1.071** 0.209 1.058  
(0.526) (0.452) (0.787) 
2014.year 1.166** 0.328 1.234  











Expenditures per Pupil  








Private Enrollment  





Constant -106.7*** -142.5*** -121.2***  
(28.120) (41.910) (44.860) 
Observations 649 300 300 
R-squared 0.643 0.642 0.645 
Number of state_id 50 50 50 





Additional Analyses and Results 
As stated previously, the analyses shown in Table 8 are limited by suspicion of 
endogeneity between the dependent variable, proportional charter enrollment, and the primary 
independent variable of interest, proportional TPS FTE per 100 adults. Although I address this 
endogeneity to some extent with the panel data fixed-effects method and the secondary variable 
of interest, annual percentage change in TPS FTE per 100 adults, some concern remains.  
 Two characteristics researched in previous literature are absent from my initial analysis: 
union strength and rural versus urban populations. Multiple-year data were unavailable for both 
of these variables. Creating a workaround for the rural-versus-urban population spread in states 
might be challenging because of changing demographic patterns in some areas. Hence, this study 
is limited to some extent by the exclusion of this control variable. Later I discuss the extent to 
which the rural nature of states might be reflected in the RTW analyses. 
  However, union strength can be proxied using states’ status with regard to Right-to-Work 
(RTW) laws. RTW laws grant states the authority to determine whether workers must join a 
labor union to get or keep a job (NCSL, n.d.). States without RTW laws therefore allow unions 
to determine this employment criterion. As of this writing, 27 states had RTW laws and 23 states 
allowed unions to control union membership as an employment criterion (NCSL, n.d.).  
I create a binary variable wherein a “1” indicates a state is a RTW state, and a “0” 
indicates the state does not have a RTW law. While most of states’ RTW laws have existed for 
decades, a few states passed their laws only recently. To account for this issue in my data, I 
count as “RTW states” only those states that had RTW laws in place during the entire span of 
time their charter school laws have been in place. This restriction results in 23 states with RTW 




With the RTW variable added, I first segregate the two state groups and redeploy my 
models for each group. Along with the strong, highly statistically significant, negative coefficient 
of interest in the original model resulting from the 50-state analysis, anecdotal evidence 
influenced me to not expect to see a large difference between the two state groups. Anecdotally, I 
knew that Arizona and Kansas both were RTW states, even though they were on opposite ends 
of the spectrum on both my dependent variable and my independent variable of interest. 
However, my analysis lacks the potentially important consideration of states’ relative rural 
nature. Therefore, I make no hypothesis about the relationship between proportional charter 
enrollment and proportional TPS FTE staff.  
Table 9 shows the results of this initial RTW analysis alongside those of the original 50-
state regression. As shown, the two state groups diverge dramatically. All other things being 
equal, states with RTW laws show an even larger negative and statistically significant 
association between proportional TPS FTE and proportional charter school enrollment than did 
all 50 states in the initial models; further, states without RTW laws show a positive, though 
statistically insignificant, association between these two variables.  
The fact that the coefficient for my variable of interest diverges so dramatically between 
the two groups of states provides evidence that endogeneity between the dependent variable and 
the variable of interest is minimal. If the relationship were endogenous, one would expect similar 
coefficients between the two groups of states.56 
This was not the only coefficient by which the two state groups differ. All other things 
equal, racial and ethnic differences are more pronounced and party politics make a bigger 
 
56 Some experts recommend controlling for endogeneity in situations such as these by regressing the year-to-year 
change in the variables in question. While here I use another way to control for endogeneity which reveals important 




difference in RTW states (though statistical significance varies depending on the model used). 
Moreover, a pattern emerges between the two state groups when examining the year fixed 
effects, with RTW states generally showing negative associations for most years while non-RTW 







Table 9  
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Segregated-States Analysis 
 Model A: PP Exp Included; Priv Enr Excluded  Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl. 
Charter Enrollment  
per 100 TPS Students 
(1)  
50 States; No 
RTW Distinction  
(2)  
States w/  
RTW Laws 
(3)  
States w/o  
RTW Laws 
 (1)  
50 States; No 
RTW Distinction  
(2)  
States w/  
RTW Laws 
(3)  
States w/o  
RTW Laws 
TPS FTE/100 Adults -0.951*** -2.801*** 0.331  -1.534** -3.910*** 0.0869  
(0.344) (0.672) (0.356)  (0.617) (1.145) (0.624) 
Ann. Pct. Change: TPS FTE/100 0.017* 0.029* -0.004  0.016 0.053 -0.025  
(0.010) (0.016) (0.011)  (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) 
Total Population (log) 7.944*** 17.75*** 7.057***  9.419*** 21.25*** 8.117**  
(1.762) (3.603) (2.063)  (2.858) (5.895) (3.250) 
Pct Black Non-Hispanic -0.384*** -0.799*** -0.308*  -0.358 -0.471 -0.533*  
(0.146) (0.220) (0.176)  (0.234) (0.364) (0.287) 
Pct. Hispanic 0.524*** 0.770*** 0.313***  0.408*** 0.716** 0.113  
(0.086) (0.178) (0.082)  (0.136) (0.273) (0.136) 
2.Party-All 3 Dem. (Gov, Sen, Hs) -0.050 -0.788** -0.198  -0.037 -0.527 -0.435  
(0.182) (0.358) (0.194)  (0.284) (0.562) (0.307) 
3.Party-Split, Gov Different -0.311** -0.830*** -0.546***  -0.309 -1.062** -0.668**  
(0.156) (0.268) (0.175)  (0.250) (0.459) (0.278) 
4.Party-Split, Sen/Hs Different -0.323* -0.623* -0.059  -0.289 -0.433 -0.059  
(0.176) (0.357) (0.172)  (0.277) (0.568) (0.269) 
2002.year 0.095 -0.304 0.27  
   
 
(0.222) (0.371) (0.229)  
   
2003.year 0.086 -0.762* 0.549**  0.079 -0.873* 0.626**  
(0.234) (0.396) (0.242)  (0.269) (0.470) (0.280) 
2004.year 0.151 -1.277*** 0.912***  
   
 
(0.256) (0.456) (0.263)  
   
2008.year 0.452 -3.175*** 2.323***  
   
 
(0.434) (0.879) (0.426)  
   
2009.year 0.484 -3.431*** 2.546***  0.529 -3.986*** 3.131***  
(0.453) (0.913) (0.446)  (0.662) (1.435) (0.645) 
2010.year 0.686 -3.398*** 2.826***  
   
 
(0.468) (0.942) (0.462)  
   
2011.year 0.681 -3.735*** 2.990***  0.641 -4.485*** 3.541***  
(0.481) (0.970) (0.482)  (0.715) (1.561) (0.706) 
        
        




Table 9 (cont.) 
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Segregated-States Analysis 
        
2012.year 0.883* -3.686*** 3.262***  
   
 
(0.499) (0.998) (0.501)  
   
2013.year 1.071** -3.705*** 3.509***  1.058 -4.596*** 4.235***  
(0.526) (1.059) (0.529)  (0.787) (1.714) (0.783) 
2014.year 1.166** -3.872*** 3.758***  1.234 -4.791*** 4.602***  
(0.553) (1.111) (0.558)  (0.830) (1.790) (0.836) 
2015.year 1.410** -3.855*** 4.081***  
   
 
(0.580) (1.163) (0.586)  
   
2016.year 1.524** -4.037*** 4.333***  
   
 
(0.613) (1.226) (0.620)  
   
Expenditures per Pupil  
(Adj. Reg. Cost Difcs.; log) -1.086 3.793** -3.523*** 
 
-1.498 4.416* -4.665*** 
 (0.748) (1.593) (0.709)  (1.137) (2.480) (1.086) 
Private Enrollment  
per 100 TPS Students 








Constant -106.7*** -287.1*** -74.77**  -121.2*** -344.7*** -74.3  
(28.120) (57.080) (31.880)  (44.860) (94.850) (49.380) 
Observations 649 298 351  300 138 162 
R-squared 0.643 0.65 0.751  0.645 0.661 0.769 
Number of state_id 50 23 27  50 23 27 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   
 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 




 To provide greater precision, I employ an interaction between states’ FTE per 100 adults 
and their RTW law status. I revise my model as follows, by adding an interaction variable. 
!ℎ#$%!" = '# + )$'$*+#!" + )%'%,-$!" + .&'&+/0123/4!"
+ .'''35%364-2#.4$7!" + .('(3%-8#$%100+3;!" + ))')31%0<,-.!"
+ .*'**+#_>+?!" + @ 
where	*+#_>+?!" is the interaction between proportional TPS FTE and the binary variable 
wherein a “1” represents states with RTW laws. 
As shown in Table 10, the association between proportional TPS FTE and proportional 
charter enrollment results in an additional coefficient of -1.267 (p=0.1) or -1.001 (p>0.1), 
depending on the model, in states with RTW laws, all things equal. This coefficient is additive to 
that of states without such laws, i.e., -0.5 or -1.125 (p>0.1). Hence, in states with RTW laws, a 
one-unit increase in TPS FTE per 100 adults is associated with a 1.8- to 2.1-unit decrease in 
charter enrollment per 100 TPS students enrolled. The joint significance test shows the addition 
of the interaction term, along with the FTE variable, is significant at the 95% confidence level in 






Table 10  
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Interaction  
 
Model A: PP Exp Included; Priv Enr Excluded 
 
Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl.  
Charter Enrollment  




























Difference in effect of TPS 
FTE/100 Adults on Charter Enr: 




    (0.646)     (1.077)  
TPS FTE/100 Adults -0.951*** -2.801*** 0.331 -0.496  -1.534** -3.910*** 0.0869 -1.125  
 (0.344) (0.672) (0.356) (0.414)  (0.617) (1.145) (0.624) (0.758)  



















Total Population (log) 7.944*** 17.75*** 7.057*** 7.535***  9.419*** 21.25*** 8.117** 8.937***  
 (1.762) (3.603) (2.063) (1.770)  (2.858) (5.895) (3.250) (2.906)  
Pct Black Non-Hispanic -0.384*** -0.799*** -0.308* -0.412***  -0.358 -0.471 -0.533* -0.374  
 (0.146) (0.220) (0.176) (0.146)  (0.234) (0.364) (0.287) (0.235)  
Pct. Hispanic 0.524*** 0.770*** 0.313*** 0.534***  0.408*** 0.716** 0.113 0.421***  
 (0.086) (0.178) (0.082) (0.086)  (0.136) (0.273) (0.136) (0.137)  



















3.Party-Split, Gov Different -0.311** -0.830*** -0.546*** -0.297* -0.309 -1.062** -0.668** -0.285   
(0.156) (0.268) (0.175) (0.155) 
 
(0.250) (0.459) (0.278) (0.251)  
4.Party-Split, Sen/Hs Different -0.323* -0.623* -0.059 -0.281 
 
-0.289 -0.433 -0.059 -0.273   
(0.176) (0.357) (0.172) (0.177) 
 
(0.277) (0.568) (0.269) (0.278)  






Table 10 (cont.) 
Potential Predictors of Charter School Enrollment: Right-to-Work Law Interaction  
 
 Model A: PP Exp Included; Priv Enr Excluded  Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl.  
Charter Enrollment  
per 100 TPS Students 

















2002.year 0.0951 -0.304 0.27 0.066       
 (0.222) (0.371) (0.229) (0.222)       
2003.year 0.086 -0.762* 0.549** 0.055  0.079 -0.873* 0.626** 0.058  
 (0.234) (0.396) (0.242) (0.233)  (0.269) (0.470) (0.280) (0.270)  
2004.year 0.151 -1.277*** 0.912*** 0.101       
 (0.256) (0.456) (0.263) (0.257)       
2008.year 0.452 -3.175*** 2.323*** 0.37       
 (0.434) (0.879) (0.426) (0.435)       
2009.year 0.484 -3.431*** 2.546*** 0.403  0.529 -3.986*** 3.131*** 0.464  
 (0.453) (0.913) (0.446) (0.454)  (0.662) (1.435) (0.645) (0.666)  
2010.year 0.686 -3.398*** 2.826*** 0.6       
 (0.468) (0.942) (0.462) (0.469)       
2011.year 0.681 -3.735*** 2.990*** 0.59  0.641 -4.485*** 3.541*** 0.577  
 (0.481) (0.970) (0.482) (0.482)  (0.715) (1.561) (0.706) (0.719)  
2012.year 0.883* -3.686*** 3.262*** 0.798        
(0.499) (0.998) (0.501) (0.500) 
     
 
2013.year 1.071** -3.705*** 3.509*** 0.969* 
 
1.058 -4.596*** 4.235*** 0.985   
(0.526) (1.059) (0.529) (0.527) 
 
(0.787) (1.714) (0.783) (0.791)  
2014.year 1.166** -3.872*** 3.758*** 1.061* 
 
1.234 -4.791*** 4.602*** 1.156   
(0.553) (1.111) (0.558) (0.555) 
 
(0.830) (1.790) (0.836) (0.834)  
2015.year 1.410** -3.855*** 4.081*** 1.305** 
     
  
(0.580) (1.163) (0.586) (0.581) 
     
 
2016.year 1.524** -4.037*** 4.333*** 1.408** 
     
  
(0.613) (1.226) (0.620) (0.615) 
     
 
Expenditures per Pupil  


















Constant -106.7*** -287.1*** -74.77** -102.3***  -121.2*** -344.7*** -74.3 -115.8**  
 (28.120) (57.080) (31.880) (28.140)  (44.860) (94.850) (49.380) (45.260)  
Observations 649 298 351 649  300 138 162 300  
R-squared 0.643 0.65 0.751 0.645  0.645 0.661 0.769 0.646  
Number of state_id 50 23 27 50  50 23 27 50  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
~ Joint Significance Tests: Variables of Interest: 
Variables of Interest Model A: PP Exp Incl.; Priv Enr Excl. Model C: Both PP Exp and Priv Enr Incl. 
1-Difference in effect of TPS FTE/100 Adults 
on Charter Enr:RTW vs. non-RTW States; 









I seek to quantify the relationship between a state’s traditional public school (TPS) 
organizational power, measured by the proportion of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff per 100 
adults in the state, to the presence and strength of the state’s charter school law, measured by the 
proportion of charter students enrolled per 100 TPS students enrolled two years after the FTE 
proportional measure. Using a panel data fixed effects model and controlling for variables 
researched in previous literature for which I could obtain multiple-year data or a suitable 
alternative, under the interaction model I show evidence of a strong and statistically significant 
(p=0.05) inverse association between a RTW state’s FTE per 100 adults and its later charter 
enrollment per 100 TPS students in the complete model. The ratio between the two variables is 
approximately -2.1:1; translated, this means that in RTW states every unit increase in the 
proportion of FTE per 100 adults is associated with a 2.1-unit decrease in charter enrollment per 
100 TPS students in those states. 
 Two control variables show highly statistically significant (p=.01) associations under the 
complete interaction model. The total population and the percent of Hispanic population 
variables produced positive coefficients. Although highly statistically significant, neither of these 
coefficients was large. No other associations, including the percent of non-Hispanic Black 
population, were statistically significant. The percent Hispanic variable coefficient was 
consistent with findings of previous literature (Stoddard and Corcoran, 2007). The percent Black 
non-Hispanic coefficient was negative and insignificant, and hence it does not appear to be 
consistent with previous literature (Stoddard and Corcoran, 2007). However, the proportion of 
Black population within states has been shrinking relative to other racial and ethnic groups, so 




The controls dealing with partisan split between the governor’s office and the two 
legislative chambers were negative, relative to all being held by Republicans or Republican 
majorities. However, they were statistically insignificant, making this finding generally null and 
therefore inconsistent with previous literature.  
I am left with the limitation that I have not specifically analyzed rural versus urban 
differences across states with respect to proportional charter school enrollment, while also 
considering my TPS power variable of interest. Using the RTW distinctions provides some level 
of rural-vs.-urban comparative analysis, since strong unions dominate in largely urban states. 
However, no state is completely rural nor completely urban, and thus additional study would be 
necessary to conclude with certainty that the RTW-related findings clearly and solidly reflect 
rural-vs.-urban differences. While questions remain regarding the extent to which the relative 
rural versus urban nature of these states is driving the differences, it is possible that these 
differences are (a) related to a state’s RTW (and, hence, union) status, and/or (b) reflected in the 
year fixed effects. In revisiting the segregated results of RTW versus non-RTW states (Table 7, 
Models 2 and 3), clear differences are apparent between the two state groups. The positive 
association between log of population growth and proportional charter enrollment growth for 
RTW states is more than twice the size of that for non-RTW states. Likewise, there are sizeable 
distinctions between the coefficients for percent Black and percent Hispanic. All of these within-
state coefficients, though different for the two state groups, still reflect the same sign – e.g., if 
negative for one group, the association is also negative for the other group. The year fixed effects 
analysis, using between-states measures, shows a different outcome, with associations generally 
being negative for RTW states and positive for non-RTW states. However, these differences do 




charter enrollment and TPS power as expressed through my variable of interest. Additional 
research might better illuminate the true situation. 
Importantly, these results comport with the literature on two states’ charter school 
politics. Tran (2021) finds that teacher count is not associated with the successful passage of the 
2016 Massachusetts charter school referendum, while Conaway, Scafidi, and Stephenson (2016) 
find to the contrary that public schools exhibited protective power against the 2012 Georgia 
Charter Schools Amendment Referendum through their staffing numbers. Notably, Georgia is a 
RTW state, while Massachusetts is not. 
Additionally, regarding union politics, Maranto (2005, 2020) and Moe (2011) find that 
the TPS institution behaves differently in non-union states. Following the results of this analysis 
coupled with both public choice theory and the previously mentioned literature on non-union 
states, one might conclude that the TPS institution steps up to defend itself against interlopers. 
My major finding provides strong quantitative evidence that the monopolistic, 
centralized, and multi-layered government institution of public education in at least RTW states 
has considerable influence on whether and to what extent the charter school alternative can be 
predicted to exist. In these states the larger the state’s TPS institution, the lower the chance for 
charter educational opportunities to exist. Again, the difference between RTW states and non-
RTW states suggests that in RTW states, the institution steps up to protect itself against the 
charter alternatives. Moreover, based on this analysis, it appears that bureaucratic, rather than 
partisan, politics affect charter school strength in RTW states. 
This finding is particularly concerning for disadvantaged students in RTW states, 
including low-income students and students of color, who find themselves unable to opt out of 




charters, disadvantaged students will continue to have no choice but to attend the public school 
assigned to them. Under this system, it is important to remember that the staff in public schools 
which are filled with students who have no other options – i.e., the institution itself – has little to 
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Chapter 6 – Charter School Closing Inequities: Do Automatic Closure Laws Target Black 
Charter Entrepreneurs and Black Students?57 
Introduction 
Inherent to the charter school innovation is the explicit bargain that in exchange for 
substantial autonomy, charter schools which fail to succeed will face closure, providing strong 
incentives for successful outcomes in serving students (Hassel, 1999). Many charter schools do 
in fact close, though this itself poses issues regarding racial inequity. Paino, Boylan and Renzulli 
(2017) report that from 1994 to 2005, 1-4% of charter schools closed each year (n=416), with 
78% doing so in their first four years after opening. Controlling for variables including school 
age, size, measured achievement, and free and reduced lunch percentage of students, they find no 
relationship with the percentage of Hispanic and white enrollment, but that a 1% increase in 
African American enrollment is associated with a 1% increase in the likelihood of closure. 
Controlling for age, region, and urbanicity, an 80% African American school would have a 
roughly 4.6% annual likelihood of closure, compared to roughly 2.3% for an 80% white school. 
This research does not consider the race of the charter school founder as a predictor of school 
closure, nor probe potential interaction between race and regulatory policy environment. Both 
merit consideration, especially given research finding that African American operators are less 
likely to be awarded charters, particularly where the regulatory barriers to receiving a charter are 
high (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020).  
Here, using data from the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ElSi), a National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) web application, as well as successful (i.e. accepted) 
petitions to open charter schools submitted between 2010-2020, we can provide better 
 





understanding of whether charter schools that were founded by African Americans or serve a 
greater percentage of African American students are more likely to close, and specifically 
whether the regulatory barriers that disparately preclude market entry also disproportionately 
predict market exit. As detailed below, the data do in fact indicate that charter schools started by 
African Americans and serving relatively more African American students are more likely to 
close, particularly in states with automatic closure provisions.  
Literature Review 
An enormous literature details multifaceted racial inequities in public schools. Prior work 
explores a wide range of phenomena including student discipline, student attainment and 
achievement, and even hiring and promotion into school leadership (works within Milner & 
Lomotoy, 2014; Carroll, Cheng, Maranto & Teodoro, In Press). Importantly, policymakers 
created charter schools in part to empower teachers (Cheng, Maranto, & Shakeel, 2020; Maranto, 
2015) and to serve marginalized ethnic communities (works in Fox and Buchanan, 2014), but 
even more to close “achievement gaps” as measured by test scores, particularly for African 
American and Latinx students (Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 2003). Quantitative evidence 
indicates that certain charter schools have succeeded in closing achievement gaps (Cheng, Hitt, 
Kisida & Mills, 2017), though researchers have questioned the means used (Golann, 2015), and 
whether mere increases in test scores have substantial positive long term impacts on student 
success (Ladner, 2018). An additional literature offers widely contested findings regarding non-
academic impacts from market-based approaches to public schooling, including increased use of 
charter schooling. For example, former Chicago Public Schools CEO and U.S. Secretary of 
Education Arne Duncan (2018) argues that closing low performing urban schools and replacing 




and their communities, but offers long term benefits by improving human capital among the least 
well off, offering the most disadvantaged students greater opportunities. In contrast, Morel 
(2018) contends that closing district schools and replacing them with charter schools politically 
disempowers communities of color and reduces public employment of African American 
education professionals. In short, the impacts of charter schooling on racial equity involve 
complex, intellectually contested terrain. 
An important, but less examined aspect of neoliberal education reform begins with the 
reality that it is not only traditional public schools which close after failing to meet specified 
criteria. A small, but important literature examines charter school opening and closing, processes 
which are indeed central to the charter school model, which proposes autonomy in exchange for 
accountability, including the threat of closure. Market accountability is one part of this: if a 
school fails to please, parents may leave for other options, closing a school by voting with their 
feet. Yet charter schools also face administrative accountability, disciplinary or closure decisions 
made by the public bodies such as school boards and state departments of education which 
granted their charter. In practice administrative accountability may involve highly detailed 
rulemaking and complex administrative judgements on the part of regulators regarding whether 
performance is adequate (Hassel, 1999; Maranto, 2015). In practice such decisions, like charter 
authorization decisions, may reflect the biases of regulators. There is indeed a longstanding 
literature regarding how regulation has systematically disadvantaged African Americans in 
housing (Massey & Denton, 1998), professional licensure and employment (Dorsey, 1983; 
Friedman, 1962), and civil service employment (King, 1995). More recently, some have applied 




While factors including financial stability and academic performance influence charter 
school approval and survival, research also finds empirical evidence of discrimination in policy-
making systems. Using a Critical Race Theory approach to study the charter authorizing process 
in post-Katrina New Orleans, Henry (2021) argues that a charter authorizing process ostensibly 
engineered as “neutral, benign, and objective” is in fact a gatekeeping mechanism that tends to 
privilege elites and punish people of color. Some African American charter entrepreneurs have 
echoed these concerns. The African American Charter Schools Coalition formed in Philadelphia 
in 2020, their mission predicated on the observation that Black-led charters face greater obstacles 
regarding oversight, expansion, and renewal (Graham, 2020).  
Regarding charter school closing, studying Florida charter schools, Jameson (2017) finds 
that measured school academic performance, age, and size all correlate negatively with the 
likelihood of closure: in short newer, lower performing, and smaller charters are more likely to 
close. Roughly in accord with these findings, coding charter applications from eight states and 
New Orleans in the 2010-18 period, Kingsbury, Maranto and Karns (2020) find that charter 
schools associated with charter management organizations, which are more often led by whites, 
are less likely to close. Comparing the large and lightly regulated Arizona charter sector to 
comparable traditional public schools, Milliman (2016) finds that lower academic performance 
increases the likelihood that charters will close, while having no impact on other public schools. 
Milliman does not explore the impacts of race. In contrast to Milliman, in a quantitative and 
qualitative study of North Carolina charter school closures, Paino, Renzulli, Boylan and Bradley 
(2014) find evidence that market (parent exit), financial, and administrative/bureaucratic factors 
influence closing; academic results do not have direct impacts. Similarly, in their study of Ohio 




achievement affects the likelihood of charter closure, but considerable evidence that integrated 
schools are more likely to survive while predominately white and predominately African 
American schools are more likely to close. Also studying the Ohio charter market, though over a 
different time period, Carlson and Lavertu (2016) find evidence that mandatory closures of low 
performing charter schools in Ohio led to modest improvement in charter school academic value 
added over time, as Duncan (2018) indicated regarding closings of low performing district 
schools in Chicago.  
Here, we build on prior research regarding the role of race and regulation in shaping 
charter school markets, to test four hypotheses regarding disparate impacts of charter school 
closing on under-represented communities. We add to the literature by specifically assessing 
whether automatic closure disparately impacts charter founded by or serving African Americans. 
Automatic closure laws establish “tripwires” that require authorities to close the school. In non-
automatic closure states, charter schools are subjected to individualized progress and procedural 
assessments likely involving opportunities to correct deficiencies.  
We hypothesize that: 
• H1: The proportion of African American students in a charter school will be 
positively related to charter school closure.  
• H2: In states with automatic charter closing provisions, schools serving larger 
percentages of African American students will be relatively more likely to close. 
• H3: Charter schools started by African American educational entrepreneurs will be 
relatively more likely to close than those started by other educational entrepreneurs.  
• H4: In states with automatic charter closing provisions, schools started by African 





Testing our hypotheses requires data about which charter schools closed, the student 
demographics of charters schools, and the race of the charter school founder. The first two 
variables are available through the Elementary/Secondary Information System (ElSi), a National 
Center for Education Statistics (NCES) web application. Notably, ElSi does not provide 
information about why certain charter schools closed, but rather the timeframe in which they 
operated or ceased operating. Ideally, we would be able to disentangle the precise reason why a 
charter ceased operations--- whether it comes about from charter revocation, voluntary closure, 
transition into a traditional public school or some other factor---to bring greater clarity to our 
analyses. This is a limitation in that we lack data to determine whether closings reflect market or 
regulatory accountability. Policymakers like Keegan (2001) and academics like Maranto (2015) 
and Yancey (2000) suggest that that regulatory warnings or sanctions may reduce enrollment 
from parents, suggesting interactions between the two processes. Nevertheless, whether a 
cessation of operations is a market sanction (i.e. low enrollment or financial mismanagement) or 
was imposed by external public authorities, the data can test our hypotheses.  
Identifying the race of the charter school founder is less straightforward. We code the 
race of the “contact person” identified on the petition originally submitted for charter 
authorization. The “contact person” (henceforth, founder) is likely the most deeply involved of 
the founding members, and their race serves a reasonable proxy for the composition of the 
founding group (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020).58 Charter school petitions do not identify 
 
58 Notably, the degree to which the race of the “main contact” reflects the demographics of the founding entity 
becomes obscured when the individual is affiliated with an education management organization (EMO) or charter 
management organization (CMO), which can be large, dynamic organizations that employ hundreds of staff. 
Affiliation with an EMO or CMO is not systematically recorded on charter school petitions or in any publicly 
available dataset, so we do not code this information. Our inability to control for this variable could increase the 




the racial identity of the founder. We code race by performing an internet search of the name of 
the founder---along with their affiliated charter school or other details identified in the petition 
(e.g. place of residence or occupation)---and then use our best judgement to identify their racial 
classification. McCormick et al. (2015, p. 393) conclude that such practices tend to deliver 
accurate results, and that social scientists should consider social media “as a valuable source of 
demographic information to answer relevant social science questions.” To assess the validity of 
our coding process, a second coder reviewed a random sample of 50 charter petitions and coded 
the race of the main point of contact. The two coders agreed in 45 of 50 cases (intercoder 
agreement=90%). 
Charter school petitions are not publicly housed in one domain. Rather, custody of 
records varies from state to state, and typically from authorizer to authorizer. To access as many 
records as possible, we collected all publicly available records of charter schools that opened 
between 2010-2020.59 In states with charter school laws that did not make records publicly 
available, we contacted the state charter agency to request records of charters opened between 
2010 and 2020, and then issued official public record requests if our informal request went 
unanswered. A summary of where the charter petitions were collected from is available in Table 
11. Several requests were denied, and we therefore do not have petitions from all states with 
charter schools. Moreover, because custody varies by authorizer, the petitions we received are 
typically not the universe of successful petitions submitted in that state, but the ones submitted to 
a particular authorizer or authorizers. In all, we collected 925 successful petitions from 24 states.  
  
 





Table 11  
Charter Petitions by State and Means Collected 
State Petitions 
Collected 
How Petitions were Procured 
AR 39 Publicly available 
AZ 70 Publicly available 
CT 6 Shared upon request 
CO 51 Received through public records request 
DE 9 Publicly available 
FL 180 Publicly available 
GA 26 Shared upon request 
ID 26 Shared upon request 
IN 25 Publicly available 
LA 22 Shared upon request 
MA 27 Publicly available 
MO 8 Publicly available 
NC 92 Publicly available 
NJ 16 Shared upon request 
NM 23 Publicly available 
NV 3 Shared upon request 
NY 146 Publicly available 
OH 10 Publicly available 
OK 19 Publicly available 
OR 5 Shared upon request 
PA 30 Received through public records request 
RI 8 Shared upon request 
SC 68 Received through public records request 
TX 16 Publicly available 
 
 
We use Education Commission of the States (ECS) data (2018) to determine whether a 
state employs automatic closure laws and the timing of such laws, as seen in Table 12. Notably, 
ECS categorizes four states (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, and Washington) as automatic 
closure states despite statutory language that suggests otherwise. We classify these four states as 
automatic closure states in our estimates, and confirmed that the underlying results are not 





Table 12  
Automatic Closure Provisions by State 
State  Statute  Year Adopted  
Alabama  Ala. Code § 16-6F-8  2016  
District of Columbia  D.C. Code § 38-1802.13; D.C. Code § 38-
1802.13  
1996  
Florida   Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1002.33  2012  
  
Indiana  Ind. Code Ann. § 20-24-2.2-2  2011  
Kansas  Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-1907 (transferred to 72-
4209)  
1994  
Louisiana  La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 17:3992  1997  
Michigan  Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.507  2009  
Missouri  Mo. Ann. Stat. § 160.405(8)(b)  1998  
Nevada  Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 388A.300  2013  
New Hampshire  N.H. Rev. Stat. § 194-B:16  1995  
Ohio  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3314.35  2006  
Oklahoma  Okla. Stat. ttl. 70, § 3-137  2015  
Rhode Island  R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 16-77  2016  
South Carolina  S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-110; S.C. Code Ann. § 
59-40-111  
2002 
Tennessee   Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-122  2014  
Texas  Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 12.027; §12.063; and 











Utah  Utah Code Ann. § 53A-1a-510 (repealed)  
New Statute: 53G-5-503  
2014  
Washington  Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.710.200  2013  
 
Results 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 use data from ElSi. Therefore, to test these hypotheses, we use data 
that encompasses all charter schools that were opened between 2010-11 and 2018-19, the most 
recent year for which ElSi provides data. We treat schools operating as charters in that year as 
open, whereas we consider schools opened in 2010-11 or thereafter but closed or operating as 





Descriptive statistics (Table 13) lend support to our hypotheses. Among majority Black60 
charter schools, 604 of 1,894 (31.9%) closed. Among all other charter schools, 900 of 4,058 
(22.2%) closed. Moreover, automatic closure appears to impact schools differently depending 
upon their racial composition. In settings with automatic closure, 409 of 1,063 (38.5%) charters 
that served a majority Black student body closed, compared to just 205 of 1,404 (14.6%) of other 
charters. By comparison, majority-Black charters in states without automatic closure were 2.7 
percentage points less likely to close compared to all other schools (23.5% to 26.2%).  
 
Table 13  
Charter Closure Rates by Student Racial Composition and Automatic Closure61 
Student 
Demographics 
Number and % of 
Charters that Closed 
Number/% of Charters that 
Closed in States with 
Automatic Closure 
Number/% of Charters that 
Closed in States Without 
Automatic Closure 













In our fully specified linear probability model62 we express closure as a function of the 
proportion of African American students63, automatic closure, and an interaction between those 
 
60 For this and other analysis that uses student demographics, we use ElSi data to calculate the average proportion of 
African American enrollment during the time period beginning in 2010-11 and ending 2018-19.  
61 Observations from states with automatic closure are categorized as “without automatic closure” if they were 
closed before the automatic closure provision was enacted. For example, a Florida charter that closed in 2011-12 
would not be scored as subject to automatic closure. A Florida charter that closed in 2012-13 or later would be 
scored as subject to automatic closure. Our method might occasionally misapply an automatic closure label, as 
school closing information and automatic closure statutes are not defined at a more granular level than the year in 
which they occurred. These “bubble” schools (i.e. the closure school year overlaps with the timing of the automatic 
closure statute) comprise less than 1% of our dataset.  
62 ElSi tables specifically denote whether a school has ceased operations. For reasons unclear, sometimes ElSi 
reports zero enrollment during years in which the school is reported to be operating, although the estimates generally 
return to a non-zero number after one year. As a sensitivity test, we omitted schools reporting zero enrollment 
during 2018-19 from the analysis. None of the estimates change in practical terms, and none change in terms of 
statistical significance.  
63 The proportion of African American students is the average proportion of African American students in the school 




two terms, as well as year opened fixed effects, formally: 
 Y= β1AASharei + β2AutoClosureit + β3AASharei*AutoClosureit + β4 YearOpenedi + εit 
In this and subsequent models, we include a state fixed effect when automatic closure is 
not featured as an explanatory variable, but omit it if automatic closure is featured. Given the 
high degree of collinearity between the two variables, the inclusion of both variables makes 
interpretation of the automatic closure variable challenging.64  
  
 
64 As a sensitivity test, we check how inclusion of both state FE and automatic closure impacts our estimates. The 
impact of the proportion of African American students changes appreciably in model II, increasing from .0003 to 
.0019 (p=.01). In model III, the coefficient for that variable becomes positive (.0012) and remains statistically 
significant (p=.01). All told, the models affirm our hypothesis about a disparate impact from automatic closure, 




Table 14  
Racial Composition and Closure Regression Estimates65 
 I II III 








Automatic Closure - -.1143*** (.0117) 
-.2586*** 
(.0154) 




- - .0045*** (.0003) 
Year Opened Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
State Fixed Effect Y N N 
Obs. 5,458 5,458 5,458 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. 
 
Regression results (Table 14) support our hypotheses. Among all states, a one percent 
increase in the share of African American students is associated with a .19 percentage point  
increase in the likelihood of closure after controlling for year opened and state in which the 
charter school operates. In the fully specified model (column III), a one percent increase in 
African American students is associated with a .20 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of 
closure in states without automatic closure. However, in states with automatic closure, a one 
percent increase in African American students is associated with a .45 percentage point relative 
increase in the likelihood of closure compared to states without automatic closure, all else equal. 
Illustratively, the estimates indicate that a charter school in which 30% of the student body is 
African American has a 6.0 percentage point lower likelihood of closure compared to a school 
with no African American students if the school is in a state without automatic closure. 
However, if the 30% African American school is in a state with automatic closure, the school has 
a 7.5 percentage point greater likelihood of closing compared to the school with no African 
American students.  
 




Hypotheses 3 and 4 require us to utilize the dataset that we constructed through soliciting 
charter school petitions and coding the race of the main point of contact. Unadjusted differences 
(Table 15) hint at the possibility that automatic closure is more punitive to Black charter 
entrepreneurs than to others. Among schools started by African American charter leaders in 
states that utilize automatic closure criterion, 53.2% closed compared to just 20.4% of charters 
founded by others. The incidence of closure is also greater among African American 
entrepreneurs in states that do not utilize automatic closure criterion, but the difference is 
substantially less pronounced; Among charters founded by African American leaders in states 
that do not utilize automatic closure, 18.9% of charters closed compared to 11.5% of charters not 
founded by African Americans.  
 
Table 15  
Charter Closures by Race and Automatic Closure66 
Point of Contact Number and % of 
Charters that Closed 
Number % of Charters 
that Closed in States 
With Automatic Closure 
Number % of Charters that 
Closed in States Without 
Automatic Closure 
















66 Observations from states with automatic closure are categorized as “without automatic closure” if they were 




To obtain linear probability estimates we express closure as a function of the race of the 
founder and other characteristics, formally: 
 
Y= β1AACharterEntrepeneuri + β2AutoClosureit + β3AACharterEntrepeneuri*AutoClosureit + 
β4AAStudentSharei+ β5AAStudentSharei*AutoClosureit + β6 YearOpenedi + εit 
 
Though we already assessed the correlation between student racial composition and 
closure, we include them in certain iterations of this model. African American charter 
entrepreneurs are more likely to serve African American students (r=.49), so the inclusion of 
both variables is important to understand which variable, if either, is driving any observed effect.  
Once again, we omit the state fixed effect from models that include automatic closure, as 
their inclusion makes it challenging to interpret the automatic closure coefficient.67  
Linear probability estimates support our hypotheses that charter schools started by 
African American charter entrepreneurs are relatively more likely to close than those started by 
other charter entrepreneurs, and that they are disproportionately impacted by automatic closure 
mandates. Specifically, after controlling for state and year opened, charters with African 
American founders are 18.1percentage points more likely to close compared to others. Estimates 
also support our hypothesis that African American founders are disparately impacted by 
automatic closure. Compared to states and time periods without automatic closure, African 
American founded charters are 23.7 percentage points more likely to close after controlling for 
whether the founder is African American, automatic closure, and year opened.
 
67 As a sensitivity test, we included state fixed effects in all models to observe how it effects our variables of 
interest. No variables of interest drop in their significance level. However, the interaction term in column IX 




Table 16  
Founder Race and Closure Regression Estimates  













































































Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N Y 
State Fixed 
Effect Y N N N N Y N N N Y 
Obs. 767 767 767 649 649 717 717 717 649 649 






Insofar as student and founder demographics are correlated, regression analysis indicates 
that both factors independently predict closure, although the finding is sensitive to model 
specification. Moreover, the estimates generally affirm that automatic closure disparately 
impacts both Black founders and schools that serve a larger share of African American students 
even when accounting for the other variable.  
Discussion 
Linear probability estimates support our four hypotheses. Charter schools are more likely 
to close when they educate more African American students and more likely to close when they 
were founded by an African American charter entrepreneur. Moreover, automatic closure 
mandates appear to disparately impact charter schools that serve more African American 
students or those founded by an African American charter entrepreneur.  
Notably, recent research (Kingsbury, Maranto & Karns, 2020) indicates that African 
American charter leaders are less likely to be affiliated with charter management organizations 
or education management organizations compared to other charter leaders. Information about 
association with an EMO or CMO were not systematically or consistently recorded in the charter 
petitions that we accessed, so we cannot conclude to what degree that might explain the higher 
incidence of closure or disparate effect from automatic closure laws. Given that EMOs and 
CMOs have expertise in navigating state charter laws and regulations, it is plausible that schools 
affiliated with them are less likely to be closed down, and that this phenomenon may help 
explain the greater incidence of closure among charters founded by African Americans.  
Our examination is limited by the fact that we did not distinguish between different 
states’ automatic closure laws. Automatic closure provisions vary widely across states. While 




which tripwires they use. For example, several states require automatic closure if a school fails to 
meet certain academic performance expectations, but those expectations differ. Some states 
allow for discretion at the charter school level – allowing a charter school serving a highly 
challenging student body to set and meet performance standards realistic to the specific students 
being served. Other states require all charter schools meet uniform performance or growth 
standards, regardless of the specific student body served. Another auto-closure trigger, relating to 
charter school fiscal conditions, varies among the states from specific (i.e., a charter’s failure to 
meet accepted accounting principles) to language that allows greater interpretation (i.e., a charter 
displays a “pattern” of unacceptable accounting practices). Thus, the condition of automatic 
closure is not the same from state to state, and further study could discern whether stricter auto-
closure laws exacerbate the racially inequitable outcomes that we observe in our study.  
Regardless of underlying cause, our observations about how student and founder 
demographics predict charter school closure should raise alarm among policymakers and 
advocates. For those who intrinsically value charter schools as institutions authentically rooted in 
and empowering the communities they serve, our findings---in conjunction with the observation 
that African Americans are disproportionately denied charters in the first place---raise concern 
about the degree to which charter schooling has strayed from its original mission. For those who 
view charter schools as a means to better outcomes rather an end unto themselves, our findings 
raise questions about whether charter school closures---especially those caused by automatic 
closure laws---benefit the students they serve. Concerns are elevated by the fact that African 
American staff tend to benefit African American students, often in ways not detected by test 




vein, perhaps charters founded by African American charter entrepreneurs benefit African 
American students in ways not detected by test scores.  
Our findings also invite fresh deliberation about the merits of automatic charter closure 
laws. As of 2011, approximately 1 in 5 charters that close do so because they fail to meet 
performance benchmarks (Consoletti, 2011). The topic of automatic closure laws is contentious 
even among pro-charter organizations, as it exposes a rift between the “market model” and 
“regulatory model” of charter schooling (Hess, 2004). The National Association for Charter 
School Authorizers “encourages states to establish in statute a process for automatic closure of 
underperforming charter schools” (NACSA, n.d.). The National Alliance for Public Charter 
Schools echoes that sentiment (Ziebarth, 2015), whereas the Center for Education Reform posits 
that foot voting by parents should ultimately arbitrate questions of school quality (Consoletti, 
2011). Overall, the evidence base to support their differing positions is mixed. On one hand, a 
study in Ohio indicated that charter school students academically benefited in math when their 
schools are shuttered due to mandatory closure laws (Carlson & Lavertu, 2016). On the other 
hand, a national study indicates that more stringent charter regulatory regimes are not predictive 
of stronger achievement on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) exams (Wolf 
et al., 2021).  
Clearly, this is an area on which more research is needed, so that policymakers can make 
better informed choices regarding how to best balance possible tradeoffs between two values 
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 Scholars cannot examine reform completely without understanding prior history. Neither 
can they contemplate reform and all its effects without considering the structure in which 
reforms occur. Education reformers too frequently proceed with research and recommendations 
while remaining unaware of the history and structure of the system they wish to reform. As a 
result, ambitious and well-intended reform efforts are frequently at least unsuccessful and at 
most resource-wasteful and even harmful to those they are intended to help. In this paper, I fill 
an important niche in education reform research. Here I offer explanations regarding how and 
why large, interconnected bureaucracies, once established, tend to protect themselves against 
change. I suggest that nothing else is as important in explaining structurally why decades of 
increased funding and various reforms implemented by well-intended policymakers have failed 
to improve either achievement or equity. 
I have provided a summary of the American public school system’s formation. I show 
how, from the country’s individual community-led beginnings, myriad centripetal and other 
forces joined together to amass a monopolized, centralized, and layered bureaucratic structure I 
call the education centropoly. 
 Using historical, theoretical, and empirical analyses, I provide evidence that the 
educational centropoly has done much to segregate the country’s disadvantaged students, 
trapping them not only in schools layered under levels of centralized bureaucracy and run by the 
centropoly’s growing number of bureaucrats, but also in a uniform, inflexible system that serves 
student bodies that are anything but uniform. As a result, the educational centropoly has done 




 Chapter 1 argues that public choice theory provides not only an adequate, but perhaps the 
most suitable basis for examining the centropoly. Chapter 2 provides a somewhat complete 
history of the system’s formation, addressing how the underlying district system is both 
monopolized and segregated and how it became centralized at the state level. Chapter 3 shows 
how, upon realization that the underlying system did not serve low-income students, the federal 
government intervened with its most significant education reform ever – ESEA and its 
reauthorizations, including NCLB; yet, these reforms served mainly to grow the centropoly. In 
Chapter 3 I show empirically that ESEA is associated with large staff increases while 
improvement in achievement is nebulous. My later review of NAEP scores, including Sousa and 
Armour’s (2016) synthesized review of ESEA Title I effectiveness studies, indicates 
disadvantaged students showed only scattered academic improvement.  
 If the system cannot improve, what of attempts to leave it? Can America’s student body, 
including and especially disadvantaged students, find schools that give them not only an 
education, but a foundation in agency for their adult lives? 
 In Chapters 4-6, I turn to aspects of the charter schools reform movement as one avenue 
of exit from the centropoly but one that decidedly takes political support to achieve. Chapter 4 
reveals how charter schools were born of both the public school system and the school choice 
movement. Importantly, the chapter also discusses various theories of how elected policymakers 
decide to make major (as opposed to incremental) changes. Once again, public choice theory 
imposes its rational self-interest basis. Taken to its logical extent, and – as evidenced empirically 
in Chapter 5 – considering the potential strength of the centropoly in at least the Right-to-Work 
states, it is little wonder that charter school laws vary so widely in quality and strength. Chapter 




relative state and local traditional public school staff counts and charter school enrollments in 
Right-to-Work states. Chapter 6 provides another concerning aspect in the analysis of the 
centropoly’s potential effect on exit from its stronghold. We show that the presence of automatic 
closure laws – likely a “compromise” to get charter school legislation passed – are significantly 
associated with disproportionate likelihood of closure of Black-operated and Black-attended 
charter schools.  
 It is not sufficient to say only that reformers are well-intentioned. I must add that those 
employed in the centropoly are not ill-intentioned. These bureaucrats are by-in-large not bad 
people; instead, they are normal people. This is a frequent theme of public choice-based work: 
when faced with a choice between the “greater good”, as reflected in the public motives of an 
organization, and private benefits, as reflected in individuals’ life considerations, public choice 
dictates that private motives win the contest. Reformers might be advised to stop trying to 
change the centropoly bureaucrats, who are rewarded for choosing based on their private 
motives, and instead work to create alternatives to the centropoly. Over time, those parents least 
well served by the centropoly will depart for those alternatives; those well-served will remain.  
 However, my research indicates at least two problems regarding this latter point. First, 
the centropoly works diligently to prevent alternatives from being created. In addition to 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this paper, which detail a mechanism as well as results of opposition by the 
centropoly, one need only read about school choice legislation around the country to gain an 
understanding of how centropoly bureaucrats, and those beholden to them, work to prevent such 
alternatives. Importantly, the system teaches an ideology of conformity to its values and to 




 Second, preventing alternatives means those ill-equipped – or ill-disposed – to advance in 
the one-size-fits-all school system will continue to suffer. For thousands of students – including 
those disadvantaged by poverty or disability as well as those who choose to be different for 
myriad reasons – the centropoly severely limits their opportunities to flourish. 
 In researching this paper, I noted several areas in need of additional research. These 
include a concerning finding in Chapter 3. In examining the associations between ESEA 
reauthorizations and state and local public school staff (FTE) increases, I find that a state’s 
population in poverty (logged) is highly statistically significantly associated with an FTE 
decrease. In other words, poverty is associated with a decrease in FTE, separate and apart from 
the law changes and the population control variable. This finding might simply reflect the fact 
that poverty increases and staffing might decrease during a state-level economic downturn. 
However, the finding seems to indicate that the poorest students might be served by fewer, not 
more, public school staff; hence, further research is necessary to determine the detail behind this 
association. In my Chapter 5 examination of the association between relative TPS staff counts 
and charter school enrollment, I note that an increase in a state’s Black population is associated 
with a decrease in charter school enrollment. Given that this finding is contrary to expectations, 
but that in recent decades the Black population proportion in states has been decreasing, this 
could simply be an artifact of the relative population decrease. However, it might also represent 
evidence supporting a newly developing literature postulating that African American adults 
might oppose TPS alternatives for the rational reason that they (the adults) are successful in 
seeking and keeping employment in the TPS system. See, e.g., Carroll, Cheng, Maranto, & 




 I wish to study other aspects of this structural phenomenon as well. In Chapter 3, I 
mention concern with the accountability system created by NCLB, but accountability in general 
deserves much further study. I propose studying accountability from the perspective of 
examining how the centropoly itself prevents effective accountability – perhaps above and 
beyond that of a “regular” government service. Several scholars and I have begun to examine 
educational accountability by first comparing educational accountability research to general 
government accountability research, and I hope to continue that work. Of course, this research 
would be but a first step in evaluating whether the centropoly could ever be held accountable, 
given that it consists of a layered structure of interconnected bureaucracies. Additionally, there is 
much to be done in terms of the involvement of higher education – both in its own right, as well 
as its relationship to the centropoly in terms of educator training. One straightforward project 
would be to update the findings contained in Greene (2010) which detail the disproportionate 
growth in university administrative staff. 
 In the meantime, students continue to churn through the educational centropoly. 
Disadvantaged students, in particular, move through the system with little to show for their time. 
Scholars must continue to research the structural impediments to educational success, and they 
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Elementary and Secondary Education Act: Initial Authorization, Reauthorizations, Amendments, and Flexibility Waiver 
Year 
Law/ 
Authorization Brief Summary 
Agencies/Boards 
Created 
1965 P.L. 89-10 Initial Enactment; created Titles I-V; Title 1-A (Basic Grants, focused on 
concentrations of low-income students in LEAs) is primary focus. Also 
provides federal funding for library materials, "supplemental educational 
services", education research, and SEAs (state boards of education [34 CFR § 
300.41]).  
1965 P.L. 89-313 ESEA-related amendments affecting impact aid districts; created new program 
to provide grants to State Education Agencies (SEAs) for education of children 
with disabilities ("SEA grants"). 
 
1966 P.L. 89-750 First reauthorization; extended Title I-A program for two years (through FY 
1968), modified Basic Grant program formula which expanded program size 
and increased cost; eliminated a grant program scheduled to go into effect FY 
1967 so its approximately $400 million became available for Basic Grants. 
Added Title VI (Education of Handicapped Children). 
Bureau for Education 
and Training of the 
Handicapped; National 
Advisory Committee on 
Handicapped Children 
1968 P.L. 90-247 ESEA Amendments of 1967: extended Title I-A program through 1970, 
authorized use of advanced appropriations for ESEA programs; changed Basic 
Grant formula (minimally) and re-added a modified Special Incentive Grant 
formula (not funded until FY 1971). Added Title VII (Bilingual Education). 
Advisory Committee on 
the Education of 
Bilingual Children 
 
1970 P.L. 91-230 Second reauthorization: ESEA Amendments of 1969: extended most ESEA 
programs through FY 1973; modified Basic Grant program, expanded Special 
Incentive Grant program and included provision for Special Grants to Urban 
and Rural Schools - to provide additional funding to areas with high 
concentrations of disadvantaged children. 
 








Authorization Brief Summary 
Agencies/Boards 
Created 
1974 P.L. 93-380 Made changes to the three Title I-A formulas (Basic Grants, Special Incentive 
Grants, and Special Grants), many of which reflected concern that the formulas 
favored urban over rural areas. Authorized research on bilingual education by 
the National Institutes of Health, provided for several categorical programs. 
National Advisory 
Council on Bilingual 
Education, National 
Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES), 
Advisory Council on 
Education Statistics 
1977 P.L. 95-112 (Carter) One-year extension of ESEA to study programs before next 
comprehensive reauthorization.  
1978 P.L. 95-561 Third reauthorization: Extended Basic Grants for five years, made changes to 
allocation formulas "generally benefitting urban areas." (CRS Report R44898)  
Added a new Concentration Grant program, providing supplemental funds to 
areas with especially high concentrations of low-income students. Converted 
Special Incentive grant program to federal matching grant program for state 
compensatory education expenditures beginning FY 1980. Dropped Special 
Grant program. 
"[M]ultiple new offices, 
councils, committees, 
and commissions" 




1981 P.L. 97-35 Fourth reauthorization: (Reagan) Education Consolidation and Improvement 
Act of 1981 (ECIA) - Largely unsuccessful attempt to convert ESEA programs 
into block grants, resulting in only one block grant which replaced a few small 
categorical education programs. ESEA Title I became Chapter I of the ECIA 
(Financial Assistance to Meet Special Educational Needs of Disadvantaged 
Children). Consolidated remainder of ESEA into ECIA Chapter 2 
(Consolidation of Federal Programs for Elementary and Secondary Education). 
"[Increased] states' flexibility in controlling allocation of federal funds" 
(Collins, 2014, 18).  
1983 P.L. 98-211 Clarification and clean-up amendments.  









Authorization Brief Summary 
Agencies/Boards 
Created 
1988 P.L. 100-297 Fifth reauthorization: Generally extended programs through 1991. Repealed 
the ECIA, returned provisions back to ESEA, modified various ESEA 
programs, added several new programs. Reauthorized Title I-A as Title I, 
Chapter I-A. Updated Basic Grant formula, made significant changes to 
Concentration Grant formula in favor of rural areas. Authorized creation of 
national evaluation standards for Title I programs and required states to 
establish student performance standards for Title I students. 
Upgraded NCES status 






1994 P.L. 103-382 Sixth reauthorization: (Clinton) Improving America's Schools Act - changed 
existing Basic Grant and Concentration Grant formulas; added two new 
formulas - Targeted Grants and Education Finance Incentive Grants, both 
attempting to target Title I-A funds more effectively on concentrated areas of 
low-income students. Merged the SEA grant program for students with 
disabilities into the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 
removed full funding requirements for SEA programs. Tied federal funding to 
requirement that state standards be consistent with national (Goals 2000) 
standards. (President Clinton pursued Goals 2000 in parallel with this 
reauthorization.) Required states to define "Adequate Yearly Progress" (AYP). 
States are permitted to determine “cut scores” – the test scores at which 
proficiency and other achievement levels are met.  
2002 P.L. 107-110 Seventh reauthorization: (G.W. Bush) No Child Left Behind Act - 
significantly changed underlying programs by requiring stepwise achievement 
improvement in states and accountability programs: state testing in math and 
reading for Grades 3 - 8; required states to meet AYP goals (established by 
each state individually, but 100% of students in each state were required to 
reach “proficiency” level in math and reading achievement by 2014), increased 
teacher education requirements, provided consequences for schools that fail to 
meet AYP goals. Maintained and made small changes to Basic Grant, 








Authorization Brief Summary 
Agencies/Boards 
Created 
2011 Offered by 
USDOE 
Flexibility waiver authorization: "In September 2011, the U.S. Department of 
Education (ED) offered each State educational agency (SEA) the opportunity to 
request flexibility on behalf of itself and its local educational agencies (LEAs) 
and schools. This voluntary opportunity provided ... flexibility from certain 
[NCLB] requirements ..., in exchange for rigorous and comprehensive State-
developed plans designed to improve educational outcomes for all students, 
close achievement gaps, increase equity, and improve the quality of instruction. 
Each SEA with an approved request that will expire at the end of the 2014–
2015 school year may request a three-year renewal of ESEA flexibility, 
through the 2017–2018 school year."   
2015 P.L. 114-92 Eighth reauthorization: (Obama) Every Student Succeeds Act (Note: NCLB 
expired in 2007, but ESEA was not reauthorized until December 10, 2015.). 
ESSA revamped NCLB's language to be more permissive as to determining 
and measuring student achievement improvements  
Sources: CRS Report R44898, Updated July 17, 2017, titled "History of the ESEA Title I-A Formulas", retrieved 2/29/20 from 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44898.html#_Toc488412031 ; Collins, C.A. (2014). READING, WRITING, AND 
REGULATIONS:A Survey of the Expanding Federal Role in Elementary and Secondary Education Policy, Mercatus Center 
Working Paper No. 14-24, August 2014, p. 18; USDOE, "ESEA Flexibility Renewal" (n.d.). Retrieved 3/2/20 from 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/flex-renewal/index.html ; and “Goals 2000 and ESEA” (n.d.). Clinton Digital 
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Using Annual % Change Variables in Place of Regular Proportion Variables 
Ann Pct Change Charter Enr  
per 100 TPS 
Model A: Model C: 
PP Exp Included; 
Priv Enr Excluded 
Both PP Exp and 
Priv Enr Included 
Ann. Pct. Change: TPS FTE/100 0.906  (8.753) 
    
(3.111) (10.170) 
Total Population (log) -0.484 -3.004  
(5.922) (10.740) 
Pct Black Non-Hispanic -0.132 -0.121  
(0.487) (0.847) 
Pct Hispanic -0.441 -0.503  
(0.318) (0.561) 
Exp per Pupil (Adj. Reg'l Cost Difcs; log) 1.288 2.359  
(2.952) (5.462) 
2.Party: All 3 Dem. (Gov, Sen, Hs) -1.091 -1.092  
(0.682) (1.281) 
3.Party: Split, Gov Different -0.0276 -0.14  
(0.566) (1.086) 





















2013.year -2.371 -1.819  
(2.045) (3.500) 












2017.year -2.275 -1.433  
(2.417) (4.160) 
Private Enrollment per 100 TPS Students 
 
0.251   
(0.248) 
Constant 5.516 31.58  
(100.100) (181.300) 
Observations 421 226 
R-squared 0.095 0.101 
Number of States 42 42 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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